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WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON.

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I.

HAVING frequent occasion, in the prosecution of certain historical studies, to refer to the voluminous biography of Mr. Garrison, written by two of his sons,* we find the question again and again recurring: What idea of the man and his times would be got from these volumes by one who had no other source of information?

It is a question not altogether easy to answer off-hand. Doubtless the idea would be somewhat confused at first; but being allowed to settle and clarify itself, after some cancelling of contradictions and eliminating of impossibilities, it would come out somewhat in this shape:

Mr. Garrison was a man of meek, gentle and affectionate spirit, and wholly blameless character, who devoted himself at an early age, with absolute unselfishness, to universal philanthropy, and especially to the abolition of slavery. Beginning this work with a nearly unanimous public sentiment on his side, he pushed it forward with such boldness, ability, tact and discretion, that by the end of fifteen years he had brought the public opinion of the nation, both South and North, into almost equally unanimous antagonism to himself. Particularly was this true of the Christian Church and ministry in America, who had shown him hearty sympathy at first; but many of whom, including men who are even yet held in the highest veneration and love, actually engaged in active opposition to slavery with the nefarious purpose of thereby sustaining that wicked institution; and when Mr. Garrison, in the simple fulfilment of his duty, rebuked such conduct, they abused him, the gentle Garrison, with vituperative language. This conspiracy of the entire Christian Church against him, simply for his superior righteousness, was only exceeded in wickedness by the abominable

conduct of many of his nearest friends and benefactors and most self-sacrificing fellow-laborers, who had the hardihood to separate from his Society, and set up another society and newspaper which they called anti-slavery, but which the acumen of Mr. Garrison at once recognized as "the worst form of pro-slavery." Thus, deserted and betrayed by men whom for years he had extolled as among the noblest of the human race, he was publicly declared at last, by one of his few remaining adherents, to be "the only righteous in a world perverse."

In nothing was this good man's abhorrence of slavery more shiningly illustrated than in his rejection of any slavish bondage to his own consistency. At some periods in his career he was a gradual abolitionist, a gradual emancipationist, a colonizationist, in favor of compensated emancipation, devoted to the Constitution of the United States, inculcating the exercise of citizenship, and maintaining a narrow and rigid Sabbatarianism. He had held these views in the simplicity and innocence of his heart; but such was the wild and swift degeneracy of the age and people, that after he laid them down, they were never afterwards held by anybody else, except with vile insincerity, by patent fallacy, with abominable motives, for atrocious ends.

His methods as a reformer were original almost to the point of paradox. He had two main objects: 1, Immediate emancipation of slaves by their holders; 2, immediate abolition of slavery by the repeal of the slave code. The first was sought by a style of address to the slaveholders that enraged every man of them against him and his views to the utmost fury. The second was to be achieved by persuading all opponents of slavery into abdicating their rights and powers as citizens, and so committing the control of legislation ex-

* "William Lloyd Garrison: 1805-1879. The Story of his Life told by his Children." New York: The Century Co. 1885, 1889.

clusively to the upholders of that iniquitous system. But in the prosecution of this bold and energetic policy, the good Garrison was sadly hindered by the criminal folly of those who thought that one good way to oppose bad laws in a republic was to vote against them, and who thus committed themselves to "the worst and most dangerous form of pro-slavery."

But nothing in all this good man's career was so wonderful as his success. At last, by the power of his "sweet reasonableness," he so far won the people of the free States to sympathy with his abhorrence of the Constitution and Union of the United States and his sense of the sinfulness of voting, that they formed a great political party in which every principle characteristic of Mr. Garrison was repudiated, and fought out at the polls the old issue, that was old when Garrison was a baby. But his greatest triumph was when his peace and non-resistance principles had gained such a hold over the popular mind that at last a million of men stood in arms and entered into the bloodiest war of recent times for the maintenance of the Union and Constitution which Mr. Garrison detested—a war in which every death was held by him to be a wicked murder, and the incidental result of which was the abolition of slavery.

It was a fitting close to this triumphant career, that when he had accomplished his great work, he for himself and his family and friends in his behalf, should step promptly forward as they have, to accept for him the homage due to successful and humane achievement.

Such is the paradoxical, but filially pious portraiture of Mr. Garrison given in these volumes. The hero of them is depicted as a noble and wholly faultless character, of whom the world was not worthy. Indeed it is hardly so much the worthiness of the hero as the world's unworthiness of him that most impresses the reader's mind. One who reads believing is shocked, from page to page, with growing proofs of the utter debasement and turpitude of the generation in which he lived, especially of those who pass for the best men of it; and with the vile perfidy towards Mr. Garrison of such large numbers of those who came into intimate relations with him, in business, in reform-agitation, and in personal friendship.

No trait of Mr. Garrison's character is more emphasized and illustrated by his biographers than his singular equanimity, self-control and gentleness of temper. His

mildness of manner and expression are the theme of repeated and admiring comment; and it is demonstrated, not boastfully perhaps, but with evident pride, that his remarkable composure, in circumstances which to most men would have been exciting to the last degree, was due not to self-control, but to the actual absence of excitement. Contrariwise to the public impression of him, he was not a man of hasty or irritable temper, or given to grudges or evil thoughts of others, but one who cherished not merely a doctrine of non-resistance, but actual kindly feelings towards bitter enemies. And yet, as we read, we do come upon language of his that has a different sound. For instance, in a long article on the remonstrances of some of his best friends and fellow-reformers against what they deemed the harshness and severity of his language, he says :

"The same cuckoo cry is raised against me now as I heard when I stood forth alone; and the same sagacious predictions and grave admonitions are uttered now as were then spoken with the infallibility of ignorance, the disinterestedness of cowardice, and the prudence of imbecility. There are many calling themselves anti-slavery men who, because they are only 'half-fledged' themselves, and have neither the strength nor the courage to soar, must needs flutter and scream because my spirit will not stoop in its flight heavenward, and come down to their filthy nest."—[Vol. I. 459, 460.]

Improving upon this pleasing metaphor, he characterizes the General Conference of the Methodist Church as "a cage of unclean birds, and synagogue of Satan." [II. 78.] The action of the Consociation of Rhode Island in declining to entertain a memorial from an epicene convention in Boston is declared to be "clerical ruffianism." [II. 220, n.] And the Rev. Charles T. Torrey, who not long after died a martyr to his anti-slavery convictions in the Baltimore jail, but who had been guilty of the "sedition" (so Mr. Garrison termed it) of desiring another Society and another journal than Garrison's is described as coming in "the full tide of his priestly bile." [II. 270.] We have these occasional specimens of a style of expression which in most men would be indicative of anger, or hatred, or some evil passion, although in this book no evidence appears, except in expressions of shame, disgust and heart-sickness on the part of many of Garrison's best friends, that his habitual style was that of the most brutally vituperative writer of his time. And yet the testimony, both of himself and of others who knew him, is that he was a man of exceptional mildness

and gentleness of temper. What solution can be found for so strange a paradox?

That which is suggested by one of his admiring friends and cited by his biographers, seems not improbable. Miss Harriet Martineau, in 1835, found his countenance to be

"wholly expressive of purity, animation and gentleness." "His conversation . . . is of the most practical cast. . . . Sagacity is the most striking attribute of his conversation. It has none of the severity, the harshness, the bad taste of his writing; it is as gladsome as his countenance, and as gentle as his voice. Through the whole of his deportment breathes the evidence of a heart at ease. . . . I do not pretend to like or to approve the tone of Garrison's printed censures. I could not use such language myself towards any class of offenders, nor can I sympathize in its use by others. But it is only fair to mention that Garrison *adopts it warily*; and that I am persuaded that he is elevated above passion and has no unrighteous anger to vent in harsh expressions. . . . He gives his reasons for his severity with a calmness, meekness and softness which contrast strongly with the subject of the discourse, and which convince the objector that there is *principle* at the bottom of the practice."—[II. 70-71.]

It seems a hard thing for sons to have to say of a father whom they love and venerate, and yet it seems to be true, that the frenzied and unbridled scurrility of Garrison's polemic, such as might be extenuated, not excused, on the ground of irritated feeling or excited passion, was really adopted by him "warily," without a particle of animosity, in cold blood, as a matter of policy for the accomplishment of a purpose. There was no noble and irrepressible rage in it. His feelings never ran away with him, no matter how diabolical the wickedness that confronted him. A very striking illustration of this self-command is presented in these volumes. On the subject of liquor-selling, said he, in 1829:

"We who are somewhat impetuous in our disposition and singular in our notions of reform—who are so uncharitable as to make no distinction between men engaged in one common traffic, which shall excuse the destroyer of thousands and heap contumely on the murderer of a dozen—we demand that the whole truth be told on all occasions, whether it induces persecution or occasions a breach of private friendship. . . . If it be injurious, or criminal, or dangerous, or disreputable to drink ardent spirits, it is far more so to vend, or distil, or import this liquid fire. 'Woe unto him who putteth the cup to his neighbor's lips'—who increases his wealth at the expense of the bodies and souls of men—who takes away the bread of the poor and devours the earnings of industry—who scatters his poison through the veins and arteries of the community, till even the grave is burdened with his victims! Against *him* must

the artillery of public indignation be brought to bear; and the decree must go forth, as from the lips of Jehovah, that he who will deal in the accused article can lay no claim to honesty of purpose or holiness of life, but is a shameless enemy to the happiness and prosperity of his fellow-creatures."—[I. 155, 156.]

"He looked upon 'every distiller or vender of ardent spirits' as 'a poisoner of the health and morals of community'; and could even say, in his address in 1832 before the second annual Convention of the People of Color in Philadelphia: 'God is my witness that great as is my detestation of slavery and the foreign slave trade, I had rather be a slaveholder—yea, a kidnapper on the African coast—than sell this poison to my fellow-creatures for common consumption.'"—[I. 268.]

This was in 1832. In 1833, this uncompromising reformer, burning with holy indignation, had the golden opportunity of confronting in the midst of his ill-gotten and blood-stained wealth, one of the most notorious of these monsters, more detestable than the slaveholder and the kidnapper, these murderers and public poisoners, of whom he was resolved to speak the truth on all occasions however embarrassing. It was a peculiarly flagrant case, for the caitiff wretch had not only openly made and sold his liquid damnation, but had commended it to his neighbors' lips in that seductive form known as Buxton's *Entire*; and nevertheless, was holding a high position in the public esteem, and giving himself the airs of a philanthropist and reformer and Christian. In all Mr. Garrison's stormy career, he never had so good an opportunity for unlimbering the "artillery of indignation" for a point-blank shot. But instead of this he speaks with undisguised delight of a "polite invitation by letter" from this ogre "to take breakfast with him"; on which occasion our reformer, instead of warning his host of the hypocrisy of his "claim of honesty of purpose or holiness of life" and faithfully denouncing him as the "shameless enemy of his fellow-creatures," accepted his breakfast and his compliments without a syllable of protest; and after returning to America, described him as "the worthy successor of Wilberforce, our esteemed friend and coadjutor, Thomas Fowell Buxton," and declares that, aside from a single mistake of anti-slavery policy, "Mr. Buxton deserves universal admiration and gratitude for his long-continued, able and disinterested efforts, amidst severe ridicule and malignant opposition, to break every yoke and set the oppressed free."—[I. 351, 352.]

Miss Martineau was right. The spirit of the prophet was completely subject unto the prophet. He was able to restrain the

fury of his indignation against this monstrous criminal, and devote all his energies, in England, to hounding, pestering and abusing the agent of a benevolent enterprise, of which less than four years before, Garrison himself had been an extravagant eulogist. The Colonization agent was guilty of not keeping up with Garrison in the nimble changes of his mind from love to hate; and this was a crime as much worse than Buxton's as Buxton's was worse than that of the slaveholder and the kidnapper. But let it not be supposed that even this badgering of the Colonization agent was a matter of indignation. As Miss Martineau perceived, it was only "sagacity"—part of a course "adopted warily," and on "principle"—a course disgusting enough to her, as well as to Whittier, and Follen, and the Tappans, and many others, but which nevertheless, as he calmly explained, with "gladsome countenance" and "gentle voice," had to be pursued as a matter of policy.

It is not impossible to comprehend the situation in which Mr. Garrison felt himself drawn or driven to this disgraceful policy. We must remember how scanty were the resources not only material and social, but intellectual, with which he entered on his crusade. He was a decidedly bright young fellow, who had worked his way up from printer's boy to editor—wrote in a fairly good English style, with a knack for turning a sonnet which now and then rose to the dignity of real poetry. But he lacked intellectual strength, and was conscious of the lack. The reader of this book is impressed, in the pages from Garrison's pen, with the absence of genuine eloquence, or vigor of argument, or acuteness of observation. A superiority of intellectual and moral tone is recognized at once, when we pass from a page of Garrison's writing to a page from Elizur Wright, or even Lewis Tappan. Now, what do most men do in this case—conscious that their strength is inadequate to their undertaking? They are commonly tempted to make up in violence for the defect of strength. And this was the temptation to which Garrison yielded. He was always straining his voice till it broke into falsetto. He might not be able to argue successfully; but he could scold like a fishwife. He might not convict his adversary of wrong; but he could pelt him with hard names. He might not be able to command the attention of the people by weight of character or power of language; but he could infuriate them by insult. Here were cheap substitutes for eloquence always at hand, and he had

small scruple about using them. He might not be able to win any large following to serve under him by the attraction of his genius, or the success of his leadership; but perhaps some might be intimidated into his service by a policy of systematic insult. So this policy was deliberately adopted and persistently followed. Probably it was the first instance of an attempt to carry forward a scheme of Christian philanthropy in main reliance on blackmail. The bitterest epithets and most damaging accusations in Mr. Garrison's extensive repertory were applied to these who were nearest him but failed to adhere to him. The one lower grade of turpitude was that of the men who, having once trained in his troop, detached themselves from it. The "worst and most dangerous form of pro-slavery" was to be an anti-slavery man outside of Garrison's residuary faction. There was no lack of collaborators to whom the policy of Garrison was congenial, and it was industriously prosecuted. Faithful citizens, and especially Christian ministers, were studiously annoyed with false charges of being "pro-slavery." Americans going abroad found that a system of correspondence was in operation by which evil reports were sent in advance of them. But the delight of the Garrison press and platform was to seize the occasion of the recent death of some exceptionally beloved and honored citizen, when hearts were tender, and the wounds of bereavement not yet closed, to defile his fresh grave with some abominable accusation. And down almost to this very day it has been the amiable practice of some of the survivors of that faction, notably of Mr. Oliver Johnson, to signalize the departure of some man honored for his great services in the cause of human freedom, by printing mendacious charges against him of pro-slavery sympathy, and sending them marked to the mourners.

It is only by glimpses between the lines that the reader of this biography gets an idea of the state of public sentiment in America at the time when Garrison began his work. Garrison's own reckless and swaggering account of it is this:

"At that time [before the beginning of *The Liberator* in 1831] there was scarcely a man in all the land who dared to peep or mutter on the subject of slavery; the pulpit and the press were dumb; no anti-slavery organizations were made; no public addresses were delivered; no reproofs, no warnings, no entreaties were uttered in the ears of the people, silence, almost unbroken silence, prevailed universally."—[I. 458.]

In the same ridiculously false and brag-

gart tone is his talk about Channing's little work on slavery : " We do claim all that is sound or valuable in the book as *our own*; its sole excellences are its *moral plagiarisms*;"—[IL 89]. Habitually, he abounds with great swelling words of assumption that he is the very founder and inventor of anti-slavery feeling, argument and effort.

And yet throughout the book, and especially the earlier part of it, we come continually upon facts that are only to be explained by supposing (what is the demonstrable truth) that Garrison from his childhood grew up in an atmosphere of abhorrence of slavery—an atmosphere which pervaded the North and, to a large extent the South as well. The really remarkable and distinguishing thing about his early life is the torpid insensibility of his own conscience on this subject, while all about him men were feeling deeply and speaking and acting boldly. He had had exceptional opportunities of knowing slavery in its most hideous aspect, in successive visits to one of the chief slave markets of the country; but he took no interest in the matter. In the year 1828, a speech was made in Congress by Mr. Everett, which seemed to apologize for slavery; Mr. Gurley, of the Colonization Society, Mr. Bacon, and other friends of the colored people broke out in indignant protest and denunciation; Mr. Garrison copied the speech into his newspaper without the slightest sign of disapproval.

When, at last, his sluggish conscience was roused to recognize that slavery was wrong, and he began to speak and act, he found that the whole country was beforehand with him. In the year 1828, he refers, in his Bennington newspaper, to a petition recently presented to Congress by more than a thousand residents of the District of Columbia, including all the District Judges, praying for the abolition of slavery in the District. And presently a meeting is convened at the Bennington Academy at which a petition for the same object, drawn by Garrison's hand, is read and adopted, which reads:

" Your petitioners deem it unnecessary to attempt to maintain by elaborate arguments that the existence of slavery is highly detrimental to the happiness, peace and prosperity of that nation in whose bosom and under whose auspices it is nourished; and especially that it is inconsistent with the spirit of our government and laws. All this is readily admitted by every patriot and Christian. . . . It is gratifying to believe that a large majority of the inhabitants of the District, and also of our more Southern brethren, are earnest for the abolition. . . .

Your petitioners deem it preposterous that while there is one half of the States in which slavery does not exist, and while a large majority of our white population are desirous of seeing it extirpated, this evil is suffered to canker in the vitals of the republic."

The petition was sent to *all the post-masters* of the State of Vermont, with the request that they would obtain signatures to it; and most of them "responded nobly"; so that the document was sent to Washington with no less than 2352 signatures, and there found a *nearly unanimous* resolution of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in favor of the same object.—[I. 109, 110.]

It is this exact period of which it is impudently declared (for the greater glory of Garrison):

" Fifty years ago [*i. e.*, in 1829], it is no exaggeration to say, this nation, in church and state, from President to boot-black—I mean the white boot-black—was thoroughly pro-slavery. In the Sodom there might have been a Lot or two here and there—some profound thinker who wished justice to be done though the heavens should fall, but he was despondent. It seemed as though nearly the whole business of the press, the pulpit and the theological seminary was to reconcile the people to the permanent degradation and slavery of the negro race."—[I. 298. Quoted from a speech of Elizur Wright, in June, 1879.]

Who would suppose, from reading this statement of history, that Garrison's boyhood had passed in the midst of an anti-slavery agitation that convulsed the nation almost to the point of civil war; or that in 1818 that noble act of the Presbyterian Church declaring slavery to be "a gross violation of the most precious and sacred rights of human nature, utterly inconsistent with the law of God, and totally irreconcileable with the spirit and principles of the gospel of Christ," had been *unanimously* adopted by the General Assembly, representing North and South? The eulogists of Garrison will hardly have the effrontery to claim that it was from their hero that the illustrious Kentuckian, Robert J. Breckenridge, learned either the ethics or the rhetoric of that splendid invective which he uttered in 1833 in the pages of the "Biblical Repertory," in which he declared "slavery as it is daily exhibited in every slave State" to be "a system which is utterly indefensible on every correct human principle, and utterly abhorrent from every law of God"; in which rebuking the apologists of the institution he exclaims: "Out upon such folly! The man who cannot see that involuntary domestic slavery, as it exists among us, is founded

on the principle of taking by force that which is another's, has simply no moral sense"; . . . "these are reasons for a Christian land to look upon and then ask: Can any system which they are advanced to defend be compatible with virtue and truth? . . . Hereditary slavery is without pretence, except in avowed rapacity."

Such views as these, of a conspicuous leader of public opinion in the slave States in 1833, instead of being, according to the preposterous assumption of Mr. Garrison's admirers, something unknown before his advent, devised by his own heart, becoming prevalent through his propagation of them, were, as a matter of exact history, the generally prevalent sentiment of the country at the beginning of his career; and the progressive decline of them, and, at the South, the practical extinction of them, synchronizes with the progress of Mr. Garrison's anti-slavery operations. Whether these operations stood to the decline of anti-slavery sentiment in the relation of cause to effect is a fair question, on which, however, in our own minds, there is not a particle of doubt. It is clear to us that Mr. Garrison and his propaganda had no small part in the demoralization of public opinion which went on to worse and worse during the period of his greatest activity.

But while he had no originality in the advocacy of anti-slavery, of emancipation, or of abolition—on all these points merely accepting the general sentiment of good men prevalent at the beginning of his career—there were two favorite nostrums on which he claimed exclusive rights, at least for the American market; one of these he labelled "immediate emancipation," and the other "immediate abolition." Both of them were founded in fallacy—that form of fallacy which one of his surviving disciples, Mr. Oliver Johnson, with unconscious humor, characterized * as "elastic definition," but which is better known to logicians as "ambiguous middle." All slaveholding is wicked, said the reformer; therefore every slaveholder should instantly emancipate all his slaves, and until he does so, he is a murderer, a man-stealer, a pirate, to be excommunicated from the Church, and shunned by decent men. But being questioned what he would do in the case of one who was holding slaves only until he could bring them away to a State where the laws would permit the emancipation of them, he answers at once: "When I say slaveholding is wicked, I mean the wicked

kind of slaveholding; the man you describe holds slaves, indeed, but he is not what I mean by a slaveholder. I have 'an elastic definition' that can be accommodated to all such cases." In short, he fell afoul of the English language; his long quarrel with the best men of his generation was a contest in defence of his indefeasible right to use words out of their proper meaning.

So with his demand for "immediate abolition," objection to which filled him with "inexpressible abhorrence and dismay." It "does not mean," he says, "that the slaves shall immediately . . . be free from the benevolent restraints of guardianship."—[I, 294.] In short, when he says "immediate abolition" he means what is ordinarily understood by "gradual abolition," which if any man dare to express approval of, he will belabor him with foul words in his *Liberator* and do what he can to injure him in public estimation.

With more patience than this patent fallacy deserved, the sober anti-slavery men of this country labored to clear excited minds of the illusion which Garrison and his followers persistently labored to maintain. Said Leonard Bacon:

"As for the thing which alone they profess to recognize as slavery, we hold it to be invariably sinful. As for the thing which, when they attempt to speak accurately, they call emancipation, we hold it to be the plainest and first duty of every master. As for the thing which they describe as the meaning of immediate abolition, we hold it to be not only practicable and safe, but the very first thing to be done for the safety of a slaveholding country. The immediate abolition against which we protest as perilous to the commonwealth and unjust to the slaves, is a different thing from that which the immediate abolitionists think they are urging on the country. . . .

"The sophism by which they unwittingly impose on their own minds and inflame the minds of others, is this: the terms 'slavery,' 'slaveholding,' 'immediate emancipation,' etc., have one meaning in their definitions, and, to a great and unavoidable extent, another meaning in their denunciations and popular harangues. Thus they define a slaveholder to be one who claims and treats his fellow-men as property—as things—as destitute of all personal rights; one, in a word, whose criminality is self-evident. But the moment they begin to speak of slaveholders in the way of declamation, the word which they have strained out of its proper import springs back to its position, and denotes any man who stands in the relation of overseer and governor to those whom the law has constituted slaves; and consequently every man who, in the meaning of the laws, or in the meaning of common parlance, is a slaveholder, is denounced with unmeasured expressions of abhorrence and hate, as an enemy of the species. What is the effect of this on their

* *Century Magazine*, vol. IV (1883) pp. 153, 636.

own minds? What, on the minds of those who happen, from one cause or another, to be ripe for factious or fanatical excitement against the South? What, on the minds of those who, without unravelling the sophistry of the case, know that many a slaveholder is conscientious, and does regard his slaves as brethren? What, on the minds of those slaveholders themselves who are conscious of no such criminality?"—*Quarterly Christian Spectator*, 1834.

The possible effect of his sophistical talk on other men's minds seems not to have been veiled from Mr. Garrison. In the retrospect, at least, he looked back with complacency to the syllogism which he had furnished to the extreme defenders of slavery: "If human beings could be justly held in bondage for one hour, they could be for days and weeks and years, and so on indefinitely from generation to generation."—[I. 140.] It was an instruction which needed no bettering, to fit it exactly to the use of pro-slavery men, North or South, in their conflict with the anti-slavery feeling that was everywhere dominant when Garrison began his glorious work. But this bearing of it seemed to be no objection to it in Mr. Garrison's mind; and the fact that it would be exasperating and alienating to good, conscientious and anti-slavery men among the slaveholders was vastly in its favor. His grievance with the old anti-slavery societies was that they did not "personally arraign the slaveholder and hold him criminal for not immediately emancipating his slaves, and seek to make him odious and put him beyond the pale of intercourse."—[I. 159, *note*. The language is the biographers']

Nothing in all this book is more truly characteristic of Mr. Garrison than these words of his children. A policy of reform might be wise, effective, successful; it might have extinguished slavery, as indeed, it had extinguished it, in State after State, and be moving hopefully for the like result in other States yet; but unless it was personally exasperating it had no charms for him. He was not exasperated himself; and he no more believed every slaveholder to be criminal than Dr. Bacon or Dr. Breckinridge did; but with his little contrivance of "an elastic definition" he continued, with great composure and equanimity, to pour out the weekly torrent of bitter, foul, insulting language with which he succeeded in quenching the anti-slavery sentiment of the South to its last embers, and infuriating an opposition to the very name of abolitionist, even in the North, that showed itself in the shameful mobs which he delighted to provoke, and which were re-

pressed or prevented by the efforts of men for whom he had no thanks, but only abuse and calumny. His love of a mob was not in the least like the Tipperary Irishman's delight in a shillalah-fight. It was a matter of policy, and in the roughest tumble of it his "mind was tranquil"; and when it was over he sat down and footed up the net advantages: "New subscribers to the *Liberator* continue to come in—not less than a dozen to-day. Am much obliged to the mob."—[II. 50.] He was even capable of refraining from exciting a mob when he saw no profit in it—"a mob without doing us any benefit, as the market is now getting to be somewhat glutted with deeds of violence."—[II. 105.] But in general, he actually hungered for a row, and labored, when he saw the populace nearing the boiling-point, to throw in fresh provocations, and invite general attention to his non-resistance principles. On the eve of the Boston riot, he was disgusted with the apparent lull of popular excitement which threatened that the storm would blow over. "Boston is beginning to sink into apathy. The reaction has come rapidly, but we are trying to get the steam up again."—[II. 2.] In like manner, at the dedication of Pennsylvania Hall in Philadelphia, his disgust at the address of David Paul Brown, the eminent anti-slavery lawyer, was irrepressible. That address seemed adapted "to allay, in some measure, the prejudice that prevails against us and our holy cause"; and that was not at all what he had come to Philadelphia for. There were placards out inciting to a riot, and it was an opportunity not to be missed. The mob needed punching up, and Garrison was just the man to do it. So he took the platform with some sneering and insulting remarks about Mr. Brown and his address, and about men of "caution," and "prudence," and "judiciousness," generally.

"Sir, I have learned to hate those words. . . . Sir, slavery will not be overthrown without excitement, a most tremendous excitement. And let me say there is too much quietude in this city. It shows that the upholders of this wicked system have not yet felt that their favorite sin has been much endangered. You need and must have a moral earthquake. . . . Your cause will not prosper here—the philosophy of reform forbids you to expect it—until it excites popular tumult, and brings down upon it a shower of brickbats and rotten eggs, and it is threatened with a coat of tar-and-feathers."—[II. 215, 216, *note*.]

The desire of Garrison's heart was promptly gratified by the smashing of the windows and the burning of the building; out of all which he got safely off, and

wrote to his mother-in-law in high spirits, from Boston. "We have had great doings in Philadelphia, during the present week. . . . It will do incalculable good to our cause. . . . Our friends are all in excellent spirits, shouting Alleluia! for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth! Let the earth rejoice!"

The attitude of Mr. Garrison and his queer little "persecuted remnant" of followers, towards the mob, was like that of Messrs. Dodson and Fogg towards the enraged Mr. Pickwick. "Perhaps you would like to call us swindlers, sir," said Dodson. "Pray do, sir, if you feel disposed; now pray do, sir." "Go on, sir; do go on," added Mr. Fogg. "You had better call us thieves, sir; or perhaps you would like to assault one of us. Pray do it, if you would; we will not make the smallest resistance. Pray do it, sir"; and Fogg put himself very temptingly within the reach of Mr. Pickwick's clenched fist."

The case is not exactly in point. The mob was by no means as innocent as Mr. Pickwick, and the abusive epithets, to which *thief* and *swindler* were terms of compliment, were rather bestowed by Mr. Garrison than solicited. But Dodson and Fogg never equalled Mr. Garrison in the cool studiousness with which he invited assault with the standing promise of impunity, serenely calculating on the ulterior advantage of it. He swaggered insolently about in the panoply of his non-resistance principles, the "Moral Bully" described by Dr. Holmes:

" His velvet throat against thy corded wrist,
His loosened tongue against thy doubled
fist."

" The *Moral Bully*, though he never swears,
Nor kicks intruders down his entry stairs,
Though meekness plants his backward-sloping
hat,
And non-resistance ties his white cravat, . . .
Hugs the same passion to his narrow breast;
That heaves the cuirass on the trooper's
chest;
Feels the same comfort, while his acrid words
Turn the sweet milk of kindness into curds,
As the scarred ruffian of the pirate's deck
When his long swivel rakes the staggering
wreck."

The lesson of Mr. Garrison's life, truly told, is instructive but sad. It is the story of the failure and wreck of what could hardly, in any case, have been a great career, but might have been a wholly honorable and useful one. The whole course of his active life is a continuous history of opportunities wasted, influence forfeited, faithful friends and benefactors alienated and forced into hostility, and friends that still remained

"sickened" at the folly and violence of his language, and at the irreparable mischiefs wrought by it to the cause which he claimed for his own. Meanwhile he was embittered by seeing "enlargement and deliverance arise from another place." The sober, conscientious, Christian anti-slavery sentiment of the country was clearly enlightened, and resolutely and wisely led, by such men as Albert Barnes, Leonard Bacon, William Ellery Channing and Francis Wayland—men for whose persons, whose arguments, and whose measures Mr. Garrison had no words but bitter denunciation and insult, and all the more as he saw them leading on to success where he had miserably failed. The attempt to represent that the only consistent and sincere anti-slavery of the nation was confined to Garrison and the infinitesimal faction of his adherents—an attempt pertinaciously prosecuted by him during his lifetime, and now renewed since his death—needs to be rebuked in the name of public morality; and not less, the mischievous lesson that is deduced from this false representation, to wit, that extravagant statement, sweeping denunciation and personal abuse of antagonists may be relied on to carry almost any crotchet of "reform," if only they are stuck to long enough.

The public career of Mr. Garrison, to which we have mainly confined our attention, is not difficult to understand. His personal character as exhibited in this book would be a more complicated study, very interesting, but less important to the world. Certain fine qualities he had in a high degree. His courage lacked nothing, but a little modesty, of being perfect and entire; but he advertised it too much in his newspaper. He was completely superior to mercenary considerations, and took joyfully the spoiling of his own goods, and still more joyfully the spoiling of other people's goods; no one of the proprietors of Pennsylvania Hall seems to have equalled him in the happy serenity and even hilarity with which he witnessed the destruction of that valuable property. For the great cause which he had at heart, he was willing to bear the loss of friends—so willing, in fact, that as they turned, grieved or indignant, from his door, he usually kicked them down the steps, only not with an actual boot of leather—that he held to be sinful. His sympathy with the slaves was deep and sincere; the groans of their prolonged bondage were torture to his soul; yet even this torture he was willing to bear cheerfully for an indefinite period (no matter

what their preference might be) rather than have them emancipated on incorrect principles [I. 348, 352]; so far was he from being a reckless enthusiast in his humanity. Conscious of superiority to such vulgar forms of selfishness, he sincerely thought himself (there is much evidence of this, sometimes pathetic, sometimes amusing) to be a perfect man.

One is surprised and almost sorry to find it claimed for him that he was not passionate or vindictive—that when he was running amuck through society, striking and stabbing indiscriminately all but those that ran with him, it was a mere matter of policy, about which he chatted “gladsomely” with his friends. In like manner, we are pained to discover that he was far from being the pachyderm which his recklessness of the feelings and reputations of others indicates him to be. He is sensitive to the pains which he delights to inflict or see inflicted on other men. If he fairly chuckles with joy at preventing the Colonizationists from getting a place for their meeting [I. 450] it is not because he does not go bemoaning the wickedness of the churches in not being willing to lend him or his friends a meeting-house gratis. His devoted labors to make other people “odious, and put them beyond the pale of intercourse,” were compatible with bitter complaints that he found he had made himself odious instead. The most abusive of writers is continually grumbling at being abused. He calls on John Breckinridge, who loses his temper and becomes “really abusive”; Garrison bears it with a grieved and injured spirit, but with angelic meekness, goes home and down on his knees for his enemy; and then puts the knife into him in the next *Liberator* as “ferocious and diabolical.”—[I. 449.]

Mr. Garrison's religious faith, through the earlier period of his life, seems genuine, deep and practical. Not Archbishop Laud, nor Saint Peter Arbuez, gives evidence of a more honest piety, or more strikingly illustrates Isaac Taylor's definition of fanaticism, as the combination of the religious sentiment with the malignant emotions.

For the materials of this exposition of the character and career of Mr. Garrison, it has not been necessary to go outside of the voluminous biography written of him by his own sons. No one can blame them for not having told the whole story. They have told enough to make their huge book refute itself. Can it be wondered at that they should have walked backward laying a garment upon both their shoulders, so as not to see their father's shame? But

sooner or later some severely just and faithful hand must take up the task of thoroughly exposing the perversions of history that have been perpetrated by a considerable number of writers, for the canonization of Garrison. It is in the interest of good morals that he should be known to the next generation, as he was known to the past generation, as the systematic, cold-blooded and unscrupulous calumniator of better men than himself, and the constant antagonist of the men and the measures that were most helpful (as the event demonstrated) to the abolition of slavery. That his example may not be of evil influence in the future, it is needful that the demonstrable fact should be publicly exhibited and proved, that good did not come from the evil which he did that good might come; that the cause which he claimed as his own was begun without him, and went forward to success not because of him but in spite of him; and that the failure of his career—a miserable failure, notwithstanding all the false glorying of his panegyrists—is a warning to any who may hereafter be tempted of the devil to follow him in those methods which won for him the indelible title of “malignant philanthropist.” This work might well occupy a volume, or more than one. But something may be accomplished towards it, even within the narrow limits of a magazine article.

"THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF."¹

BY A. M. FAIRBAIRN.

From *The Contemporary Review* (London), April, 1895.

THE appearance of the statesman as a theologian is a matter of interest not only to theologians, but also to the State. It speaks of interests which have all the greater significance for this world that they embrace another and larger, and of ideals which are potent in making character and governing both private conduct and public policy. Plato has told us that only the statesman under the inspiration of the kingly Muse can implant in the souls he governs the Idea, which is a divine principle, of the noble, and the just, and the good; while not till philosophers were kings, and political power was wedded to philosophy, could his ideal city live and behold the light of the sun. Aristotle was doubtful whether kings were an advantage to States, but he was clear that they ought to be chosen for their merit, or personal life and conduct: while the statesman might

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be considered as much a lover of virtue as the philosopher, since it was the note alike of the wise State and wise man to regulate life according to the best end. It is well now and then to be recalled to the ancient idea that the State is, alike in basis and aim, essentially an ethical society, and that virtue and ethical knowledge in the statesman are necessary to order and progress in the State. Our tendency for the moment is to substitute material for moral well-being, to conceive comfort as the highest good and poverty as the last evil. To be poor or to endure hardness is to be thought incapable of being personally happy or of contributing to the common happiness. If Diogenes were to appear among us with his tub, he would be told that before he could be heard or be regarded as other than an object of charity, he must have a more desirable dwelling, exchange his sack for respectable broad-cloth, and demand of Alexander not only that he get out of the sun, but actually dispel the smoke or the fog that was intercepting his beams. If Epictetus were to set up as a teacher of morals, he would be assured that he could not be a philosopher while he continued a slave, or think worthily while his labor was another's. We ought, then, to welcome a book which shows us that we have a statesman who at least thinks as deeply of ethical as of material well-being, and who spends his quiet days not simply on brown moors or breezy links, but in attempting to lay anew, broad and deep and strong, "the foundations" of the beliefs on which he conceives society to rest.

I.

1. It does not indeed always follow that the statesman who studies theology either applies his religion to the State or serves it by his studies. We all remember Gibbon's famous aphorism as to "the various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world" being "considered by the people, as equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false; and by the magistrate, as equally useful"; but if the philosopher chanced to be also a magistrate, his use of the religion he held to be false was more a tribute to the expediencies of government than to the integrity of philosophy. Cicero, too, as orator and statesman, praised the popular religion, and played the rôle of sincere believer, fervently recounting the miracles it had accomplished on behalf of himself and the Republic; but as a philosopher we find him in his treatises flouting

¹ "Decline and Fall," chap. ii. 1.

this same religion with lordly disdain. Marcus Aurelius appears in his "Meditations" as the typical Roman saint, the ideal man of the Stoics embodied in breathing flesh and blood, but he stands in history as one of the chief persecutors of the Christian Church, leaving to us the hard problem of reconciling the tolerant philosopher with the intolerant Emperor. In the long roll of English kings two stand out as eminent and learned theologians, Henry VIII. and James I. To the former we owe, among other things, the famous book against Luther, the *Assertio Septem Sacramentorum*, which procured for its author and his successors the proud title of "Fidei Defensor"; to the latter, among other things, the "Basilikon Doron," which declared that he hated "no man more than a proud Puritan"—a being no king could suffer, unless indeed "for trying of his patience, as Socrates did an evil wife"—and the "Apology for the Oath of Allegiance," which explained his theory of kingcraft in the province of religion. But he would be a bold man who should assert of Henry that he was one of the most just and magnanimous of kings, or of James that he was one of the wisest. Last century Bolingbroke discoursed through five prolix volumes on sundry matters, philosophical and theological, including such congenial themes as "the folly and presumption of philosophers, especially in matters of the first philosophy," and "authors in matters of religion"; and "Alexander Pope, Esquire," to whom the essays and letters were addressed, did the system of his "friend and genius," the "master of the poet and the song," into the polished measure and empty optimism of the "Essay on Man." But, though Bolingbroke professed deism and upheld the Church, yet we may reckon it among the kind things of Providence that he had not the opportunity of realizing his "Idea of a Patriot King," or maintaining as a statesman the Church he did not believe in as a man. In this century, statecraft and theology have often gone hand in hand. In France, Joseph de Maistre led the counter-revolution, and evoked the Papacy as the spirit which was to reduce to order the chaos of loose and lawless wills; the Duc de Broglie described the early, that he might inform and defend the living, Church; Guizot, when relieved by the Second Empire from the service of the citizen king, occupied himself with the interpretation of Evangelical Christianity, and the revival of French Protestantism; while Jules Simon had edited "Descartes," and vindicated "La Religion Naturel"

before he was known as a politician and minister. In England the most venerable of living statesmen has also been throughout his long life an eager and prolific theologian. He began his career as a sort of lay divine, claiming for his Church a higher place, more independent authority and indefeasible rights, than even her official heads had then either the courage or the faith to affirm; and at its close, he pleads at once for the integrity of Christian doctrine and the recognition of the excellence of the Christian virtues, whether within or without his own communion. And now, just as many have been feeling how the withdrawal of a mind accustomed to study the State through the large and luminous atmosphere of religion had impoverished politics, younger statesman descends into the arena and boldly challenges attention and criticism by his "Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology." And what can a theologian do but ask, Whither does this Introduction lead—into theology? or elsewhere?

2. Mr. Balfour here repeats and expands his older book,¹ developing and applying its principles. And we may at once say, the old book is the best introduction to the new, and is, indeed, necessary to its complete elucidation. The new work is distinguished by many admirable qualities, is at once lucid and subtle, brilliant and eloquent, always grave, yet often lighted up with flashes of a nimble though ironical humor, with a delicate yet elastic style, excellently suited to the dexterous and sinuous movement of the thought. If to be well put were to be victoriously argued, this would indeed be a cogent book; but I must frankly, even at the very outset, confess that to one reader, at least it has been a deep disappointment. The early chapters awakened high hope; their form threw over one a sort of spell; but the spell slowly faded, and pleasure turned to pain as the underlying philosophy was seen to be shifting sand rather than solid rock, and what could its unstable weakness do but fracture the whole frail superstructure? The farther the reading proceeded, the less satisfactory the argument seemed. The criticism that had appeared so pleasantly potent at the beginning became sadly impotent at the middle, and mischievously inadequate or irrelevant at the end. This was a conclusion most reluctantly reached; but whether justly reached it will be for the readers of both the book and this review to determine.

It is, I hope, not necessary to say how thoroughly I sympathize with Mr. Balfour's purpose, and how entirely I admire the motives of his book and the ability by which it is everywhere distinguished. As one whose work and interests lie altogether in the domain of theology, I would welcome the incursion into it of this brilliant amateur. For so far as it relates to theology, properly so-called, it is an amateur's book, and as such it ought to be judged. It is difficult, for example, to conceive that any one whose knowledge was first-hand, especially if possessed of a philosophic and scientific mind, could have written the note on pp. 278-9 as to the decisions of the early Church relative to the doctrine of the Trinity. The very thing that the creeds were not was "the negation of explanations." They were framed by men who had elaborated doctrines which were theories concerning the highest mysteries, and their decisions were definitions which were expressly intended to affirm their own and exclude other and opposed doctrines. The symbols both of Nicæa and Chalcedon are distinguished by terms as strictly technical as any terms in either philosophy or science; and, indeed, the great struggle at Nicæa, which it needed all the subtlety of Athanasius and all the authority of the Emperor to overcome, was against the introduction into a symbol of terms and phrases which had been coined and used in the schools, but had not hitherto been sanctioned by the Church. In other words, the terms were exactly what Mr. Balfour says they were not—"of the nature of explanations"; they expressed theories, embodied definitions, affirmed one doctrine and denied another, and were for this very reason introduced, and for the same reason strenuously resisted. But if in historical theology he shows the mind and art of the amateur, it must not be understood to mean that his appearance as a philosophical theologian is held to be unwarranted. On the contrary, there is no field of inquiry where a fresh and well-disciplined mind may be of more real service, especially if he be in thought and language neither derivative nor conventional. And there are sections or borders of the field where a man of Mr. Balfour's knowledge and speculative capacity is absolutely in place; and it is with such a section that his book is mainly concerned. The men who are in this field, as it were, common day-laborers, may well feel cheered and exhilarated at the appearance amongst them of an occasional workman so effective in form and so dexterous in the use of his tools as is this last comer,

¹ "A Defence of Philosophic Doubt: being an Essay on the Foundations of Belief." 1879.

who so happily combines the capacities of the philosopher and the statesman.

Mr. Balfour well defines his initial position, which also implies the function he is best able to fulfil, in the sentence: "The decisive battles of theology are fought beyond its frontiers. It is not over purely religious controversies that the cause of religion is lost or won. The judgments we shall form on its special problems are commonly settled for us by our general mode of looking at the Universe." This, of course, means that theology is implicit in philosophy, or philosophy explicit in theology. As the late Sir William Hamilton used to say, every question which emerges in theology has before emerged in philosophy. So the philosopher can render no greater service to theology than the discussion in his own free province and way of those principles which determine its problems. But I wonder that Mr. Balfour failed to feel how fatal to his theological purpose is his want of an explicit philosophy. Without a positive philosophy how is a positive theology possible? The "mode of looking at the universe" which is to determine our attitude to theology, will not be created by a negative criticism of philosophical or scientific ideas; this is more likely to leave us in an attitude of vacant expectancy, where perception is blind and conception empty, than in one of intelligent receptivity. One may deeply sympathize with Mr. Balfour's purpose, and be all the more deeply regretful that he has, by his peculiar method, done so much to defeat it. But this is to anticipate a criticism which has still to be made good.

The book, though divided into four parts, really falls into three main divisions; which we may distinguish as the critical, the transitional, and the positive or constructive. In the critical, Mr. Balfour discusses and dismisses as philosophically inadequate both the empirical and the transcendental theories of knowing and being, especially as regards those ideas which are held to be assured and necessary principles for the interpretation of man and nature. In the transitional he discovers and emphasizes what he holds to be a group of neglected factors in the formation of belief. In the positive, he attempts a provisional justification and unification of beliefs. What is to be here said will deal with these three divisions in succession.

1 "The Foundations of Belief," pp. 2, 3.

II.

1. The critical discussion which runs irregularly through the entire book, though it is more systematically dealt with in Parts I. and II., is applied to four provinces—two philosophical, empiricism and transcendental idealism—and two theological, the older rationalism and its corrective yet counterpart, the older apologetic and rationalistic orthodoxy. The latter two need not concern us, though they are perhaps more kindly handled than as tendencies historically effete they altogether deserved to be. Nor need we concern ourselves with the discussion on Transcendental Idealism. It is not very serious and in no respect thorough, nor is it marked by the author's usual subtlety and grasp, while it really stands outside the argument, which has not been "arranged" "with overt or tacit reference to that system" (p. 6). Only two things need be said: (1) Mr. Balfour fails to recognize the conspicuous services this Idealism has rendered to the cause he champions, and the recognition might very well have been associated with the name of the late Professor T. H. Green, whose position is mainly here criticised. To see what these services have been, we have only to remember the controversies of from twenty to twenty-five years ago, when, under the impulse given to pamphysicism by evolution, agnosticism became belligerent and constructive, and the doctrine that "matter had the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," was preached with eloquent assurance from the chair of the British Association—and then compare that most electrical atmosphere with the very different "psychological climate" we now enjoy. If to-day our empirics cultivate a modesty which was then unknown, if they are more conscious of the limitations and impotence of their physico-metaphysical theories, it is largely due to the criticism of the Idealism which is here so cavalierly dismissed. (2) This Idealism is not to be understood from the subjective point of view emphasized by Mr. Balfour. He fails to apprehend its objective significance, its ability to explain those problems in the history of mind which remain in his hands the most hopeless of puzzles. The one philosophy which has done even approximate justice to the religions of man and the nature by which they are, certainly deserved juster treatment in a book concerned with the "foundations of belief."

It reveals, at least, an imperfect sense of the gravity and range of the most serious attempt yet made to solve these problems.

2. But the author's serious and perfectly tireless criticism is concentrated on what he terms "Naturalism" (p. 6). His dexterity in dealing with it is marvellous; he argues against it, he examines its psychological data, analyzes its logical principles and processes, tests it by man, measures it by nature, and finds it, in all its fundamental doctrines, either impossible, or unveracious, or self-contradictory. Its creed is composed of two elements: "The one *positive*, consisting, broadly speaking, of the teaching contained in the general body of the natural sciences; the other *negative*, expressed in the doctrine that beyond these limits, wherever they may happen to lie, nothing is and nothing can be known."¹ One would have expected him to be rather more careful in his definition. What is here described as the positive element does not belong to Naturalism in any special or even in any tolerable sense at all, and what is termed the negative is really the only positive element. For what constitutes "Naturalism" but the affirmation that beyond the limits of nature, as it exists to sense, "nothing is, and nothing can be, known"? The "Natural Sciences" have nothing to do with it; it existed before they were as they are now; they exist now where it is denied; it exists to-day where they are known only in part.² Nobody knows better than Mr. Balfour that the most distinguished names in Natural Science are those of men as averse to "Naturalism" as he himself is. And this double definition was an argumentative as well as an historical blunder; it forces him to become, as it were, a scientific agnostic, in order that he may the better refute metaphysical agnosticism; and to become a fictitious character is certainly not the most effectual way of ending fiction. Nor is he a happy warrior who in battle strikes at friends as well as foes; in the result he may slay what he most of all wishes to save alive.

The Naturalism he thus defines he discusses from two points of view: the personal and practical, and the psychological and speculative. Under the first aspect, he shows its insufficiency to man as an ethical, aesthetic, and rational being. This is, to my thinking, his far most satisfactory piece of work; for it I have nothing but

praise. In Part I., which deals with it, his dialectic and literary qualities are seen at their best. Under the second aspect he shows that Naturalism is psychologically unjustified and speculatively incoherent; its theory of knowing contradicts its theory of being. His arguments are not new; they are the commonplaces of transcendental criticism; but they are vigorously put and strikingly illustrated and applied. The experience which supplies Naturalism with its premisses is not a thing of nature;³ nor are these premisses in the strict sense true to nature. "The most immediate experiences carry with them no inherent guarantee of their veracity." "Habitual inaccuracy" attends "the cognitive leap through perception to object." "Our perceptions, regarded as psychological results," are "regarded as sources of information, not merely occasionally inaccurate, but habitually mendacious."⁴ As a consequence, "science owes its being to an erroneous view as to what kind of information it is that our experiences directly convey to us."⁵ Nay, more, "Out of a succession of individual experiences" such a fundamental scientific principle as causation cannot be "reasonably extracted."⁶ The conclusion therefore is—"A philosophy which depends for its premisses in the last resort upon the particulars revealed to us in perceptive experience alone, is one that cannot rationally be accepted."⁷

Now, why this elaborate analysis and refutation of empiricism? It serves various ends, negative and positive. It is only by "an effectual criticism of empiricism" that Naturalism can be effectually destroyed,⁸ and the admission compelled that we are "as yet without a satisfactory philosophy."⁹ Doubts are started "as to the theoretic validity of certain universally accepted beliefs,"¹⁰ in order that a scientific standard may cease to be used as "sole test of truth."¹¹ Beliefs that are so open to doubt cannot be logically held to make other beliefs doubtful; the weapon sceptical criticism has blunted has lost its power to kill or even to wound. The result is that our ethical and religious ideas have nothing to fear at the hands of those termed scientific; their provinces differ, and, as regards the right to be, the one class has no advantage over the other.

1 P. 92.

2 That Mr. Balfour is perfectly well aware of the distinction is obvious (see p. 184); but in his reasoning he often allows it to seem as if he forgot it.

1 P. 108. 2 P. 111.

3 P. 118. Cf. "Philosophic Doubt," p. 287. "Science is a system of belief which, for anything we can allege to the contrary, is wholly without proof. The inferences by which it is arrived at are erroneous: the premisses on which it rests are unproved."

4 P. 119. 5 P. 183. 6 P. 184. 7 Pp. 246-7.
8 P. 246. 9 P. 235.

They are in many respects parallel, yet, in a sense, inter-independent. "Philosophic doubt" as to "an independent outer world" is possible, but "for all practical purposes" the belief in it "should be accepted with a credence which is immediate and unwavering."¹ Similarly doubt may be possible as to theological and ethical beliefs, yet they ought to be accepted as necessary to the satisfaction of human needs and the regulation of conduct. Both classes of belief are alike "symbolic"; "the world, as represented to us by science can no more be perceived or imagined than the Deity as represented by theology."² Our idea of Deity is no more anthropomorphic than our idea of the external world.³ Our knowledge of matter is no more direct than our knowledge of Deity.⁴ So ideas that are alike symbolic and alike open to sceptical criticism agree in a kind of unity; neither can claim preeminence or be used to discredit or disprove the other.

3. The cogency of the criticism is undeniable; its usefulness, within limits and properly balanced and qualified, may be undoubted; but what precisely does it accomplish in Mr. Balfour's hands, and how does it serve his purpose in regard to the foundations of belief? He himself recognizes its thoroughly sceptical character, not only so far as empirical theory, but even so far as fundamental scientific ideas are concerned.⁵ His two books are indeed models of mordant scepticism. He has said of his earlier book that "the title has attracted more interest than the contents."⁶ but the title is hardly just to the contents or their interest. It is not so much a "defence of philosophic doubt" as critical doubt of all the philosophies. These two are not only different, but almost opposite things; "philosophic doubt" is more positive in character than doubt of philosophy. Hume is the typical exponent of "philosophic doubt," but he is in some respects much more positive and even constructive than Mr. Balfour. He accepted the current philosophical doctrine of his day: Locke's "ideas of sensation," Berkeley's "ideas of sense," were his "impressions"; while, we may add in passing, the familiar "phenomena" of our contemporary thought, and Mr. Herbert Spencer's "vivid manifestations of the unknown" may be regarded as their living represen-

tatives, if not strict equivalents. Locke's "ideas of reflection," Berkeley's "ideas of imagination" were Hume's "ideas" which were echoes or reminiscences of the impression, true in the measure that they repeated it, false in the degree they omitted any feature of their original. Now, Hume did not trouble himself with Descartes' speculative deduction of being from thought, with his innate ideas and occasional causes; nor with Spinoza's substance, with its two attributes of extension and thought; nor with Leibnitz's monads and pre-established harmony, or his pregnant hint that the intellect was needed to interpret the impressions which the senses conveyed in from without. On the contrary, he resolutely left philosophical criticism alone, and, assuming the premisses of the home or native philosophy, turned to the problem they set him. He saw quite as clearly as our author sees that if "impressions" were ultimate, the origin of all knowledge and its only authentic elements, then those fundamental beliefs by which we interpreted both man and nature had no warrant in reason. Every "impression" was of a single or individual thing, a subjective experience which could tell nothing of the reality or nature of the objective world, its system or coherence, its causation or continuity, or of the continued personal being of the subjective. What caused and what experienced the "impressions" were alike unknown: nor were we endowed by Nature with any faculty or instrument sufficient for their discovery. But Hume was at once too subtle and too speculative to remain satisfied with so purely negative a conclusion; and so he boldly essayed to explain how beliefs that had no warrant from Nature yet naturally came to be. His problem was twofold: How did a fleeting succession of subjective "impressions" come to suggest and to seem a permanent and ordered outer world? And how could a stream of ideas in perpetual flux, and succeeding each other with inconceivable rapidity, come to bear the appearance of a continuous personal and conscious self? The solution lay in the mystic words "association" and "custom"; association was personal, individual, the tendency to join together in thought things perceived together in sense, to conceive as inseparable objects invariably associated in perception; but custom was collective—association worked into a habit at once common and personal. Now, Hume's scepticism, so construed, cannot, whatever we may think of its intellectual or philosophical validity, be denied a

1 P. 238.

2 "Philosophic Doubt," p. 245.

3 *Ib.* p. 246.

4 *Ib.* p. 258.

5 F. B. pp. 245-6; cf. "Philosophic Doubt," pp. 237

293.

6 "Essays and Addresses," p. 284.

positive character. His formation of ideas or beliefs by association or custom, whether arbitrary, illicit or accidental, was a philosophic theory of knowledge adapted to a special though current and common psychology. His speculative sincerity may be doubted, even when his speculative genius is admired,¹ but his philosophy was a theory intended to account for beliefs which, however unreal, had all the appearance and served all the purposes of realities. But Mr. Balfour, while more critical, is less positive than Hume. He may not be sceptical in his results, but he is so much so in his argumentative process as to leave us without any premisses that can justify his conclusions. His book is the work of a man who has "always found it easier to satisfy himself of the insufficiency of Naturalism than of the absolute sufficiency of any" other system of thought;² and what he gives is cogent destructive criticism unredressed by any equally cogent constructive argument. In other words, he vindicates his own principles by invalidating those of other people, but he does not explicate or justify the principles on which he builds his superstructure, or discover the basis on which they ultimately rest. Hume was sceptical both in his premisses and in his conclusion, though positive in his method; but Mr. Balfour, though positive in his conclusion, is negative in his method, and uncritical as to his premisses. He dismisses, by a searching critical process, our current philosophies, empirical and transcendental; then confesses he has no effectual substitute to offer, and finally offers a provisional theory for the unification of beliefs which throws into the most startling relief all the sceptical elements in his own criticism.

This criticism need not, perhaps, be further elaborated, but it is necessary that its precise point and purpose be not missed. There is no complaint that Mr. Balfour's criticism of empiricism is destructive; the more thorough he can make it in this respect the more wholesome will it be. The objection is to its purely sceptical character; it creates doubt, it does nothing more. It does not make the formation of belief more intelligible, the process of knowledge more conceivable, its results more real, or its conclusions more trustworthy. It involves all these things in deeper doubt; it turns the relation of mind to nature and of nature to mind into a hopeless maze, and creates suspicion as to the truth

and reality of knowledge. And this cannot be done at one point of our intellectual being without affecting every other. Scepticism is a double-edged weapon, and very dangerous in audacious hands. If faith in one class of beliefs is broken down, the result is more likely to be that all classes will suffer than that any one class will specially benefit. Doubt of the veracity of mind in its simplest operations has a subtle way of becoming doubt all round. Certainly faith is not made more possible by the processes and products of mind being made less intelligible and real. The want of a constructive philosophy, an architectonic idea and method, is a fatal want in a book which aims at the conservation of belief. Descartes' universal doubt was not doubt, and was not universal; it was a process of digging down to what the thinker believed to be solid rock, in order that he might build upon thought a system which thought could clearly conceive—*i. e.*, the critical process was necessary to the architectural purpose—was, indeed, the first stage in its realization. So, too, the Transcendental Idealism, which is here so episodically criticised, may handle Empiricism quite as caustically as our author, but it does so that it may discover the real factors or positive condition of knowledge. Its aim is to make the universe more intelligible to man, and man more intelligible to himself; to show the subjective reason and the objective rationality in such reciprocal action and correspondence as to make the process of knowledge a solution of the problem of being. The theory may be true or it may be false, but, at least, it is positive—*i. e.*, it so uses the transcendental factor in knowledge, the interpreting reason, as to discover and determine the real ultimate of being, the interpreted reason, and to make the thought which unites these a veracious and rational process. But Mr. Balfour's method is purely sceptical; he leaves mind bewildered in the face of Nature, unable to trust its perceptions, unable to determine what is truth, unable to feel any reality in knowledge. By this means he may have made the fundamental ideas of science too doubtful to be used against faith; but what is the only logical deduction possible from the principles which he has used his sceptical method to obtain? Why, this: Since error creeps into all our thought, and uncertainty surrounds all our knowledge of Nature, how can we know that there is any truth anywhere, in any premiss or in any argument, any certainty in any knowl-

¹ "Foundations of Belief," p. 96. Cf. "Philosophic Doubt," pp. 85-6.

² "Foundations of Belief," p. 92.

edge, any reality in any belief? If such be the result of his sceptical criticism, where is the advantage to faith? For what does it represent in thought save the method of the blind Samson who sacrificed himself in order that he might the more effectually bury the Philistines under the ruins of their own temple?

III.

So far we have been concerned with what may be termed fundamental philosophical theory; we have now to proceed to its application to religious or theological belief.

1. And here I may say that Mr. Balfour seems to me to have no adequate sense of the range and complexity of the problem he has set for himself; *that* is nothing less than to find a positive philosophy of religious beliefs. And this is all the more bound to find that his destructive criticism has been so merciless and so complete. But this problem cannot be discussed simply as if it were a matter of individual experience, or a question of contemporary thought. There is nothing at once so universal and so particular, so uniform and so varied, as religion. Man everywhere possesses and professes it, yet it is never in any two countries, with any two peoples, or even any two persons, exactly the same thing. There are, therefore, two distinct yet cognate questions: Why are religious beliefs at once so invariable and so varied? Why do they everywhere emerge, and yet everywhere assume some specific local form? It is evident that the special function of the philosophy of religion is to explain at once why religious belief is so universal and uniform, and religious beliefs so multiform and varied. The causes that produce it must be common and continuous in their action; but the conditions that produce variation, local and occasional. The creative factor can never cease to operate, otherwise the belief would cease to live; and were the modifying conditions to become inactive, all beliefs would tend to a monotony of character or sameness of form. The one question is wholly philosophical, the other is partly philosophical and partly historical; and taken together they signify that the only scientific and satisfactory method of inquiry and discussion is the constant correlation of the permanent factor of belief with its varying forms in order to the discovery of the reason at once of its continuous life and constant change. Now, what one most of all misses in this book is the sense that there is such a prob-

lem, that it is initial to all philosophical theology, that till it be discussed neither the bed nor the material for any foundation for belief has been found. One is surprised to find Mr. Balfour distinguishing as he does between "causes" and "reasons" of belief; in the only sense tolerable in such a discussion "causes" are "reasons," and reason is cause. In a scientific theory of the genesis of knowledge we find its justification; in a philosophical explanation of the origin of belief we have its vindication. The very process which, consciously and analytically pursued by the individual, justifies his theism, produces, when spontaneously and synthetically pursued by the race, the beliefs which have organized and built up its religions.

But we must take Mr. Balfour on his own terms; we have no right to demand his acceptance of ours. Well, then, let us grant that his sceptical criticism has been completely victorious, empiricism is vanquished, and its scientific ideas so paralyzed that they can no longer be used as tests or standards to determine the credibility or incredibility of theological beliefs. What then? The beliefs are *there*: What are they? How did they come to be? How are they to be justified? He has proved scientific ideas to be so incapable of proof as to be without normative value or force in the ethical and religious realm, but he has not proved theological beliefs to be true; on the contrary, he has pursued a method which compels us to approach them in an attitude of doubt or even negation. The radical scepticism which has created doubt of one class of beliefs has created a presumption against the truth of the other class. But what do we find here? A sudden reversal of the method before pursued, and no attempt made to compel the beliefs to give an account of themselves, to justify their being or to examine their form and contents in the light of their source. The whilom sceptic becomes curiously credulous, while he skilfully does not see the questions which he can neither discuss nor answer frankly and explicitly; but he offers an instructive substitute for a discussion. There is a titular inquiry into the "Causes of Experience."¹ What are these "causes"? The most diligent search through the book has left me still with the question, but without any answer. This, of course, may be purely my fault, but the fruits of the search are worth recording. "Naturalism" is dismissed; what,

¹ Part III. chap. 1.

then, is to be our system? Not dualism, "a natural world immediately subject to causation, and a spiritual world immediately subject to God." This is "a patchwork scheme of belief," "a rough-and-ready expedient" for escaping from "the rigid limits of a too narrow system," excellent in a measure, and not to be hastily condemned, but clearly a system in which many find it "difficult or impossible to acquiesce."¹ To those who "ask for a philosophy which shall give rational unity to an adequate creed" he answers, "I have it not to give."² Instead, "provisionally restricting himself to the scientific point of view," he forbears "to consider 'beliefs from the side of proof,'" and "surveys them for a season from the side of origin only, and in relation to the causes which gave them birth."³ This is excellent; the best philosophy of belief is an adequate theory of its origin, though we note that the forbearance from proof is here logical, or rather inevitable; the sceptical criticism had made any other course simply impossible, especially any course involving rational proof. What, then, is the cause or origin of "the apparatus of belief" (a most significant phrase) "which we find actually connected with the higher scientific, social, and spiritual life of the race"?⁴ The causes are many, "presuppose the beliefs of perception" (the very perception which had been proved so habitually inaccurate and mendacious), "memory, and expectation in their elementary shape," and "an organism fitted for their hospitable reception by ages of ancestral preparation." We may note, in passing, how empirical and scientific this mode of speech is; but "these conditions" (not *causes*, it will be seen), "are clearly not enough"; there must be "an appropriate environment," and within this is "a group of causes" (not conditions), "so important in their collective operation" as to demand "detailed notice." The name of this group is "authority," and our immediate concern is with it as "a non-rational cause of belief."

Now, our first question here is, What does Mr. Balfour mean by "Authority"? It is a large word, denotes varied things, connotes many ideas. It has one sense in literature, another in science, another in law, still another in religion; in the realm of opinion it denotes the right to define and the power to enforce belief; in the sphere of action, the right to prescribe conduct and to exact obedience. It has been

conceived as both personal and impersonal, vested in the one case in a society like the Church, or in a body of beliefs like tradition, or a written word like the Sacred Scriptures; or, in the other case, in either an invisible Head like our Lord, or in a visible head like the Pope. Now, in what sense does Mr. Balfour use the term? He says it is "a word which transports us into a stormy tract of speculation nearly adjacent to theology";¹ it may be too much to say it "has been for three centuries the main battle-field of new thoughts and old," but we can contrast it with reason, its "rival and opponent."² "We are acted upon by authority," but when "we reason" we act, we produce.³ When it is so described we seem to be dealing with authority in its special religious sense, as legislative over opinion, and judicial as regards conduct; but this soon turns out to be a mistake. For under one aspect it is the *Zeitgeist*, the spirit of the age; then it appears as a "psychological atmosphere," or "climate," favorable to some, unfavorable to other beliefs;⁴ then it assumes the shape of "custom, education, public opinion, family, party, or Church";⁵ in a, for him, curious antithesis, "the equities of reason" are opposed to "the expediencies of authority";⁶ and finally, it is said to "stand for that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning,"⁷ and in this sense it is contrasted with "Papal infallibility."⁸ What, then, does he mean by "authority"? Why, exactly what Hume meant by "custom"; what Mr. Spencer might describe as the accumulated and transmitted experience of the race, of the State, or of the family. It is an explanation of belief by means of a "non-rational cause";⁹ in Hume's phrase, it is "belief engendered upon custom," which custom he would, in turn, have termed the creation of "a certain kind of accident"—*i. e.*, a result which was "non-rational," or for which he could give no reason. We may understand why Hume should tell us that the "ultimate cause of the impression is perfectly inexplicable by human reason," that reason itself is only "an unintelligible instinct," that "belief is an act of the mind arising

1 P. 194. 2 Pp. 195, 219. 3 P. 203. 4 P. 206.

5 P. 218. 6 P. 215. 7 P. 219. 8 P. 223 ff.

9 In "Philosophic Doubt" Mr. Balfour seemed prepared to apply his theory to theological as well as to other beliefs: "The progress of knowledge has led us rather to diminish our estimate of the part which reasons as opposed to other causes have played in the formation of creeds; for it has shown that these reasons are themselves the results of non-rational antecedents."—Pp. 200-1.

from custom," which is "the foundation of all our judgments"—*that* was scepticism logically applied to all classes of beliefs ; but what we do not understand is how custom, though transmuted into "authority," should be able to save one class of beliefs while criticism is free to inflict upon another the sentence of intellectual death. What seems plain is that Mr. Balfour has, by emptying the reason or normal nature of man of all constructive ideas, emptied it also of all the higher beliefs, and so has to invent a special agency or method for their introduction. In other words, the sceptical criticism has evoked its inevitable Nemesis—*i. e.*, has divorced thought as completely from God as perception from the realities of Nature, and so made, in Mr. Balfour's own words, "certitude the child of custom,"¹ only custom has undergone baptism, and appears as "authority," the demure mother of Christian beliefs.

2. Now, on this very curious theory, which is also most instructive, especially so far as it illustrates Mr. Balfour's own mind and attitude to theology, I have some criticisms to offer.

i. What is the "reason" to which "authority" is here opposed ? It seems to be not so much "reason" as ratiocination. The use and interchange of terms in this chapter is indeed a perplexing but highly educative study. We have "reason," "we reason," "reasoning" gliding out and in of sentences and taking each other's places as if they were strict synonyms. Now, ratiocination may denote an activity or exercise, or process of the reason, but it is not reason, and is in no sense the antithesis of authority, under which, as scholasticism shows, it may live and operate with quite preternatural acuteness and success. If these opposed terms had been carefully discriminated and defined we should have been spared this chapter.

ii. It is curious that the author, in dealing with a matter so fundamental to his argument, should never raise the question—how this authority, or custom, or group of causes "of psychic processes," acting within our psychological environment, came to be ? To what kind or class of factors or agencies does it owe its existence ? He describes it as "a non-rational cause of belief," but what is it itself—a creation of reason, a result of purpose, or a non-rational effect of a non-rational cause ? If reason made it, how can it be truly described as "a non-rational cause of belief" ? If reason did not make it, what did ? Accident

or chance ? But these terms denote the worst sort of Agnosticism; they are the kind of words which a moment of puzzled incompetence surprised out of sceptic Hume, and so they are alien to the mind which comes to lead us into the inner court of theology. The question as to the source or cause of the authority is determinative of its nature and character ; one would think that if it be a "rational effect" it could not be a "non-rational cause" of a thing so rational as ethical and religious belief. And the greater the function authority has in history and in the formation of mind, the less can we conceive it as a non-rational factor of rational things ; otherwise the forces which govern man will cease to be either theistic or ethical. And the puzzlement is increased by some of Mr. Balfour's own phrases. His "authority" assumes various most rational forms ; "the spirit of the age," which is just the intellectual atmosphere created by its living thought ; parental discipline, which is surely the action of rational will upon rational will ; education, which is the more mature acting by means of rational instruments on the less mature mind ; custom, which is a mode of intelligent action become habitual and common.² What acts under these forms and conditions is surely incorrectly described as "a non-rational cause of belief." The phrase seems, therefore, to me either insignificant or absurd. If what is here termed authority—viz., our organized ethical ideals—intellectual habits, and social instincts in their organizing action—have a rational cause—and unless this be granted we depose Providence for accident—then it must be rational when it becomes a cause of beliefs. And, whatever their cause, what are beliefs ? Non-rational effects ? If so, what are the things whose being Mr. Balfour would justify but blind creations of a blind cause which man must with his growth in reason get progressively rid of ?

iii. It is also curious that Mr. Balfour did not raise the question as to the relation of the individual to these beliefs of non-rational origin. Man is ever modifying his environment by his action on it, which means that this so-called authority is ever in process of change, being, as it were, ever called to account and compelled to adapt itself to the new mind and its new forms of belief or modes of thought ; and this further means that the person whom

¹ Mr. Balfour in one place explains "authority" by "the non-rational action of mind on mind" (p. 238). Sentences of this order cause one's ideas to get a little mixed.

the authority forms, in turn reforms the authority. For the life of the belief is quite as significant as its origin. If its origin is non-rational, it lives its life in a rational medium, and has to accept the conditions under which life there is possible. And surely it is more philosophical to bring the causes of the origin and the conditions of the maintenance of life into harmony, than to set them at war with each other. We must also remember that the life of the belief within the reason ever acts as a modifying force on the environment. Mr. Balfour knows the distinction which the Roman jurists drew between *jus naturale* and *jus civile*, and the use they made of the former to affect the latter. The *jus civile* was statutory, established and fixed law, as it were, the actual legal environment; the *jus naturale* was ideal, the principle of justice and equity immanent in the man, yet, with the progress of his ethical culture, growing ever more articulate. And the great jurists of the second and third centuries, who were also for the most part Stoics, so applied the ideal of law within to the actual law without as to compel the actual to embody the ideal, at least in as perfect a degree as we are ever likely to see in time. And precisely the same action is ever going on in the region of belief. Whatever may be its origin, thought is a potent factor in its modification; and on its harmony with thought its continued life depends. A "non-rational cause" is no explanation of the being of a rational thing; and we may be certain that in the last analysis the real source can never be different in kind from the cause which secures continuance.

iv. The most curious point of all is this: Mr. Balfour never raises the question as to whether the authority which causes the belief justifies the belief it causes. This surely was for his purpose the most vital point in his problem; apart from it his cause was without character or logical function. The real question he set himself to answer was this: What are we to think of Christian theology and the principles on which it is built? It is not any or every religious belief that he seeks to justify; it is our specifically Christian beliefs. He has made his appeal to authority, which is "the spirit of the age," our "psychological climate," public opinion, custom, family, party, Church; but these are all the most variable of things. Our "psychological climates" are more numerous, varied, and changeable than our geographical; the extremes are greater, the gradations steeper,

and the variations more sudden. Mr. Balfour is a statesman as well as a philosopher, and he will not think me impertinent if the point be illustrated by his own position and experience. He is by descent and family a Scotchman, by education and political place an Englishman; the "psychological climate" in Scotland is Presbyterian; in England, Episcopalian: does his double nationality duplicate his beliefs? Does it justify his being a Calvinist and Presbyterian north of the Tweed, an Arminian and an Anglican south of it? Are the proper beliefs of a man those of his "psychological climate"? or is this "climate" a justification for the beliefs? or has it no significance for their character? But this is an innocent comparison, involving what may be thought no very radical difference. Well, then, Mr. Balfour, as a statesman, has helped to govern India, he may one day be at home the responsible minister for it, or even go out there to be the representative of his Sovereign. Its "psychological climate," customs, education, public opinion—in a word, "authority"—is very unlike ours: what of the beliefs it causes? What is their truth, their validity, their value and warrant? The question is not simply curious; it is vital. If authority is invoked to explain belief, how do the beliefs it explains stand related to theology and theological truth? Is religion to become a theory of "climate"? And is all idea of a religion true for all places, all times, and all men to be allowed to fall to the ground? This would be indeed a strange result to follow from a philosophically conservative attempt to lay "the foundations of belief." Yet it recalls the attempt of another conservative and sceptical philosopher to make the "psychological" coincide with the civil or national, if not with the geographical, climate; it exactly repeats the theory of Hobbes, with impersonal authority substituted for the personal king. We were not surprised at it in his case, for he had a frankness which was so blunt as to leave no room for surprise; but we do wonder at finding it in so acute a critic of "Naturalism," and so strenuous an upholder of theology as Mr. Arthur Balfour.

IV.

But it is more than time we passed to the constructive part of the work, if constructive it can be called. Here it is more difficult to criticise, for the points of agreement and difference are in these later chapters so intricately intermixed. His argument has about it the waywardness of genius, it halts in unexpected places, turns back upon

itself, breaks into felicitous asides, diverges into delightsome by-paths. The book indeed is redeemed by its digressions ; without them it would have seemed a mere exercise in cunning sword-play, but with them it has all the appearance of an army of victorious arguments marching into the battle. Were battles won by gallant bearing, gay banners, and martial music, our author would deserve to be saluted as a victor indeed.

What, then, is the method and principle of the constructive argument? It starts with the provisional scheme for the unification of beliefs; and here the definition of faith is significant: "Faith or assurance, which, if not in excess of reason, is at least independent of it, seems to be a necessity in every great department of knowledge which touches on action."¹ In this sense it belongs in an equal degree at once to science and theology, to ethics and religion; and while the belief in an outer world is more universal and inevitable than any single religious belief, yet "these peculiarities have no import. They exist, but they are irrelevant." For man is a being of needs as well as of sense-perceptions, his needs require ethical ideals and religious beliefs for their satisfaction. And just as in every belief which has its origin in perception we assume some kind of harmony between ourselves and the outer universe, so a like harmony ought to be assumed between "that universe and our higher needs."² What strikes one in this rather rudimentary equation of beliefs is its unreasoned character, indeed the utterly illogical and unphilosophical procedure by which it has been accomplished. Nothing could be more different than the measure which is meted out to the two orders of beliefs respectively. The one class has been analyzed, criticised, satirised, beaten and buffeted in every possible way ; the other class is allowed to enter without any kind of question or any attempt to examine either its subjective warrant or objective validity. But this difference is a serious confession either of the incompetence of the philosophy to justify the beliefs or of the incapability of the beliefs to be justified. It is an acknowledgment that they cannot bear to be reasoned about, but live in a region of emotion or instinct, of feeling and impulse. This is of all positions the most intellectually dangerous, especially when the basis for it has been laid in philosophical scepticism. For feeling is an individual thing, living an unstable and

dependent life, noble only as it is penetrated by the intellect and governed by the conscience. A distinguished German thinker whose philosophy was even as Mr. Balfour's, described himself as a heathen according to the intellect, but a Christian according to the heart. And where such a schism has been introduced into the nature, the old heathen is certain to prove himself subtler and stronger than the young Christian.

Mr. Balfour, indeed, maintains that the relation between our "needs" and their satisfaction is not as "purely subjective in character" as that between "a desire and its fulfilment." The correspondence is that between "the immutable verities of the unseen world," and "these characteristics of our nature, which we recognize as that in us which, though not necessarily the strongest, is the highest."¹ But what are these "characteristics?" What faculty in us corresponds to verity in the universe? Is it not reason or thought, the faculty by which we know rather than feel? He had everything to gain by as free a use of the critical method on the source, the form, and the matter of religious beliefs, as on the basis and truth of scientific ideas ; by his failure to use it he leaves to the beliefs an unjustified existence, introduces a hopeless schism between knowledge and faith, and tends to reduce religion to a mere consuetudinary and institutional system. Indeed, the notion that religion—though not religious ideas—is the creature of custom, the thing of "psychological atmosphere" or political "climate," is the historical correlative of his fundamental philosophy, and though incompletely developed, it lurks in all the constructive parts of the book, notably in his theories of "authority" and of "beliefs and formulas."

But I would not part from the book and its author without expressing anew my admiration of its spirit and of his purpose and endeavor. It is a remarkable achievement for a statesman, and gives to the State the happy assurance that a mind which may yet control its destinies has visions of higher and more enduring things than the strife of parties, the collision of interests, or the jealousies of classes. We live by faith, and this faith is here often fitly and finely expressed. To his belief in a God capable of "preferential action"; in an inspiration "limited to no age, to no country, to no people"; in an incarnation which may transcend science, but is "the abiding-place of the highest reality"; in

Christianity as a religion so "effectually fitted to minister to our ethical needs" as to be made even more credible by the mystery of evil which it so forcibly recognizes that it may the more victoriously overcome—I entirely and heartily subscribe. My criticism has concerned not so much the end he has reached as his mode of reaching it. The way of faith is in these days hard enough; it need not be made more difficult; and it becomes those who believe that the highest truth of reason is one with the highest object of faith, to make it clear that in their view at least a true theology can never be built on a sceptical philosophy, and that only the thought which trusts the reason can truly vindicate faith in the God who gave it.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF.*

BY JAMES MARTINEAU.

From *The Nineteenth Century* (London), April, 1895.

The *Notes* on *The Foundations of Belief*, from the hand of a rising statesman, pleasantly recall Plato's implied prophecy, that "until in our states either philosophers are rulers, or the present nominal rulers become competent philosophers, and political power and philosophy coalesce, and the ordinary natures that seek the one without the other are forced to stand aside, there is no rest from ills for states, or indeed for human kind, and our true commonwealth cannot possibly be born and see the light," † "that ideal state, the model of which is stored in heaven." † For once that we may be liable to go wrong under leaders whose judgment on social problems is "too academic," we incur a tenfold risk of mistake through a blind copying of some unsifted "practical experience." The men of the intellectual schools, moreover, are of "climates" and temperaments sufficiently different to watch and check one another; as in the present case, our two Right Hons. Messrs. Balfour and Huxley, by their exchange of criticisms, will perhaps help us, their readers, to conclusions better balanced than their own.

At all events, they produce delightful books. The impressive charm of Mr. Balfour's even tempts the eager reader to do him a certain wrong, by treating its title of *Notes* as over-modest, and trying the work by a standard to which it does not profess to conform. It is not a didactic exposition of what, in Berkeley's lucid English, was

known as *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, but now is rebaptized as *Epistemology*; for it does not even tell us what "knowledge" is, by what mark we may recognize it when we see it, or how we must go to work to get it, or in what respect it differs from "belief" that falls short of it. This would require a systematic and constructive treatise—a philosophical *Organon*—which the reader is not to expect. And yet he comes upon so much of the matter and so many of the questions on which such a manual would touch, that he is apt to move through the text with a wrong measure in his thought. The *Notes* are strictly a series of critical reflections on certain finished systems, arising in a mind familiar with several, and finding lacunæ or contradictions in all. Of the beliefs thus dropped off, like derelicts at sea without compass or anchor, are some charged with the most precious of human treasures. To provide for their recovery and reunion, the charts are revised, the longitude retaken, the computations corrected, till the broken track is remedied, and the common destination is plain once more. The unification of moral conviction, æsthetic apprehension, and religious trust with intellectual cognition, is the aim of which the author never loses sight. What advances he makes towards its realization it will be the object of the following remarks to estimate.

To prepare the way for his own *Provisional Philosophy*, Mr. Balfour shows the need of it by reviewing in succession the two systems now in the ascendant, the Naturalism of the Scientists and the Idealism of the Hegelians, and by emphasizing the missing requisites in both. Either of them might work and give a coherent account of "Man's place in Nature," if he had no personality, no responsibility, no spiritual dependence. But neither of them finds room for these facts, which he knows as certainly as he knows his own existence.

The essence of Naturalism (often called Agnosticism, Positivism, or Empiricism)

is sufficiently easy to describe. For its leading doctrines are that we may know "phenomena" and the laws by which they are connected, but nothing more. More there may or may not be; but if it exists we can never apprehend it; and, whatever the world may be "in its reality" (supposing such an expression to be otherwise than meaningless), the world for us—the world with which alone we are concerned, or of which alone we can have any cognizance—is that world which is revealed to us through perception, and which is the subject-matter of the natural sciences. Here, and here only, are we on firm ground. Here, and here only, can we discover anything which deserves to be described as knowledge. Here, and here only,

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† *Republic*, 473 D.

‡ *Ibid.* 592.

may we profitably exercise our reason, or gather the fruits of wisdom. Such, in rough outline, is Naturalism.*

The phenomena, then, which alone we can know, are changes which turn up and constitute our experience of sensible perception. They deliver to our knowledge certain contents of an outer world—the qualities of form, dimension, color, relative place and movement, of objects within sight; and, in doing so, make us acquainted with several varieties of sensation and judgment in ourselves. On these empirical data science takes its stand and begins its work; scrutinizing them according to their kinds, physiologically and psychologically; noting down their order of succession in time and their groups of co-existence in space; measuring their intensive and extensive quantities; till their laws of occurrence are made out, and we can read their story back into the past and forward into the future.

Are, then, these phenomena as scientifical-
ly known what they were as presented in per-
ception? Are the qualities in a visible object
a fac-simile of their idea in us? Of a billiard
ball, *e. g.*, is our idea round and hard and red?
If not, the quality—which alone we know—
has nothing in common with the perception
which constitutes our experience of it, and
cannot be revealed by it; the phenomenon
present in our consciousness is in a different
world from that of which it is supposed to
give report: and if we believe its report and
ask no questions, it is at our peril; for it
has no credentials to offer. We take it on
trust, in blind reliance on the veracity of
our modes of cognition. Yet, the more
closely we look at this seeming act of *imme-
diate* apprehension, the more does it elong-
ate itself into a chain bridge of many
links unseen at first. The object's color is
not its own, but a selection of the light-rays
which it can reflect; these "rays" again turn
out to be ether-undulations of definite and
calculable number, while the absorption of
the rest depends on the molecular constitu-
tion of the reflecting body. On the other
hand, the observer's conscious experience is
conditional on neural changes conceivable
only as forms of motion in the organic
elements; the last of which, were it ever so
visible, would only look down into the dark
chasm which separates physical movement
from intelligent thought. The knowledge,
therefore, which Naturalism assigns to per-
ceptive experience of phenomena as its ex-
clusive possession turns out, as Mr. Balfour
shows in an elaborate argument too ample
for condensation, to be in the same plight as

the metaphysical entities postulated by ethics and religion. We are thus reduced to a very simple alternative. If nothing is to be taken as *known*, which comprises anything *assumed*, the naturalistic field, as well as the ethic, the aesthetic, and the religious, must be confiscated to the Agnostic. If it is legitimate for Naturalism to assume the uniformity and determinism of the cosmic causality, and the limitation of human cognition to phenomena, it cannot be inadmissible for the human conscience and religious sense to assume, as the truest interpretation of their experience, their relation, of free personality, with a Divine Author of duty and Sustainer of spiritual life. The most resolute sceptic cannot escape metaphysical beliefs by hiding himself among "phenomena." In knowing *them*, he knows himself as subject of the knowledge, and is aware that, as phenomena, they are not self-existent, but must be referred to some permanent ground to which they belong. The existence of other minds, human or Divine, neither needs nor admits of "proof" from premisses more certain than itself, and may well rely, for safe-keeping, on a position counterpart to the most certain of all, the existence of the thinker himself.

Mr. Balfour's critique on "Naturalism" would perhaps have gained additional strength, had his attitude towards these necessary *postulates* in the premisses of the first possible *proof* been less ambiguous. That there must be *data* from which to start your primary syllogism, and that such data must be chosen as *self-evident*, is obvious, but is a fact which Mr. Balfour does not willingly look in the face. It is more like a mere "making the best" of a bad case than a firm assertion of a good one. The word "reason" must not be applied to anything *unproven*; such propositions, accordingly, are repeatedly called "non-*ra-
tional*" or "irrational." For want of a well-grounded *Epistemology* the reader is never distinctly told what it is to *know*; what constitutes the "rationality" of beliefs which are not held on the tenure of *inference*; what stock there is of *given* premisses, which are legitimate as *self-evident*, intuitively known. This is the more to be regretted because the usual marks relied on for the singling out of such *data* of belief, *viz.*, their "inevitableness" and their "uni-
versality," are expressly repudiated, on the ground that these features, with the *certitude* which they secure, are the blind effects of custom, and afford no guarantee of truth. Among the *causes* of our beliefs, none are so irresistible or universally operative as inher-

itance, tradition, nationality, education, the *Zeitgeist* and the *genius loci*; and none are so ineffectual against these pressures of our environment as the *reasons* which may prompt us to resist them. I will not dispute this estimate of relative strength in the competition between custom and intelligence, but must avow my surprise at Mr. Balfour's satisfaction with it. He sides with the victorious inertia, and holds cheap the disturbing influence of thought. There is a strange caprice, not to say shabbiness, in his treatment of "reason" throughout. He pays it the compliment of using it freely and with fine effect in his conflict with Naturalism; he disclaims any intention "to discredit reason";* he pleads that "if one consequence of his investigation has been to diminish the importance commonly attributed to reason among the causes by which belief is produced, it is by the action of reason itself that this result has been brought about."† Yet he welcomes this depreciating result, saying:

Nor is the comparative pettiness of the rôle thus played by reasoning in human affairs a matter for regret. Not merely because we are ignorant of the data required for the solution even of very simple problems in organic and social life, are we called on to acquiesce in an arrangement which, to be sure, we have no power to disturb; nor yet because these data, did we possess them, are too complex to be dealt with by any rational calculus we possess, or are ever likely to acquire; but because, in addition to these difficulties, reasoning is a force most apt to divide and disintegrate; and, though division and disintegration may often be the necessary preliminaries of social development, still more necessary are the forces which bind and stiffen, without which there would be no society to develop.‡

The "custom," whose authority Mr. Balfour prefers to the dictates of "reason," is the mere product of the social environment, and has only local, social and temporal "inevitability" and "universality." A belief that has no more to show for itself than such relative marks is as likely to be false as true. But when the "inevitability" and "universality" are unconditional, co-extensive with the faculty of reason itself, and inherent in its constitution, they are genuine vouchers for the truth of the belief. If what we all *have to think* in virtue of our endowment with intellect cannot be depended on for validity—nay, must even be taken for false because we think it—our whole cognitive apparatus becomes a fraud, and the only thing we can know is our own doom of absolute ignorance. The syllogistic analysis and organization of "proof" do not exhaust the

business of reason; in these is presupposed its higher function, viz., the discrimination of primary from dependent beliefs, and the entry of them as claiming intuitive recognition. To effect this selection reason must apply itself to psychological phenomena fairly predictable of mankind at large; and when it has got hold of what everybody cannot help believing, yet nobody can derive from what is more certain still, it has found the reality of which it was in quest, unless he has been decoyed into the trap of a lying universe. The willing acceptance of this small group of postulated beliefs (including that of the veracity of the world) may be called, if you will, *faith* instead of *reason*. If reason be taken with Mr. Balfour as equivalent to *reasoning*, or mediated belief, *faith* will be its proper counterpart, as denoting *immediate belief*. But I must refuse to tie up the intellect in its search for truth to the business of ratiocination, and to allow reason no partnership in a *faith that is rational*. The intuitive apprehension of first principles, which may legitimately be assumed as self-evident, is a surer sign of penetrating insight and clear judgment than dexterous weaving of dialectic proof. Nor is this larger interpretation of reason without sanction from Mr. Balfour. The moment his thought springs from the human to the Divine sphere, the "pettiness" of the intellectual function disappears, and it becomes creative and sublime. In the transcendent region it reigns supreme as the cause of causes: it organizes the cosmos, thinks out all truth into reality, invents the varieties of beauty, and evolves the gradation of spiritual good. On the theatre of human life it appears crippled and insignificant—overborne by a crowd of blind authorities that dictate what we *shall* believe, in defiance of what we *ought to* believe. This prevailing forgetfulness of the Divine relations of reason often affects me towards Mr. Balfour's own theoretic attitude much as he himself feels towards Mr. Spencer's naturalism and its outlook.

Mr. Spencer, who pierces the future with a surer gaze than I can make the least pretence to, looks confidently forward to a time when the relation of man to his surroundings will be so happily contrived that the reign of absolute righteousness will prevail; conscience, grown unnecessary, will be dispensed with; the path of least resistance will be the path of virtue; and not the "broad," but the "narrow way," will "lead to destruction." These excellent consequences seem to me to flow very smoothly and satisfactorily from his particular doctrine of evolution, combined with his particular doctrine of morals. But I confess that my own personal gratification at the prospect is some-

* P. 246. † *Ibid.* ‡ Pp. 228, 229.

what dimmed by the reflection that the same kind of causes which make conscience superfluous will relieve us from the necessity of intellectual effort, and that by the time we are all perfectly good, we shall also be all perfectly idiotic.

I know not how it may strike the reader, but I at least am left sensibly poorer by the deposition of reason from its ancient position as the ground of all existence to that of an expedient among other expedients for the maintenance of organic life; an expedient, moreover, which is temporary in its character, and insignificant in its effects. An irrational universe which accidentally turns out a few reasoning animals at one corner of it, as a rich man may experiment at one end of his park with some curious "sport" accidentally produced among his flocks and herds, is a universe which we might well despise, if we did not ourselves share its degradation. But must we not inevitably share it? Pascal somewhere observes that man, however feeble, is yet in his very feebleness superior to the blind forces of nature, for he knows himself, and they do not. I confess that on the naturalistic hypothesis I see no such superiority. If, indeed, there were a rational author of nature, and if, in any degree—even the most insignificant—we shared his attributes; we might well conceive ourselves as of finer essence and more intrinsic worth than the material world which we inhabit, immeasurable though it may be. But if we be the creation of the world—if it made us what we are and will again unmake us—how then? The sense of humor, not the least precious among the gifts with which the clash of atoms has endowed us, should surely prevent us assuming any airs of superiority over other and more powerful members of the same family of "phenomena," more permanent and more powerful than ourselves.*

Mr. Balfour's recommendation to the general reader to pass over his chapter on Transcendental Idealism, I must accept as applicable no less to his ordinary reviewer—so far at least as to allow him only the few sentences needful to indicate the position of the critique in the author's arguments.

With the two factors of experience, the world perceived and the perceiving mind, it is possible to work out the result from opposite ends; empirical psychology setting the senses to build up the mind as a natural product; and idealism reserving nature and all its tissue of relations to be the creation of the mind's own activity. The thinking subject and the object of thought do not, in this view, belong to different worlds, of which either might exist without the other, but are linked in interdependence: each *kind* of relation, be it of resemblance, of co-existence or succession, of causality, etc., supplying a distinct category; and the whole manifold of categories being co-extensive with the cosmos, and when referred back to their unrelated pre-existence, identical with

God. "God," says Professor Edward Caird, "is the unity of subject and object."

I will not wrong Mr. Balfour's very effective criticism of this strangely prevalent doctrine by any attempt to compress it. That the doctrine takes away the predicate of *personality*, in any intelligible sense, from both the human and the Divine agent, and that its determinism leaves no room for ethical responsibility, is evident at a glance—a consequence which even Spinoza admitted to be serious. "To the belief in freedom," he says, "must be referred, at least in their higher degrees, *remorse* and *self-approval*, *i.e.*, sorrow and satisfaction, for something personally done with the consciousness of one's self as its cause"; "feelings of the utmost vehemence, from the belief which men have that they are free";* and similarly intensified are the affections directed upon a free-will agent; "love and hatred in any given case must each be greater towards a being supposed to be free than towards a necessary instrument."† And if the ethical enthusiasms are shamed away as illusions at the bidding of this doctrine, still more desolate is the religion which tries to worship the "unity of subject and object." How are we to draw near to such veiled divinity? What homage can we bring? To fall before Him with adoring thought is to make Him an objective being; to say, "Lord, Thou knowest all things" is to address Him as the subject of intelligence. In either case, we deny Him by breaking the unity which is His essence. He is not reached till we retreat behind the component terms of all relations; being the abstract *prior* of a universe made up of relational categories, on the rise and in the presence of which He becomes "One that hideth Himself."

Consider only what this means. No predicate of any relational term can He have. He is not matter. He is not mind. He does not think or act. He is not good or evil. He is the Absolute of all such antithesis, without causing them or caring for them, or taking sides in their history. If the universe, as Professor E. Caird says, is "a thinking Being," its "dialectic process" is not *His*, but must be sought in the consciousness of the creatures. He cannot be the inspirer of thought, the object of love and trust, the rewarder of righteousness, the perfection of holiness, of beauty, and of blessedness.

With the removal of the two systems of highest pretensions to recognition as coherent and adequate philosophies of the world—Naturalism and Idealism—the way is open

* Pp. 74-76.

* Eth. iii. xxx.; Schol. ii. Schol. Def. Aff. 25, 27.

† Eth. iii. xlxi.; and Schol.

for the advance to Mr. Balfour's own provisional theory. As this, however, has to deal more closely with theology, even on its historical side, than with speculative philosophy, he approaches it through some interesting notices of eighteenth-century opinion and more recent modes of criticism and doctrinal belief.

One memorable attempt to repair the insufficiency of Naturalism, while saving its fundamental principle, Mr. Balfour thus describes : the remedy

consists in simply setting up side by side with the creed of natural science another and supplementary set of beliefs which may minister to needs and aspirations which science cannot meet, and may speak amid the silences which science is powerless to break. The natural world and the spiritual world—the world which is immediately subject to causation, and the world which is immediately subject to God—are, on this view, each of them real, and each of them the object of real knowledge. But the laws of the natural world are revealed to us by the discoveries of science; while the laws of the spiritual world are revealed to us through the authority of spiritual intuitions, inspired witnesses, or divinely guided institutions. And the two regions of knowledge lie side by side, contiguous but not connected, like empires of different race and language, which own no common jurisdiction nor hold any intercourse with each other, except along a disputed and wavering frontier where no superior power exists to settle their quarrels or determine their respective limits.*

It would have been well if, before speaking contemptuously of "this patchwork scheme," Mr. Balfour had authenticated his description of it by citing some writer who upholds it. I do not remember ever, in the pages of any author of philosophical repute, coming across this strange partition of empires, between "Causation" and "God," and the antithesis renews a regret, often felt in reading his volume, that Mr. Balfour has not defined the meaning he attaches to the word "Cause." That he should have alighted upon "thousands of persons" who believe that where "Cause" is "God" is not, and where God is Cause is not, without reporting them to the Missionary, or at least to the Geographical, Society, is surely a questionable reticence. What is *Nature* but the province of God's pledged and habitual causality? and what is *Spirit* but the province of His free causality responding to needs and affections of His free children?—the very end for which Mr. Balfour insists on His "preferential action." There is nothing in the regularity of cosmic laws to forbid its being simply the immanent activity of God, and there is nothing in the free

life of both the Supreme Mind pervading it and the dependent minds within it to preclude it from co-existence with the predetermined order and thrust it out as an intrusive and "unconnected fragment." "Heterogeneous," no doubt, the two modes of action are—the *legislated* and the *optional*; yet, as Mr. Balfour well knows, they are not only compatible, but essential to the unity of every personality.

In asking for a reference to some one who has earned this criticism of Mr. Balfour's, I have perhaps overlooked an account given in a later chapter, of the theoretical preconceptions of the deistical writers of the last century, and of the "natural religion" which they rendered familiar to men's minds as at least the necessary prelude of revelation, if not its entire substitute. "The eyes of an eighteenth-century deist," it is said, "looked at the natural world in its ordinary course, as if it were a bundle of uniformities which, once set going, went on forever automatically repeating themselves," and "the apostles' and prophets' message to mankind consisted in announcing the existence of another or supernatural world, which occasionally upset one or two of these natural uniformities by means of a miracle."* It would seem from this that these deists may have been in view as the people who thought that nature carried its own causation and went of itself, and that God was wanted only for the spiritual world through His prophets. If it be so, the imputation, as applied to a group of writers by no means homogeneous, appears to me far from historically just. Their "Deism" was not a foreign cutting grafted upon a naturalistic stem that had no sap wherewith to feed it. Far from committing themselves to the maxim, "All we know is *phenomena*," they regarded the knowledge of God as on precisely the same footing as the knowledge of our fellow-men, both being of *realities*. Nor did they treat the world of perceptible objects and the world of spiritual experience as mutually alien, so that the religion of the latter could have nothing in common with the intelligence of the former, to save their combination from being "patchwork." Nor was their God thought of as a retired architect, who might possibly be now and then called in for repairs. There was nothing in their theology to prevent their regarding Him as immanent in the world and in communion with the soul of man. In the case of one of their most eminent representatives, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, we meet with a Theism which is indistinguishable from a

* Pp. 186, 187.

* P. 312.

direct light of Inspiration. Much as there is in this school of writers which for me is uncongenial and out of tune, their position, intellectual and spiritual, will, I think, be underrated by readers who estimate it from Mr. Balfour's supercilious expressions. That they could dispense with miracles, yet live on in consciousness of Divine relations, shows an attitude of mind touched by a deeper piety than that which cannot wake till it is startled by signs and wonders. Never, I must own, could I listen with patience to the conventional "Apologist for God," who, on surveying the world and himself, finds such a godless look on the face of all things that he must open his case by proving the absolute *Necessity of a Revelation*, which he proceeds to effect by browbeating Reason and Conscience out of their modest pleas and significant experiences, and then calling a group of prodigies into the witness-box on behalf of a religion at variance with both.

The antithesis *Natural and Revealed* is indeed ambiguous as applied to religion, and needs some clearing up to become serviceable. Does the word "Natural" mean "derived from the study of nature"? and the word "Revealed" "derived from the witness of miracle"? Then the former will designate the knowledge or thought about God which may be inferred from the constitution and government of the perceptible world; and the latter, the trustful acceptance from the prophet accredited by miracle of the contents of his message, whatever they be. Cases will occur to every one of new convictions, and even entire *conversions*, brought about under such reported conditions. But how precarious become, with lapse of time, the presuppositions tacitly involved in this faith, must be plain on the slightest reflection. That He who has immediate access to all minds and hearts should keep silence there, and circuitously avail Himself of our stupid assumption that He was to be met with only in prodigies, is surely incredible. Can you suppose that in the very act of giving us the truth He would humor us in our falsehoods? The twofold implication, that nature is self-active and God's agency intrusive, is a childish misconception, which compels us to seek for a more tenable interpretation of the contrasted terms.

This we at once obtain, if, under the words, "Natural and Revealed," we look at the relation, not of the opposite *fields of phenomena* studied, but of the opposite *movements of thought* in the minds that meet and find each other. The human in-

telligence, in its *natural* working on its own experience, beats out the steps of inference which lead to a knowledge of God, more or less distinctly realized. This is a process consciously, even anxiously, elaborated in conformity with recognized laws of rational judgment: man is the explorer, and stands at last in the Divine presence, rendering the worship of his "Natural Religion." But the God who has made Himself accessible by this *mediate* process has not renounced the freedom of Infinite Spirit, or bound Himself not to commune with the freedom He has lent to the finite spirits of His children: and according to their needs, or in response to their aspirations, He comes to them unseen, with a new flash of insight, the hint of a higher ideal, or the touch of more hopeful enthusiasm which lifts them from their level life, and joins them to the prophets who best know His counsels and win men to His righteousness. Here, then, the initiative is with God, of whose quickening and illuminating wave of power Man is the recipient. In his consciousness that he has not worked it out for himself, it comes to him as revelation, and is accepted as a trust given for the enlargement of faith and the consecration of life. Here, then, "*Revealed Religion*" is the *immediate* Divine knowledge by the communion of God's Spirit with man's, as distinguished from the *Natural Religion* earned by the *mediate* operation of the human faculties of search.

Thus understood, the antithesis in question appears to me perfectly tenable and applicable to the facts of religious experience. It certainly assumes that, in working out its speculative theism, the inquirer's *Reason* is let alone to do the best it can by its own laws. It also assumes that a *Freewill Theist* may consistently attribute to God newbeginnings of spiritual influence on dependent minds, though a Determinist doctrine would exclude them. This clear stage in their respective cases, for the human and the Divine agents, Mr. Balfour, by a curious and original turn of thought, emphatically denies. In man he does not believe "that, strictly speaking, there is any such thing as 'unassisted reason,'" and he is "sure that if there be, the conclusions of 'natural religion' are not among its products." And in the sphere of Divine influence, "Inspiration is limited to no age, to no country, to no people." "Wherever any individual soul has assimilated some old discovery, or has forced the secret of a new one, there is its co-operation to be discovered. Its workings are to be traced, not merely in the later

development of beliefs, but far back among 'their unhonored beginnings.'*** Rightly, therefore, have mankind "almost always claimed for their beliefs about God that they were due to God."† As in this copartnership of the believer's faculties and the Inspirer's intervention, no rule is given for distinguishing the shares, there is no telling whether the mixed product is a Divine truth adulterated, or a human inference ratified. And as the same two factors, fallible and infallible, are co-present and indistinguishable in all religious beliefs, however conflicting and contradictory, the Divine element lies hid in the chaos, and helps us to no truth. If we are really committed for our education to this hopeless medley of causation as the "Authority" which "Reason" is powerless to sift and clear, our position seems not less desolate than it would be under mere naturalistic conditions. Far better lay the follies and horrors of savage or sensual superstition at the door of human incapacity or degeneracy, and denounce them with a prophet's rage as abominations hateful to the Most High, than apologize for them as the unclean instruments with which He has to begin their discipline. A doctrine of the spiritual world which, instead of providing a clear stage of relational action for the human spirit and the Divine, tries to work up the functions of either personality into the composition of the other, I take to be of serious danger to both Morals and Religion.

Since it is not the function of Divine Inspiration to "provide mankind with a satisfactory criterion of religious truth," and since "the mere fact of its co-operation cannot in any particular case be a protection against even gross error,"‡ some other purpose has to be assigned for its intervention. Mr. Balfour finds that purpose in the experienced response given by the dispensation to some urgent want of human nature. And the claims of each Religion to Divine sanction must be estimated by its ability to stand this test. How will this test work when, in its application to religions depending on historic facts, it becomes requisite to authenticate its records and distinguish fact from fiction? If, in issuing a Revelation, God adjusts its facts to the exigencies of human nature, so does Man, in either unconsciously evolving or purposely inventing a new type of religion, seek to relieve some oppression, or satisfy some aspiration of the burdened heart. In either case, the adaptation is sure to be there as "the cause of belief": but whether as its sufficient

warrant can only be determined by processes of historical investigation which Mr. Balfour declines and underrates.

In the particular case of Christianity, taken as defined in the three Creeds, the human need to which it responds is said to be deliverance from the terror of so stupendous a Universe as this, and so insignificant a life as ours; in thralldom to the body; with the image of God, if ever there, effaced by the inherited features of a brute ancestry. What could so surely check and relieve the self-contempt of such a creature in such a world as the assumption of his nature, and the experience of its humiliations, and the consecration of its opportunities by the Son of God? Since that life of pure devotion, of vanquished temptation, of sublime sorrow, and its return to God, have not the estimates of moral greatness expanded to the dimensions of the visible and invisible heavens? Is there a constellation in the sky fairer than the galaxy of graces in a holy soul? Is there any planetary cycle that will outlast the immortal life of the children of God? Reborn under the Christian inspiration, we rise at a bound from the stunning shocks of physical nature, and are no longer alone and lost in the infinite spaces. The real drama of existence is with the spirits, whether near or far, who can aspire and love, and will and act like ourselves or above ourselves.

There is, no doubt, a profound truth involved in this estimate of the belief in the Incarnation. It has determined, in the right direction, the long-trembling balance between two competing ideals of the Divine nature; identified in the one case with the fearful aggregate of predetermining cosmic forces, and in the other with the wisdom of an Infinite Mind, partly committed to a steadfast order, but amply free to pity and to love. Has, then, the living God manifested Himself in the Son of Mary? Then we are not lashed to the wheel of necessity, but in the hands of One who "has compassion on the multitudes," who has not ordained temptation and sorrow and death without knowing what they are, and how they may be sanctified. Is this, then—this "stricken of God and afflicted"—His "Son": then we too are His sons, for this is our "elder Brother." Such an answer to the fearful and desponding heart does meet a pressing want, and often, doubtless, has relieved it. But to cite this result as an important evidence of the Incarnation miracle is hardly admissible; for, were it fiction instead of fact, it would affect its believers as it does at present. The whole creative impulse, indeed, which directs the religious imagination and shapes

* Pp. 327, 330. † P. 327. ‡ P. 333.

its significant myths and ever-growing oral traditions, is the yearning of some spiritual thirst within the soul, or the pathetic silence of thought on some unanswered problem. The need and the response are sure to find each other out, whether the initiative be taken from the secret prayer of man or the realizing gift of God.

Anyhow, the essence of the influence claimed for the Incarnation doctrine lies in this, that by *humanizing* God it draws Him within the sphere of our affections, gives deeper meaning to our assurance that He knows our trials and our griefs, and identifies the moral perfection and "beauty of holiness" which is loved of God with our own aspirations of conscience and enthusiasm of worship. In other words, the Divinity of Christ destroys the dread distance between the Infinite God and our finite selves, by bringing to the front of a great human drama the spiritual attributes, actual in Him, possible in us, which make the personal natures homogeneous, and qualify us also to be "Sons of God." But in order to reveal this homogeneity, was it necessary for God to be born and pass through the conditions of finite humanity? Whatever of godlike character such a being evinced would in that case belong to Him as a unique subject, compounded of two natures, and would afford no sample of what might be expected from us "mere men." But let the order be reversed, and from the human level let one appear who, born in the flesh, is reborn in the Spirit; let him, through a few pathetic years with tragic close, leave an indelible impression of how Divine may be a life of man at one with God; and the unification and communion of the earthly and the heavenly spheres, thus personally realized, are forever secured as the meaning of God for the soul of man.

A secret feeling of this overflow of the Divine essence into humanity contributed, I believe, not a little to the intensity—at first view so strange—of the early Arian controversy. Was the "person" of "the Son" of "essence like the Father's"? or of the "very essence of the Father's"? According to the Arians, the former; for they ranked Him as still among the "creatures" of the Divine hand, though of a high order. According to the Athanasians, the latter; for He was *uncreated*, not an organized product brought into a certain grade, however eminent, of thinking and acting life on terminable lease, but *spirit itself*, with its creative and self-directing powers, commissioned freely to conduct the Divine administration of an appointed finite province of time and space.

Is not this, then, a true conception, that we see in the mind of Christ the very essence of the mind of God in what He loves and requires to see in us; not the passiveness of an instrument or the obedience of a creature, but the filial devotion, the self-renunciation, the enthusiasm of all righteous affections, which must forever constitute the ethics of all worlds? In opening to us this co-essentiality with God through his own personality, did He show us what is true of His own individuality alone? On the contrary, He stands, in virtue of it, as the spiritual head of mankind, and what you predicate of Him in actuality is predictable of all in possibility. This interpretation of His life on earth carries the Divine essence claimed for Him into our nature as His brethren. In Him, as our representative, we learn our summons and receive our adoption as children of God.

The "Incarnation" thus extended from the person of Christ to the nature of man, may fitly be called "the central mystery of revealed religion."* When Mr. Balfour places on the same line with it the doctrine of Redemption through the atoning blood of Christ, and finds in this belief a satisfying response to a legitimate need of the human soul, I can only wish that he had more explicitly defined the ethical beliefs which he has saved from the blight of naturalism. For, however naturalism may fall short of the ideals of sin, righteousness, and responsibility, as interpreted by the conscience, it does not, like the vicarious atonement, assume them only to cripple and betray them. That personal guilt and goodness are exchangeable qualities that may be shifted by compact, like deficit and surplus between debtor and creditor; that the "Judge of all the earth," having announced a penalty for wrong, cannot remit it to the penitent offender, but may transfer it to a willing innocent; and that, in this way, the actual sins of all Christian believers have been bought off by the sufferings of Christ, and His holiness placed to the account of the redeemed, are propositions condensing into a small compass the maximum of contradiction to the very essence of morals. If it be a "pressing need" of human experience to which such doctrine brings response, it is assuredly no "ethical need." When the conscience, cleared of its film, looks with open eye upon a recent sin, does it urge the penitent to pray, "Lord, do let me off," and suggest as a supporting plea, "Or, if some notice must be taken, here is one who loves me, and will

* P. 335.

suffer in my stead"? Do you hear in this the voice of repentance, or that of selfish fear, that doubles gilt in clutching at escape on any terms? Compare with this haste "to be saved" the nobler thought of Plato, "that impunity is a more dreadful curse than any punishment, and that nothing so good can befall the criminal as his retribution, the failure of which would but make a double discord in the order of the universe. The offender himself may spend his arts in devices of escape, and think himself happy if he is not found out. But all this plotting is but part of the delusion of his sin; and when he comes to himself and sees his transgression as it really is, he will yield himself up as the prisoner of eternal justice, and know that it is good for him to be afflicted, and so, for the first time, to be set at one with truth."* To Mr. Balfour the problem of undeserved sufferings in the world appears, though not theoretically solved, at least practically lightened by the sympathetic endurance on the Cross of the very God who administers them. To me, I confess, the difficulty seems driven to its extremity when the holiest of beings is allowed, by the maximum of suffering, to buy off the penal dues of all the sinners who will accept the release.

Mr. Balfour's *Notes*, intending to deal with preliminaries only to the study of theology, arrest themselves on the threshold of the Christian Scriptures themselves. Hence, some important topics, especially the claims and place of miracles, and the historical value of the canonical books, are treated with a kind of *half discussion*, in which an estimate is made of the right attitude of mind and legitimate presuppositions to be carried into the study of the literature itself, the contents and interrelation of the several books being left in reserve for the theological student. The topics thus bisected are treated at such a disadvantage that I will refrain from comment which may be superseded by the sequel yet to come. The presuppositions in favor of miracles, moreover, can never be so strong as to avail much in comparison with the testimonial evidence on which the case mainly rests; and, at best, an antecedent probability that a want will be met may fulfil itself either by human invention or Divine intervention.

As Mr. Balfour's design did not require or allow him to enter the field of historical criticism, the summary judgments which he passes on unnamed writers, collectively described as "various destructive schools of

New Testament criticism," seem somewhat premature. From his speaking of them as all "starting from a certain philosophy which forbade them to accept much of the substance of the Gospel narrative," I suspect he has in view the critics of the Strauss period—a highly important and "epoch-making" class, no doubt, but now fruitful chiefly through the sifting and elaboration of their theories by successors of two generations to whom the same description by no means applies. It is impossible for any one who follows the recent course of strictly *historic* investigation to doubt that, with the increased knowledge of the first two centuries of our era, the whole position of the critic of early Christian history and its records is altered, and his insight into their contents greatly cleared. Should Mr. Balfour's public duties permit him ever to complete the task indicated in these Prefatory Notes, I confidently anticipate a recall of not a few contemptuous characterizations of writers who most freely breathe in "a climate" not congenial to him.

THE DOCTRINE OF SCRIPTURE. THE REFORMERS AND THE PRINCETON SCHOOL.

BY THOMAS M. LINDSAY.

From *The Expositor* (London), April, 1895.

IN my article on the late Prof. W. Robertson Smith's "Doctrine of Scripture" in the *Expositor* for October, 1894, I ventured to show that while it agreed with that of the Reformers it differed from what is commonly called the doctrine of the Princeton School. Want of space compelled me to state the points of difference very briefly. Several American correspondents, personally unknown to myself, have suggested that I should contrast the theories more fully: and the kindness of the editor of the *Expositor* has now permitted me to do this.

By the theory of the Princeton School is meant the doctrine of Scripture to be found in the *Systematic Theology* of the late Dr. Charles Hodge—*clarum et venerabile nomen*—in Dr. A. A. Hodge's "Commentary on the Confession of Faith," and in a suggestive and sagacious article on "Inspiration" written by Dr. A. A. Hodge and Dr. Warfield for the *Princeton Review*, April, 1881. It is the doctrine of Scripture to be found in these treatises that is to be contrasted with that held by the Reformers.

If I am compelled to point out a real departure on the part of these American theologians in this one doctrine of Scripture

* *Gorg.* 472 E; 509 B; 511 A; 476, 525 B.

from the theology of the Reformation, I trust it will not be supposed that I have any disposition to undervalue the massive contributions to systematic, nor the rich experimental, theology which have characterized the Princeton School.

The common doctrine of the Reformers about Holy Scripture, as I showed in my former article, may be summed up under two principal and four subordinate statements. In the first place, they held, in opposition to mediæval theology, that the *supreme* value of the Bible did not consist in the fact, true though it be, that it is the ultimate source of theology, but in the fact that it contains the whole message of God's redeeming love to every believer—the *personal* message to *me*. In the second place, they held that the faith which laid hold on this personal message was not mere assent to propositions, but personal trust on the personal God revealing Himself in His redeeming purpose—a trust called forth by the witness of the Spirit testifying in and through the Scripture, that God was speaking therein. These two thoughts of Scripture and faith always correspond. In mediæval theology they are primarily intellectual and propositional; in Reformation theology they are primarily experimental and personal. Hence the witness of the Spirit, which emphasizes this experimental and personal character of Scripture, forms part of almost every statement of the Doctrine of Scripture in Reformation theology.* The four subordinate statements which are really implied in the two primary ones are, as I explained—(1) There is a distinction to be drawn between Scripture and the Word of God, or between the record and the Divine manifestation of God, His will and His love, which the record conveys; (2) This true distinction must not be used to imply that the Spirit witnesses apart from the record, nor that one part of the record is the Word of God while another is not, nor must it prevent us saying that the record is the Word of God; (3) But it implies that the infallibility and authoritative character of Scripture belong to it, not in itself, but because it is the record which contains or presents or conveys the Word of God—it is the Word of God which is primarily infallible and authoritative, and this infallibility and authority are received through faith, not through intellectual as-

sent; (4) God has framed and preserved the record which contains or presents His Word under a singular care and providence.

The explanation and vindication of these points will be found in my former article,* but I may be permitted to point out that the distinction stated and guarded in the first three makes provision for the admitted fact, that the personal manifestation of God which is in every part of Scripture is given in a course of events which are part of human history. To apprehend the manifestation we must have faith, whose province it is to apprehend Divine infallibility and authority;† to apprehend the human casing or the historical credibility of the record it is sufficient to use the ordinary means of research. This distinction justifies all historical Biblical criticism or interpretation. The fourth proposition enjoins that all such criticism must be conducted in a reverent spirit, and in full recognition that the record dealt with has been and is under the singular care and providence of God.

When we turn to the systematic theology of the Princeton School, I am somewhat sadly forced to the conclusion that in their statement of this one doctrine of the Scripture the mediæval type predominates, and has thrust the grand Reformation thought into the background. I use the word "systematic" designedly, for the experimental theology of these American divines is richly evangelical, and their experimental use of Scripture is quite free from the mediæval taint.

This approximation to the mediæval type comes out in four ways—in the purely intellectual apprehension which they have of Scripture, in their reduction of the real distinction between the Word of God and Scripture to a merely formal difference, in their formal as opposed to a religious reading of the thoughts of the infallibility and authority of Scripture, and in their still more formal relegation of the strict infallibility of Scripture to unknown and unknowable original autographs of the Scripture records.

1. *Their purely intellectual apprehension of Scripture.* We are told, for example, that the main object in revelation is the communication of knowledge, and that the object in inspiration is to secure infallibility in teaching. The effect of revelation is to make men wiser, and of inspiration to preserve the recipient from error in teaching.‡ Then, as if to make the change

* First Helvetic Confession, § 5; Second Helvetic Confession, §§ 1, 5; French Confession of 1559, §§ 2, 4; Belgic Confession of 1611, §§ 2, 5; Scotch Confession of 1560, §§ 4, 19; Westminster Confession, chap. i, 4, 5. For a fuller discussion see the Preface to Luther's German Bible, Luther's *Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*, and Calvin's *Institutes*, Bk. I. vii., Bk. III. ii. 6.

† *Expositor*, Oct., 1894, p. 250 ff.

‡ Westminster Confession of Faith, chap. xiv. 2.

† Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, ed. of 1871, p. 155.

of view from Reformation theology more emphatic, Dr. Hodge omits in his quotations from the reformed creeds, which introduce the chapter on the Protestant Rule of Faith, those portions which include the thought of the witness of the Spirit as an integral part of the doctrine of Scripture. He omits the fifth paragraph of the Second Helvetic Confession, the fourth paragraph of the French Confession, and the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the Westminster Confession.* He does not ignore this distinctively Reformation doctrine altogether. He brings it forward more than once, especially when confuting the idea that Scripture is to be received on the authority of the Church,† and when he turns from systematic to experimental theology, as in a powerful essay on the *Ground of Faith in Scripture*.‡ But this supreme thought of the witness of the Spirit, which marked the personal as opposed to the merely intellectual idea of Scripture introduced by the Reformers, is not made a distinctive and essential part of the doctrine of Scripture. It is not used to make clear the supreme contention of the Reformers, that the Bible is above all things a record of God's personal dealing in deeds and by words with the saints of old, and therefore with us. On the contrary, revelation is treated as if it were concerned mainly if not entirely with the communication of knowledge, which consists of doctrines, facts and precepts. I do not mean to say that the Reformers did not find a communication of knowledge in the Holy Scriptures, and that passages cannot be extracted from their writings which are similar to what is asserted by the Princeton School. But their universal thought is that all such passages describe Scripture not in its primary but in its secondary aspect, and their universal contention is that Scripture is above all things the record of God's words and deeds of love to the saints of old, and of the answer of their inmost heart to God. It is this personal manifestation of God which is the main thing: the knowledge which comes along with that manifestation is important, and makes men wise *unto salvation*; but the doctrine comes from and through the promise, not the promise in and through the doctrine. To say that the main object in revelation is to make men wiser, instead of saying that it is to give personal manifestation of God and the possibility of blessed personal communion with Him, is exactly what Thomas Aquinas de-

clares, when he tells us that "our faith (intellectual assent) rests on the revelations made to the prophets and apostles who wrote the canonical books." The mediaeval theologian is consistent, for he thinks that salvation is possible by the existence of a doctrine "*per revelationem deis quae hominis captum excedunt et nonnullis etiam aliis quae humana ratione investigari possunt.*"* The rich experimental theology of the Princeton School, while it has not saved them from the formalist idea that the Bible gives us mainly information which can be worked up into doctrines, is certainly free from the corresponding formal thought that man is saved by assenting to the gospel stated in the form of propositions. Yet the two ideas are correlative, and the logical consequence of thrusting the personal element in Scripture into the background is the presentation of Christ in the form of a doctrine rather than of a personal Saviour, and the transformation of faith into assent to a proposition instead of personal trust in a personal Saviour.

2. *Their reduction of the real distinction between the Word of God and Scripture to a really formal difference.* Scripture is the Word of God. This is a genuine Reformation thought. It is because Scripture is the Word of God that it is authoritative and infallible. But the sense put on these declarations depends on the force of the copula *is*, which some theologians insist on reading, as Luther read it in the phrase, "This is My BODY." The Reformers, however, did not use the copula *is* to denote logical identity. They made it clear that while they could honestly and earnestly say that Scripture is the Word of God, they could nevertheless make a real distinction between the two. Zwingli's use of *Evangelium*, whose sum is, "that our Lord Jesus Christ, the very Son of God, has revealed to us the will of the Heavenly Father, and with His innocence has redeemed us from death and reconciled us to God."† Calvin's phrase, "that the word itself; however conveyed to us, is like a mirror in which faith may behold God";‡ the use made in the Scots' Confession of the "Revelation of the Promise";§ the way in which Reformed creeds and other subordinate standards interpreted the copula by such words as *contains*, *presents*, *conveys*,

* Dr. Hodge and Dr. Warfield contentedly place a quotation from the Council of Trent alongside of extracts from Reformed Creeds, as if Scripture meant the same thing in Roman Catholic and in Reformation theology. *Princeton Review*, II. p. 240.

† Zurich Articles of 1523. Art. I. 2.

‡ *Inst.*, III. ii. 6.

§ Art. iv.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 152.

† *Ibid.*, p. 129.

‡ *Essays and Reviews*, p. 188 ff. cf.; *Way of Life*.

records, all show that there was a real distinction in the minds of the Reformers between the Word of God and Scripture. What this distinction is can be seen in the Westminster Confession of Faith.* The Word of God consists of God's commands, threatenings, promises, and, above all, of the Gospel offer of Christ to us, and these are conveyed to us in every part of Scripture. These, and none other, are the things which faith receives as infallibly true and authoritative, and neither the Westminster nor any other Reformed Confession recognizes an infallibility and authority which is apprehended otherwise than by faith.

It is somewhat difficult to say whether theologians of the Princeton School recognize this real distinction between the Word of God and Scripture. After careful study of the article by Dr. Hodge and Dr. Warfield, I have come to the conclusion that they do not see any but a merely formal difference. Some passages in that article might lead to an opposite conclusion, † but their purely intellectual idea of Scripture, and the use of italics and small capitals on other pages, have reluctantly compelled me to believe that they do not believe what the Reformers so definitely taught. In reading the article I was constantly reminded of Luther at Marburg. He chalked *Hoc est corpus meum* on a table, and whenever Zwingli offered any explanation of the word *est*, he simply repeated the words. They print "The Scriptures ARE THE WORD of GOD," and the phrase with its capital letters comes in regularly like a refrain. Dr. Hodge's strange explanation of the section of the Westminster Confession (xiv. 2) confirms this view.‡ He actually says there, that we must first settle what books belong to the canon of Scripture before we can accept with faith the whole Word of God. He makes faith include: *first*, assent to propositions; and *secondly*, trust in a personal Christ, making in genuine mediæval fashion the promise come from the doctrine, and not the doctrine from the promise.

The Reformers had a vital religious interest in the distinction which is ignored by the Princeton School. All were agreed that Scripture was the Word of God—mediæval theologians as well as Reformers—but the mediæval Church understood God's Word to mean an intellectual revelation giving information about Christian doctrine and precept, and looked in Scripture for that alone, and where no intellectual mysteries were

plainly seen produced them out of "dead histories" by allegorical interpretation. The Reformers, on the other hand, regarded God's Word as the sum of His saving activity manifesting itself in a personal converse with man, and saw in Scripture the story of God's dealings with the saints of old, which can never be a dead history. Jesus Christ was not merely the Teacher sent from God. He was the Saviour who came to accomplish man's salvation; and God's Word was the opening up of what was in God's heart, the declaration in deed as well as in word of the eternal love on which alone man can rest. This communion between God and man is seen throughout all Scripture which records or conveys it—but the communion is one thing and the record is another.

3. *Their formal as opposed to a religious idea of the infallibility and authority of Scripture.* According to the Princeton School, the infallibility and authority or Divine authorship of the Bible seem to depend on its being an errorless record of matters God designs to communicate, and this inerrancy is due to a continued superintendence of God. This superintendence they call Inspiration. This is very clearly put in the admirable article by Dr. Hodge and Dr. Warfield already referred to, and it seems also taught in the Systematic Theology of Dr. Charles Hodge.* The article in the *Princeton Review* is deservedly celebrated. It is written with great breadth of view, and is one of the ablest treatises on the special theory of Inspiration it defends that can be met with in the round of modern theology. The authors select one of the many theories of Inspiration, define it clearly, and proceed to apply their definition with great skill and sagacity. According to these writers, it would appear that Inspiration largely takes the place of the old reformed doctrine of Scripture, and in this they follow Dr. Charles Hodge, who devotes a few lines to the doctrine of Scripture, and nearly thirty pages to a doctrine of Inspiration. Inspiration is thus defined—"God's continued work of superintendence by which, His providential gracious and supernatural contributions having been presupposed, He presided over the sacred writers in their entire work of writing with the design and effect of rendering that writing an errorless record of the matters He designed them to communicate, and hence constituting the entire volume in all its parts the Word of God to us." The essence of

* xiv. 2.

† *Presbyterian Review*, vol. ii., cf. pp. 227-229.

‡ *Commentary on the Conf. of Faith*. Ed. 1870, pp. 204-7.

* *Presbyterian Review*, vol. ii., p. 232. *Systematic Theology*, i., pp. 153, 155.

Inspiration, we are told, is superintendence, a superintendence exercised upon the writers of Scripture by the Holy Spirit, and the result of this superintendence is to secure a book free from all error, whether of fact, or precept, or doctrine. This inerrancy is infallibility, and this infallibility gives Scripture its authority and testifies to its Divine Authorship.

It is not quite certain whether the authors of the article mean to use the technical term "inspired" to denote the writers of Scripture or the works written by them. They would probably apply it to both, but primarily to the writers. The writers were under the superintendence of the Holy Spirit, and the books were written by men under this superintendence. What corresponds to inspiration in the writers is inerrancy in the writings. Thus the inerrancy of Scripture is its characteristic, which is the test both of its infallibility and of its Divine origin. We are, of course, told that the truth of Christianity is independent of Inspiration. "Revelation came in large part before the record of it, and the Christian Church before the New Testament";* but the truth of Christianity is one thing and Scripture is another, and it is Scripture that we are now concerned with.

I trust that I have not misrepresented the theory I am trying to state. If not, then the special and distinctive characteristic of Scripture is inerrancy; and when we speak of the infallibility of the Bible, we mean that it contains not even the slightest or most trivial error. Now I ask, is this a theory which can be called religious in the deepest sense of the word? Inerrancy makes no appeal to heart or conscience. It cannot touch the deep springs of sinful human nature. I do not mean to discuss the question of fact. For my own part, I do not care to use "error" as applied to the Bible, but this whole question of the formal inerrancy of Scripture seems to me to be trivial in the extreme. My sense of the infallibility of the Bible is in no way affected by the knowledge that while the author of the Second Book of Samuel says that David bought the threshing floor and oxen of Ornan for fifty shekels of silver, the author of the First Book of Chronicles says that the price was 600 shekels of gold.† I say simply that there is some discrepancy here: how the mistake arose I do not know, and I do not much care (*nec anxie laboro*).‡ I do not go to Scripture to learn the price of thresh-

ing floors and oxen. I go to learn God's wonderful dealings with David, to see the sins, and repentance, and faith of the man after God's own heart. The purchase of the threshing floor has its place in all this. It is no bit of dead history. It is part of David's biography, and that is all living to me because throughout it all God is with him, promising, commanding, comforting, warning, so that we see how throughout all Jehovah is his covenant God. The small verbal discrepancies, errors if you will, in Samuel and Chronicles are nothing to me: formal inerrancy, if proved, would not make these works more a part of Scripture than they are at present. Infallibility does not consist in formal inerrancy at all, but in the power which compels me to know that God is through this Scripture speaking to me now as He spoke not merely *by* the prophets and holy men of old, but *to* them and in them, and giving me through them in word and picture the message of His salvation.

But whatever my private opinions may be, the formal idea of infallibility which makes it to consist in verbal inerrancy was not that of the Reformers, nor is it the view of the Westminster Confession. The Reformers did not take Inspiration to mean a Divine superintendence exercised over the writers of Scripture in order to produce an errorless record. When they spoke of Inspiration in a strictly technical sense, they applied it to the writings and not to the writers of Scripture. It was the writing that was *theopneustos*, breathed of God, or inspired. This is the use of the word in all the Reformed Confessions, and is its use in the Westminster Confession of Faith. The Canonical Scriptures are inspired, the Apocrypha are not: the Scriptures in the original tongue are immediately inspired, versions are mediately inspired.* The use of the word in the Confession follows strictly its use in the proof-text, which tells us how to profit by every inspired Scripture. The universal line of thought is that Scripture is inspired because it conveys the authoritative and infallible Word of God: it is not infallible and authoritative because it is inspired. Hence in the Reformed statements on the doctrine of Scripture, whether in the writings of the theologians or in creeds, a theory of Inspiration is seldom or never given, and what fills the place which that now occupies in the writings of the Princeton School is the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit. The space occupied by their theory of Inspiration proves how thoroughly the Princeton theologians have abandoned the religious for a

* *Princeton Review*, ii., p. 227.

† 2 Sam. xxxiv. 24; 1 Chron. xxi. 35.

‡ Calvin, Com. on Matt. xxvii. 9.

* West. Conf., 1, 2, 3, 8.

formal estimate of Scripture. For with the Reformers it is the Word of God which is primarily infallible and authoritative, and Scripture or the record is infallible and authoritative only because it is the record of the infallible Word. The Princeton theory of Inspiration is an attempt to bestow on Scripture, primarily and in itself, qualities which it really possesses, but possesses only because it is the record of God's words to men and of his dealings with them.

Calvin does not require a theory of Divine superintendence which has for its object to produce an errorless record. He asks in the *Institutes* how we can get at the complete credibility and authority of Scripture, and answers that we can only do so when we learn that God is the Author. Then he shows in that wonderful seventh chapter of his how we get this knowledge, and ends by saying, "Let it be considered, then, as an undeniable truth, that they who have been inwardly taught by the Spirit feel an entire acquiescence in the Scripture, and that it is self-authenticated, carrying with it its own evidence, and ought not to be made the subject of demonstration and arguments from reason; but *it obtains the credit which it deserves with us by the testimony of the Spirit.*"* The Scriptures are infallible and authoritative because the witness of the Spirit in and with the Word in our hearts assures us that in these Scriptures God still speaks to us; or, as the old Scotch Confession says in Scripture, the "true kirk alwaies heares and obeys the voice of her awin Spouse and Pastor."† This is a religious theory of infallibility and authority very different from the merely formal ideas of the Princeton School, and it is the doctrine of the Westminster Confession, which says that the infallibility of Scripture is something recognized by faith. Faith is not required to recognize inerrancy. Inerrancy, if it exists, is merely a matter of fact to be recognized by the ordinary reason. But the infallibility which compels the conviction that God is speaking to us infallibly, telling us that if we hear and accept this Saviour we shall infallibly be saved, requires faith. And that is the infallibility which the Bible possesses and which man needs.

Of course the Scriptures must be a suitable record of the Divine Revelation, and the Westminster Confession, following in the footsteps of the Reformers, has a theory of Divine superintendence exercised over this record. It is a very different kind of superintendence, however, from that assumed by the Princeton School in their singular theory

of Inspiration. Its object was not to ensure a formally errorless record, nor did it cease when the writers had finished the original autographs of the Scriptural writings. It is now going on, and is to go on "in all ages." The Scriptures have been framed and preserved in such a way under "the singular care and providence of God" that they are suited for whatever use God assigns them to have among men.* They have been preserved in such a fashion that the Church has had "in all ages" a "pure and authentic" record of the Word of God. If it be asked how such terms can be applied to a record which gives two different accounts of the price paid for the threshing floor of Ornan, or how we can trust a record in the greater things which leaves us in doubt about some small matters of fact, we can only answer that God has not withheld from this imperfect record the witness of His Spirit, commanding it to us as His own pure authentic and infallible declaration of redeeming love, and as His own perfect rule of faith and life. Formal inerrancy is not required to make Scripture the pure and authentic Word of God. That this singular care and providence has been exercised is abundantly evident in the history of the Scripture records; may I say that we can now discern its workings in the Textual and Historical interpretation of Scripture which are features of our age?

4. *Their still more formal relegation of the strict infallibility of Scripture to unknown and unknowable original autographs of Scripture.* The Princeton School practically infers that the Scriptures as we have them now are not a formally errorless record. They do so with certain reservations in which most people will agree. They point out the marvellous and minute accuracy in all manner of historical and geographical details which characterize the Holy Scriptures, and which give them a unique position among writings which have descended to us from a remote past.† They lay down some simple canons for testing so-called errors or mistakes, and with most of these I thoroughly agree.‡ They are indignant with critics who do not judge Scripture as they would other books, perhaps forgetting that the claim they themselves make for absolute inerrancy may have something to do in provoking what they object to. But when all is said they are bound to admit that the attribute of formal inerrancy does not belong to the Scriptures which we now have, but to

* *Instit.*, i. 7, 5. † *Art.* 19.

* Chap. i. 8.

† *Princeton Review*, ii., pp. 250, 251.

‡ *Ibid.*, ii., pp. 245-6.

what they call "the *ipsissima verba* of the original autographs" of Scripture when these are interpreted in their natural and intended sense.* It follows that the Scriptures as we now have them are neither infallible nor inspired in their use of these words. This is not an inference drawn from their writings by a hostile critic. It is frankly and courageously said by themselves, "We do not assert that the common text, but only that the original autographic text was inspired." The statement is deliberately made by Dr. Hodge and Dr. Warfield.† This is a very grave assertion, and shows to what lengths the School are driven to maintain their theory, and it is one which cannot fail, if seriously believed and thoroughly acted upon, to lead to sad conclusions both in the theological doctrine of Scripture and in the practical work of the Church. It shows where necessity drives men who start with ignoring the great Reformation thought, and go back to the mediæval idea of what Scripture is. The mediæval Church began with the idea that what was given in Scripture was accurate information on doctrine and morals and the Roman Catholic Church has ended with an errorless Scripture, the Vulgate, where inerrancy is guaranteed by the authority of the Church. Where are we to get our errorless Scripture? In the *ipsissima verba* of the original autographs. Who are to recover these for us? I suppose the band of experts in textual criticism who are year by year giving us the materials for a more perfect text. Are they to be created by-and-by when their labors are ended into an authority doing for Protestants what the "Church" does for Roman Catholics? Are they to guarantee for us the inspired and infallible Word of God, or are we to say that the unknown autographs are unknowable, and that we can never get to this Scripture, which is the only Scripture inspired and infallible in the strictly formal sense of those words as used by the Princeton School? I have a great respect for textual and historical Biblical critics, and have done my share in a humble way to obtain a recognition of their work, but I for one shall never consent to erect the scholars whom I esteem into an authority for that text of Scripture which is alone inspired and infallible. That, however, is what this formalist theory is driving us to if we submit to it.

I maintain, with all the Reformers, and with all the Reformed Creeds, that the Scriptures, *as we now have them*, are the

inspired and infallible Word of God, and that all textual criticism, while it is to be welcomed in so far as it brings our present text nearer the *ipsissima verba* of the original autographs, will not make the Scriptures one whit more inspired or more infallible in the true Scriptural and religious meanings of those words than they are now; for infallibility is not formal inerrancy, but what produces the conviction of infallibly saving power. It is because I believe that the Bible *as we now have it* is the inspired and infallible Word of God, that I can take it as my guide for this life and for the life beyond; that I can preach from it; that I can put it into the hands of unbelievers, and of heathen. And if I am asked why I receive Scripture as the Word of God and as the perfect rule of faith and life, then certainly I do not answer: Because it is the slightly imperfect copy of original autographs, which, if I could only get at them, I could show you to be absolutely errorless writings. I answer—Because the Bible is the only record of the redeeming love of God, because in the Bible alone I find God drawing near to man in Christ Jesus, and declaring to us in Him His will for our salvation. And this record I know to be true by the witness of His Spirit in my heart in and with the Word, whereby I am assured that none other than God Himself is able to speak such words to my soul. This is the answer of all the Reformers, and it was also the answer of the Puritans—of Luther, and Calvin, and Knox, and John Owen. It is the answer of Dr. Charles Hodge himself when he is not writing formal systematic but experimental theology,* when he is dealing not with theological formulæ but with living men and women.

DANTE'S USE OF THE DIVINE NAME IN THE "DIVINA COMMEDIA."

BY ELEANOR F. JOURDAIN.

From *The Expository Times* (Edinburgh), April, 1895.

In the *Divina Commedia* we find that the conclusions of the philosophy of Dante's day and the doctrines of the Christian Church are placed side by side and considered to be simultaneously tenable; for Dante admits no antagonism between reason and faith. In accordance with this view his conception of God unites what the Church teaches us as to the mystery of the Holy Trinity, with what Pagan thought has gained by speculation into the Infinite. Learning

* *Ibid.*, II., p. 238. † *Princeton Review*, II., p. 245.

* Cf. Hodge: *Way of Life*.

from Aristotle, Dante distinguishes between the relative and absolute sides of Perfect Virtues, and thus he thinks of God, considered absolutely, as Perfect Holiness: considered relatively to man, as Perfect Justice. But he teaches, too, that we can only conceive of this Perfect or Divine Justice, as manifested in Power, Wisdom, and Love, the attributes which are traditionally connected with the three Persons of the Holy Trinity. This belief of Dante's has a direct bearing upon the leading idea of the *Divina Commedia*.

It is comparatively seldom, and only, I believe in the *Paradiso*, that God is referred to in the absolute sense, as, *e. g.*, "the first and Unspeakable Holiness."¹ For the most part the allusions to the Deity are from the point of view of his relation to man: Divine Justice governs the three kingdoms, Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise. But each kingdom is represented as being under the special influence and control of one person of the Holy Trinity. The spirits in Hell see God revealed to them as Power, in Purgatory chiefly as Wisdom, in Paradise as Love. There are, however, many indications in the poem that, though the vision of the spirits in Hell is strictly limited, in Purgatory and Paradise it gradually widens, and towards the end of Dante's journey the whole relation of God to man is more clearly revealed.

The evidence for these points lies principally in the use of the Name of God by the actors in the poem; though whether every detail of their practice is the result of deliberate intention on Dante's part, or only of a poetical instinct of consistency, it is hard to decide.

I.

In Hell the spirits of sinners are, presumably, forbidden to mention God by name. Vanni Fucci,² the only spirit who utters the word, uses it in blasphemous defiance of God's power. As a rule the Deity is referred to in periphrasis, not only by the shades themselves, but even by Dante and Virgil in their presence. Thus Francesca and Paolo are implored by Dante to come and speak to him "if Another deny it not";³ Odysseus describes the whirlwind which seized and sank his ship, "as it pleased Another."⁴ And Virgil in the presence of the defiant demons who bar the entrance to the city of Dis, speaks of God as "Such an One"—"By such an One is it granted."⁵ In the same way, referring to Christ's descent into

¹ *Par. x.* (The English equivalents for the Italian passages referred to in this paper are taken for the most part from Butler's *Divina Commedia*.)

² *Inf. xxv.* ³ *Ibid. v.* ⁴ *Ibid. xxvi.* ⁵ *Inf. viii.*

Hell, he says "He came."⁶ Even Beatrice, since in the allegory of the poem she represents divine Love, is not spoken of by name in presence of the shades. Virgil, when he is with Dante in the circle of the Violent, says of her, "Such an One separated herself from singing Alleluia who committed this duty to me."⁷ When, however, they are not in the presence of the shades, Dante and Virgil constantly speak of God by name. More than this, we find them separated from the sinful spirits among whom they pass by their perception of the fuller relation of God to man implied in the term "Divine Justice," which they alone are allowed to use.⁸ This expression, "Divine Justice," is nearly always a recognition, not only of God's Power, but also of his Wisdom and his Love. So, on one occasion, Dante appeals to the Justice of God—"Ah Justice Divine . . . wherefore does our sin bring us so low?"⁹

But in addressing the spirits and the officials of Hell, Dante, Virgil, and the one angel who appears momentarily on the dark scene, all speak of God—without reference to His Wisdom and His Love—as a Power,¹⁰ terrible in the movements of His unquestioned Will. "Wherefore kick ye at that Will whose end can never be cut short . . . ?"¹¹ says the angel who comes to open the gates of the City of Dis. So Virgil, fearing lest Minos should hinder his journey onward, says: "Thus it is willed in that place where to will is to have power to do."¹² To Pluto, again, he says: "Our journey to the depth is not without cause: it is willed on high."¹³ The spirits themselves acknowledge this, and recognize God as Power. In the whirlwind of Hell the cries of the sensual sinners blaspheme the "Divine Power."¹⁴ Francesca da Rimini sorrowfully admits that no prayer of hers can move this Power, this "King of the Universe."¹⁵ To the gluttonous God is "the Power that is their foe."¹⁶ To the warrior Farinata, in the place of the burning tombs where the heresiarchs lie, God is again a Power, "the supreme General."¹⁷ The demons who pursue Dante and

⁶ *Ibid. xii.* ⁷ *Ibid. xii.*

⁸ There is one instance in which a subordinate official in Hell, the Centaur Nessus, is permitted to use the name of God, and to refer to Him as "Divine Justice" (*Inf. xii.*). To him, with the other centaurs, is entrusted the punishment of contumacious sinners in the circle of the Violent, and it is quite in accordance with Dante's view that an official should have privileges distinct from the sinners under his control.

⁹ *Inf. vii.*

¹⁰ The three words usually translated "power" are *potenza*, *virtù* (having this simpler meaning rather than the moral significance attached to our word "virtue") and *possanza*. The latter word is generally used when Christ is spoken of as sharing in the attribute of power.

¹¹ *Inf. ix.*

¹² *Ibid. v.*

¹³ *Ibid. vi.*

¹⁴ *Ibid. vii.*

¹⁵ *Ibid. vi.*

¹⁶ *Ibid. vii.*

¹⁷ *Ibid. x.*

Virgil down to the Sixth of the Evil Pits are obliged by the "Will of Providence,"¹ Dante notes, to remain in the place appointed for them. The alchemist Grifolino relates how he has been condemned to his circle by Minos, "to whom it is not permitted to err,"² thus recognizing God as the Power that lies beyond and above the dread judge Minos.

During the whole of the journey through Hell we have no mention on the part of the spirits of the Second or Third Persons of the Trinity, nor of the attributes of Wisdom and Love. Even Virgil only mentions Christ twice, and then not by name. This occurs when the poets are passing through the circle where are the souls of those who lived before Christ came into the world. "Tell me, my Master, tell me," says Dante, "has any ever issued thence, either through his own merit or that of Another, so that thereafter he was in bliss?" And he who understood my shrouded speech made answer: "I was new in this state when I saw come hither a Mighty One, crowned with a sign of victory."³ And in another place he alludes to the descent of Christ into Hell.⁴ In each case the attribute of Power is strongly insisted upon. Dante, on one occasion, passing through the Second of the Evil Pits, where the simoniacs are immured, invokes the Wisdom of God, but here again the notion of Power is superadded. "O highest Wisdom . . . how great Justice does thy Power distribute!"⁵

II.

In the second kingdom—Purgatory—the spirits are not forbidden to use the Name of God. Not only Dante, his guides Virgil and Beatrice, and Cato the Warden of Purgatory, but also the shades who are doing penance, speak of God by name. Even below the entrance, Belacqua, a spirit who has not yet summoned energy enough to knock at the door and prepare to undergo his purification, and whose lazy movements and indolent speech provoke Dante to a smile, speaks of one of the guardian angels as the "Bird of God."⁶ And the spirits whose bodies were slain by violence, and who only repented in their last hour, are able to tell us that they issued forth from life "reconciled to God."⁷

As the Mountain of Purification is especially the province of God the Son, the Redeemer, we find Him frequently mentioned by name. The spirits who have given way to wrath implore the meek "Lamb of God."⁸

to grant them peace and mercy. On other occasions Christ is mentioned by name, not only by Beatrice¹ and by Dante,² but also by the repentant spirits.³ The expression "Divine Power," so frequently used in Hell, is never used by a dweller in Purgatory. The words occur occasionally,⁴ but are used by Virgil, who has come through Hell. It is Virgil, too, who alone makes use of the expression, "The Eternal King," thus referring to God in terms which recall the notion of Power. Such expressions are replaced in the *Purgatorio* by a series of words which show that the idea of God as Supreme Wisdom is present in the minds of the spirits. Thus we find continually "the Righteous Will," "the Heavenly Councils," and other similar forms. "Of a righteous will is His made,"⁵ says Casella the singer. "God in His grace has willed,"⁶ says Nino. Statius speaks of the "blessed Council" and "true Court"⁷ of Heaven, and Forese of the "Eternal Counsels."⁸ "Divine Love" is once mentioned by Dante, but he is speaking of that Love as abiding in Paradise.⁹ One remarkable expression appears for the first time: the application to the Deity of the epithet, "The Highest Good."¹⁰ But it is not used by a spirit in Purgatory. Matilda, who has descended from Heaven, is speaking of the Terrestrial Paradise. "The Highest Good . . . gave him (man) this place as a pledge to him of eternal peace."¹¹ And Beatrice uses very much the same expression. When her presence convicts Dante of having fallen from his ideal, she reminds him that once his love for her was leading him to love "that Good beyond which there is naught to aspire unto."¹²

The comprehensive term, "Divine Justice," is only used in Purgatory by Statius¹³ and Beatrice.¹⁴ Statius is perhaps marked out in this way because, usually second only to Virgil in Dante's estimation, he is here represented as a Christian, and therefore superior to him.¹⁵ In Purgatory he fills for a time the office of a guide, and explains to Virgil and Dante the laws which govern the advance of the purified spirits from terrace to terrace of the mountain.

III.

In examining Dante's use of the Divine Name in the *Paradiso*, we must remember that Purgatory is the fore-court of Paradise, and that all the spirits who are undergoing

1 *Ibid.* xxiii.

2 *Ibid.* xxix.

3 *Ibid.* iv.

4 *Ibid.* xii.

5 *Ibid.* xix.

6 *Purg.* iv.

7 *Ibid.* v.

8 *Ibid.* xv.

1 *Ibid.* xxxii.

2 *Ibid.* xxi.

3 *Ibid.* xx., xxvi.

4 *Ibid.* iii., vi.

5 *Ibid.* ii.

6 *Ibid.* viii.

7 *Ibid.* xx.

8 *Ibid.* xxiii.

9 *Ibid.* xxvi.

10 *Il Sommo Bene.*

11 *Purg.* xxviii.

12 *Ibid.* xxvi.

13 *Ibid.* xxi.

14 *Ibid.* xxxiii.

15 See Butler's edition of the *Purgatorio*.

purification are destined finally to ascend into Heaven. We are therefore not surprised to find anticipated in the *Purgatorio* some of the characteristic words of the *Paradiso*, though in the latter poem new words appear implying a closer relation with God. The difference between the expression used is, indeed, in most cases, one of degree rather than of kind. But it is clearly suggested in the *Paradiso* that at the root of God's dealings with humanity is His love for man. Thus the words recalling the view of God as Power almost entirely disappear from the pages of the *Paradiso*. In the few cases in which they still occur they are used by Dante, who, as we must remember, has passed through Hell on his way to Purgatory and Paradise, or by Beatrice, with the special intention of identifying the Christ who suffered for love of man with God the Power who rules the world. Thus, when the vision of Christ surrounded by the saints dawns on Dante's eyes, Beatrice says: "Here is the Wisdom and the Might which opened the ways between Heaven and Earth, whereof there was so long desire."¹ On another occasion, and with a reminiscence of this passage, the same epithet is applied to Christ. And again, when on hearing one of the famous invectives against the Pope, Beatrice's face changes, Dante says: "Such eclipse I believe that there was in Heaven when the most High Power suffered."²

It is only in the *Paradiso* that we find a complete invocation of the Holy Trinity.³ Throughout this part of the poem, too, we find frequent mention of the Three Persons by name, not only by Dante and Beatrice, but by the spirits of the blessed. The name of Christ occurs several times,⁴ though not so frequently as the name of the Holy Spirit. The expression "Divine Justice," including the whole relation of God to man, is used by Dante when he calls upon the image of the Eagle to solve his doubts, since by the Eagle, "Divine Justice is apprehended without a veil."

But words signifying that God is Love, is the Highest Good, crowd upon the pages of the *Paradiso*, and show that in the knowledge of God's Love the spirits rest in perfect content and bliss. "In His Will is our peace,"⁵ is one of the most beautiful expressions of this rest in God, but there are many

others. In Beatrice's words, God is the "Highest Good," the "Divine Goodness," the "burning brightness of Love"; to Dante He is the "Highest Good," "Eternal Joy," "Love which rules the Heavens," "the Primal fire of Love"; to the spirits God is the "Highest Good," "Infinite Goodness," "sweet and sacred Love," and again "Love"; till all the varying notes are attuned to this music, and, in the end, Dante, with the blessed spirits in Paradise, feels his own desire and will "swayed in eternal measure by the Love that moves the sun and all the stars."¹

WHAT IS CHURCH AUTHORITY?

BY T. T. CARTER.

From *The Nineteenth Century* (London), April, 1895.

I AM grateful to Canon Teignmouth Shore for his courtesy, and am entirely at one with him in considering that the question between us is to be viewed in the light of authority. Authority is a true note of the Catholic Church, and I would that authority of a spiritual kind had its free course amongst us.

But Canon Shore and myself differ as to what constitutes authority in the matter at issue between us. Canon Shore looks to the divines of the first few years of the Reformation period, under whose influence the second Prayer Book, the Prayer Book of 1552, was issued. I look to the concurrent testimony of our chief divines from the commencement to the closing period of the movement, which issued in the revision of the Prayer Book of 1661, the Prayer Book now in use. We differ, in short, in regard to what is meant by the Reformation.

Canon Shore's statement is as follows:

I most emphatically stated that the *only* [the italics are his] witnesses or authorities on which I relied as to the meaning of changes made in the Prayer Book at the Reformation, were the bishops and divines who were intimately associated with the Reformation, and with the revision of the Prayer Book, and not men who lived later, however learned and devout, and who differed widely in their interpretation of the Prayer Book. As to the revision, which took place between 1549 and 1552, my authorities were Cranmer, Latimer, Hooper, Jewell, *i. e.*, the men who were foremost in effecting the Reformation changes.

Canon Shore seems to forget that the revision of 1661 superseded that of 1552; and that this final revision arose out of an eventful history.

Our Reformation was preceded by a series of conflicts, temporal and ecclesiastical; it

1 *Par.* xxiii. 2 *Ibid.* xxvii.

3 *Ibid.* xiv. and xxvii. (though Hugh Capet in *Purg.* xx. had mentioned Christ and the Holy Spirit by name).

4 *E. g.*, *Par.* xiv., xix.

5 *Ibid.* iii. It will be observed that the expression "The Will of God," although it occurs in all three divisions of the poem, is identified in the first with Power, in the second with Wisdom, and in the third with Love.

1 *Ibid.* xxxiii.

was the outcome of resistance, long deeply cherished, against undue authority which had overleapt itself, the consequence of a growing disbelief of much of the doctrine that had prevailed, and which, as the Scriptures were more and more widely circulated, were seen to be unscriptural, and, as Patristic learning grew, were also seen to be unprimitiv, and, in the truest sense of the word, uncatholic. The dormant forces which underlay the movement broke out under circumstances favorable to them, not because of the favorable circumstances, but because of the growing discontent and the gathering distrust of the then Church system, and the rising in its strength, encouraged by the worldly interest of many in high places, of a spirit of inquiry, continually quickened, as the printing press, a new discovery, was busily at work.

Is it to be supposed, as Canon Shore seems to think, that the mind of the Church of England could possibly make itself felt within the first few years, when the storm was at its height, when men's minds were endeavoring to steady themselves, and learning to balance conflicting ideas and newly recovered truths, controversy with Roman advocates being of the bitterest sort; and this, moreover, when foreign Protestant divines, not at all of the English school of thought, had gained important positions in England, and greatly influenced the movements to which the changes which distinguished the second Prayer Book were mainly due? Was it not natural, and does not history prove, that for many years after the immediate outbreak there were various strivings of conflicting parties, fluctuations and counter and cross currents of thought and feeling, partly at home, partly between English and foreign divines, which characterized the century that followed the first outbreak of reforming zeal, and during which some of our greatest Church authorities witnessed to the truth of Anglo-Catholic theology, whence issued the Prayer Book which bears now authority, and to which we are subject?

The Prayer Book, as we now have it, is the result of the Savoy Conference, when the bishops met a select number of dissenting ministers in solemn debate, heard and answered all their "exceptions," and made what changes seemed to them meet, correcting what was amiss, or making clear what was insufficiently expressed. The changes made were many, and some of very real importance. Dr. Cardwell, in his "History of Conferences" (p. 385, ed. 1811), after summing up the corrections and alterations

then made, says: "These and many other minor alterations, amounting, as Dr. Tenison computed, to about 600 in number, were made in the Book of Common Prayer by the Convocation of 1662, and were finally ratified by the Act of Uniformity."

It is under the Book thus revised and confirmed by authority, after many a struggle and constant controversy, that we now act and teach. The position thus fixed for us is accentuated by the departures from it which have been made or essayed from a less clear hold of Catholic truth in important cases.

Thus, *e. g.*, when the American Church, at its first establishment, accepted our Prayer Book, certain omissions were decided on. Among them were the following, and they touch the question which has been under discussion between Canon Shore and myself.

In the Exhortation before Holy Communion, any one who cannot quiet his own conscience "was invited to come" to the minister of God's Word, that he "may receive such godly counsel and advice as may lead to the quieting of his conscience," etc. The "benefit of absolution" of our Prayer Book is omitted. In the "Visitation of the Sick," the Rubric directing the minister to "move" the sick person to make "a special confession of his sins, if he feel his conscience troubled with any weighty matter," and the indicative form of absolution, after such confession, by which "the priest shall absolve him (if he humbly and heartily desire it) after this sort," were both expunged and nothing substituted in their place.

It is also very significant that in the reign of William the Third, when an influential body of the clergy, backed by the king, attempted an alteration of the Prayer Book with the view of producing "a good agreement between the Church of England and the Protestant Dissenters"—the earliest attempt at a comprehension—similar changes were proposed. Commissioners were appointed and proposals were made with a view of removing the hindrances to a perfect agreement. In the Exhortation before Communion "the benefit of absolution" was to be omitted, and only "spiritual advice and comfort" to be given. In the "Visitation of the Sick," the term "Confession" as well as the direction to "move" the sick person to it, was to be omitted, and instead a series of questions to be introduced, of which the last was, "Is your conscience troubled with any weighty matter, in which you desire my advice and assistance?" After these questions was to follow a prayer, and then in-

stead of the indicative form of absolution, was to be said, "Upon thy true faith and repentance. . . . I pronounce thee absolved."

The object of these proposals was to remove points of doctrine and practice unpalatable to the Nonconformists. No amount of discipline would have offended them. The stumbling-block to them was Sacramental Confession. It is clear, therefore, that, in their judgment, the words proposed to be omitted or changed, and which will stand in their places, involved its use.

I would further add that, while declining to view the Reformation otherwise than as a prolonged movement closing with the last revision of the Prayer Book, I would none the less meet Canon Shore on his own chosen ground of the years 1549-52. As to the main question at issue there has never been any difference in our Prayer Book. Great as were the losses in the Prayer Book of 1552, the lowest point our Prayer Book ever touched, as compared with that of 1549, it even then retained in the address to intending communicants the invitation, if any one "could not quiet his own conscience" to come to the priest for "counsel and the benefit of absolution," and also in the "Visitation of the Sick," the direction to the sick person to make a special confession, "if he feel his conscience burdened with any weighty matter," and this to be followed by the indicative absolution. Both of these, as we have seen, have been the stumbling-blocks to dissentients from our Church system.

The Thirty-nine Articles include "Penance," with Confirmation and orders, under a common head, as "commonly called Sacraments," though not as "having like nature with Baptism and the Lord's Supper," or what were then called "Sacraments of the Gospel." And among the Homilies, though not intended to be theological treatises, but popular addresses "necessary," as the Article says, "for these times," there is, in the one entitled "Of Common Prayer and Sacraments," a paragraph which may be regarded as illustrative of the Article, because the Second Book of Homilies, in which it occurs, was published in the same year in which the Articles underwent their final revision. The passage is the most careful account we possess in any of our documents of the ground of the distinctions between the greater and the lesser Sacraments. It is well worth quoting in full for its clear witness to our Sacramental system.

As for the number of them [the Sacraments], if they should be considered according to the exact signification of a Sacrament, namely, for visible signs expressly commanded in the New Testament, whereunto is annexed the promise of free forgiveness of our sins, and of our holiness and joining in Christ—there be but two, namely, Baptism and the Supper of the Lord. For, although absolution hath the promise of the forgiveness of sin, yet, by the express word of the New Testament, it hath not this promise annexed and tied to the visible sign, which is imposition of hands. For this visible sign, (I mean laying on of hands) is not expressly commanded in the New Testament to be used in absolution, as the visible signs in Baptism and the Lord's Supper are; and therefore absolution is no such Sacrament as Baptism and the Communion are, and though the Ordering of Ministers hath this visible sign and promise, yet it lacks the promise of remission of sins, as all other Sacraments, beside the two above named, do. Therefore, neither it, nor any other Sacrament else, be such Sacraments as Baptism and Communion are.

Canon Shore is hardly correct as to the use of the expression "solvitur ambulando" when applied to the way in which confession has made its way. He ascribes a meaning to the phrase different from that in which, as I suppose, it is commonly used. He regards it as if I meant that "individual clergy are to keep on doing what they happen personally to think best, and persistence in this course for thirty or forty years is to settle the question." I had no such meaning and entirely reject it. I used the expression in its ordinary sense, as meaning that "practical matters are to be judged of by practical experience." Confession is surely a practical matter. When revived among us, it not unnaturally awoke prejudices and suspicions, which could hardly but arise from the remembrance of consequences attaching to a very different use of this means of grace from what our Reformation Settlement has secured for us, and which one might hope would pass away as experience grew. This, one may hope, has, to a great measure, been the case. At all events, my words cannot be fairly drawn to support what our Anglo-Catholic divines witness against. My reference to those chief authorities, dating from Elizabethan times down to and beyond the last revision of the Prayer Book, and which might be readily continued to our own time, must count as a dependable proof of a true Church of England use. Canon Shore might, I think, and I say it with sincerest respect, have drawn a truer distinction between what has and what has not such authority. It is time for men who love the Church of England to gain, if possible, a better mutual understanding of the lines on

which they are being led, so as to view each other's motives and grounds of action as fairly and dispassionately as possible, putting the best construction on each other's unavoidable differences, not to make differences wider.

No doubt our Prayer Book is our standard and our guide. But it is our Prayer Book as it issued from the last careful revision it underwent, when the heat of the conflict was over, and when the concurrent testimony of a long line of witnesses had sealed it with precious memories, and illustrated it with an immense amount of learning. The dangerous tendency of the present day is to lose hold of the lines laid down for us by the great teachers of the Anglo-Catholic school, strengthened as it has been by the great Tractarian leaders. The departure from these sure lines may be from defect equally as from excess.

JAMES MARTINEAU, D.D., LL.D.

1805-1895.

BY REV. A. W. JACKSON.

From *The Christian Register* (Boston), April 25, 1895.

THE ancestry of Dr. Martineau is Huguenot; and he dates his English line from a French refugee, who, driven by the persecutions which followed the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, crossed the Channel and settled in Norwich. Of the fourth generation from him was Thomas Martineau. He settled down in his ancestral city, and engaged in manufacture. The story has gone abroad that he was a wine-merchant, but it is untrue. He found a wife in Elizabeth Rankin, a woman of hardy Northumbrian stock, vigorous, affectionate, and capable; and to them, April 21, 1805, the seventh of their eight children, the lion of this tribe of Judah, was born.

Upon the early home life we want to bestow at least a passing glance. In general circumstance there was neither superfluity nor want. The father, immersed in business, the management of the family fell mainly on the mother. A mother with eight children may be as a sun in the domestic firmament that shines on all alike; but, though each has all her love, they must of necessity divide her care. And so they must early learn the useful lesson of caring for one another. Thus was it in this household. The general discipline was of the older and stricter sort, though—Dr. Martineau himself shall testify—"in the

process of change to more genial ways that Norwich home was in advance of the average." The religious discipline was graver than is common in like households now, and we can imagine the compulsory Bible-readings and the severely decorous Sabbaths. Yet that the severity was less than might have been looked for at that date, the following anecdote may show: The mother, going to church one evening, left the children at home with direction to read the Bible. On returning, she asked James what he had read; and he answered, "Isaiah." "Why, you could not have read the whole of Isaiah." "Yes, mother; I have, skipping the nonsense." Many of us of later birth took our Bible as it came, and did not dare to skip the nonsense, or even find it. Theologically, the family had departed widely from the Calvinistic standard of their Huguenot ancestry. Their church stood for English Presbyterianism, the root whence English Unitarianism has sprung.

Of the useful institutions of Norwich is a grammar school, a foundation of the fourteenth century. To this young James was sent as a day scholar from ten to fourteen years of age. The emphasis of the school was upon classical studies, and in these he made rapid progress. He also learned the French language. His most eager interest was in mathematics, the pursuit of which, to any considerable extent, was not allowed him here. The way opened for his transfer to another school, that of Lant Carpenter, at Bristol. This was one of the most important periods of his life. Mr. Martineau has never been stingy in recognition of the keepers of his intellect, but to none other has he confessed a debt so large as to his Bristol schoolmaster. Under his stimulus his whole nature was aroused. Two years only were allowed him here. His parents had decided that Apollo should do farm work for Admetus—in other words, that he should be an engineer; and he was sent to Derby to learn his craft. Fortunately, he fell into incompetent hands, which made him dissatisfied with his work. Fortunately, too, the spell of Lant Carpenter was upon him. At the end of a year he announced his desire to become a minister. Though this announcement was unwelcome to his parents, they were too wise to oppose him; and he was sent to Manchester College, then at York, for his education. Here he studied five years under John Kenrick and Charles Wellbeloved, to whose great service to him he has borne most generous testimony.

They were years of the severest application. John Kenrick twice mentions his "intemperate study."

In 1827 Mr. Martineau completed his college studies, and was "admitted to preach," but did not enter immediately upon his work. For a year he took upon himself the labors of his Bristol schoolmaster. At the close of the year he was invited to the Eustace Street Presbyterian Church in Dublin, as assistant pastor. The call was a most gratifying one. His ordination, October 26, 1828, was according to Presbyterian usage; and it was as a Presbyterian — of the English, not the Scottish type — that he began his work. At Christmas following his ordination Hellen Higginson, whom he had met at Derby, became his wife. With the aid of a friend, he purchased a house in expectation of a long period of work. Anon a baby Hellen came to them, an angel visitant, that did not tarry long. Ere long a son, Russell, was born to them, destined to the scholar's quiet toils and honorable success, now an Orientalist of fame, and assistant keeper in the British Museum.

That he entered on his work with enthusiasm goes without saying. He prepared a hymn-book for his church, "Hymns for Christian Worship," published in 1831. In 1830 he delivered an address on "Peace and Division," the earliest of his published productions. Though assistant pastor, practically all the pastoral labor devolved upon him; and he successfully discharged it. In the pulpit, he had, indeed, no Whitefield popularity, but for the serious and earnest, he had the magnetizing word. The freshness of youth was upon his features, the maturity of wisdom was on his lips, the light of genius in his eye.

A difficulty, however, arose between him and his church, which dissevered him from it after a brief ministry of three years. The senior pastor died, and he, succeeding to his office, found that it meant to him £100 addition to his salary. This was his share of the *Regium Donum*. Inquiring as to this, he found it to be a bounty paid to the Presbyterians of Ireland, and, with various discrimination, to the nonconformists of England generally. At first of the nature of a bribe for their fealty, it had gone on for more than a hundred and fifty years. But here were the Catholics taxed to pay it, taxed to support a ministry which they repudiated. His keen moral sensibilities were troubled by this; and he asked his people to relinquish the bounty, signifying that if they did not do so, he must cease to be their minister. The contest was ear-

nest, and in the issue Mr. Martineau was defeated by one vote. True to his word, he promptly resigned. Property valuations had declined, and he must part with his house at a large sacrifice. With a burden of debt and a young family, and no occupation, he must face the future.

By his attitude towards the *Regium Donum*, Mr. Martineau was disqualified to minister to the Presbyterians of Ireland. Visitors from England, however, had heard him preach. Visitors from Dublin had told in England of the new man that had come. Very soon after giving up his pastorate in Dublin, he was invited to become the colleague of Rev. John Grumby, who was settled over the Paradise Street Chapel in Liverpool. Mr. Charles Wicksteed, writing in 1877, remembered how "the pulpit was quietly ascended by a tall young man, thin, but of muscular frame; pale, but not delicate complexion; a countenance full in the repose of thought, and in animation of intelligence and enthusiasm; features belonging to no regular type or order of beauty, yet leaving the impression of a very high kind of beauty; and a voice so sweet and clear and strong, without being in the least loud, that it conveyed all the inspiration of music without any of its art or intention."

About this time he began to exercise his hand as a reviewer. In 1833 he contributed to the *Monthly Repository* an article on "Joseph Priestley." In 1834 he printed in the same magazine an article on "Bentham's Deontology," a ringing proclamation of the doctrines of necessity and utility. He came into great demand for public occasions — a speech here, an address there. In 1833 he delivered a course of lectures on chemistry before the Mechanics' Institute in Liverpool. New domestic experiences were brought him here. In 1833 a daughter, Mary Ellen, was born to him, who now presides over his home. Two years later another son was given, and the next year taken. Three children more were to come to him — Gertrude, now an artist and a clever writer; Basil, a London solicitor; and Edith, his latest born, also an artist.

In 1837 he published his first original book, "The Rationale of Religious Inquiry," a thin volume about the size of Emerson's "Nature," and, like that, a proclamation of original power. In 1839 an event took place which brought him into a good deal of prominence. It was the Liverpool controversy, whereof the echoes have not wholly died away. Of

this controversy it is impossible, save in the most general terms, to tell here. It was precipitated by the appearance in print of a circular invitation "to all who call themselves Unitarians in the town and neighborhood of Liverpool to attend a course of lectures in which the errors of Unitarianism were to be exposed." The tone of the missive was popish, and it abounded in phrases in which orthodox oppugnancy to Unitarianism was plainly rather than delicately shown. Dr. Martineau had then two fellow-laborers in Liverpool—John Hamilton Thom and Henry Giles. Jointly they met the circular with a challenge to debate, which, after various skirmishing, was accepted; and in the final arrangement the three were pitted against thirteen. The odds seem Thermopylaean. Theological sympathy will incline the reader to one side or the other, independently of any consideration of weight of learning or cogency of argument. But the readers are surely few who will not say that, though the odds were Thermopylaean, the polemic victory was Spartan.

Among the marvellous features of this controversy was the vast labor it implied in a period so brief. The first lecture was given on the orthodox side, February 6; the last was given by Mr. Martineau on the 7th of May. And between these dates the whole labor must be compressed. Yet the shortest of Mr. Martineau's lectures, if given in full, could fall but little short of three hours in delivery; and one of them would reach four. And these lectures were not crudely thrown together, but thoroughly organized and nobly elaborated and adorned.

In 1840 he did great service to his denomination, and to many others, by publishing a second hymn-book, "hymns for the Christian Church and Home." This year, however, is marked with peculiar emphasis in his career by his appointment to the chair of mental and moral philosophy in Manchester New College. Here for forty-five years he was to toil at the problems of Plato and Kant. The college was now at Manchester, having just returned from York; and thither he went two days each week for the delivery of his lectures. Occupied with church and college, it is not strange that during the next five years he did little critical labor. In 1841 he printed an essay on "Five Points of Christian Doctrine," an eloquent presentation of his attitude as a Unitarian theologian. In the same year he wrote a letter

on Lant Carpenter, published in the memoirs prepared by his son, and one of the fairest tributes a pupil ever bore his master. The year 1843 dates a blessing to many minds—the publication of the first series of "Endeavors After the Christian Life," a collection of his pulpit discourses. In 1845 he resumed those critical studies by which he was to become so widely known, with elaborate discussion of "Thomas Arnold," "Church and State," "Whewell's Morality," and the next year "Whewell's Systematic Morality" and "Theodore Parker's Discourse." In 1847 appeared the second series of "Endeavors," and so runs on the story.

Under his faithful ministry his congregation had outgrown their place of worship, and so the beautiful Hope Street Church was built. While it was building, he seized upon the opportunity for a period of rest and study in Germany. Here he sat down at the feet of Trendelenburg, the eminent Aristotelian; and the "metaphysic of the world came home" to him. He returned in season to dedicate his new church, and plunged at once into his church and college labors. The critical labors began again. In the next two years he published seven or eight of his more elaborate papers, among them the sadly famous "Mesmeric Atheism."

A change came. Manchester New College was moved to London; and, though four hours distant from Liverpool, for four years he kept appointment with it. In 1857 he was invited to come to London, and devote himself entirely to it. Accordingly, he said good-bye to his Liverpool flock after twenty-five years of service with them. At this time it is probable that he did not look for further ministerial labor, but it was before him. The year after he went to London the incumbent of the Little Portland Street Chapel died; and he and the principal of the college, John James Tayler, undertook its ministries together. This relation continued till 1869, when Mr. Tayler died. Mr. Martineau, though now with the added cares of principal of the college, toiled on in the pulpit ministries alone till 1872, when, becoming aware that his strength was overtaxed, after forty-two years of preaching, he left the pulpit.

The ebbing strength which led him to give up the pulpit did not at once return; and, though he kept at his college tasks, his friends were anxious. The fact was that he was living under a shadow whose chill was deep. At length, in 1877, after

a lingering malady, the wife of nearly fifty years dropped at his side. After her death his health returned, and for seven more years he kept appointment with the college. Those seven years brought him to 1885, when the octogenarian felt that it was

"Time to grow old,
To take in sail"

and, after forty-five years of service, laid down his college burden.

Of his literary labors that have come to us in book form I have mentioned the "Rationale," published in 1837; "Hymns of the Church and Home," published in 1840; the first series of "Endeavors," published in 1843; and the second series, which appeared in 1847. As has been often the case with distinguished English men of letters, he won his first more emphatic recognition in this country. In 1852 Crosby & Nichols, of Boston, gathered from the English magazines a volume of his essays, under the title of "Miscellanies." In 1858 the American Unitarian Association brought out another and a fuller volume, entitled "Studies of Christianity." In 1866 and 1868 W. V. Spencer, of Boston, gathered and published two other volumes, under the title of "Essays, Theological and Philosophical." In 1874 he brought out another hymn-book, entitled "Hymns of Praise and Prayer." In 1876 he published the first series of "Hours of Thought on Sacred Things," and in 1879 the second series.

It was his frequent custom to open the college year with an address. The opening address of 1874 was notable for itself and for what followed it. The subject was "Religion as Affected by Modern Materialism," and he embraced the opportunity to pass in review certain evolutionary doctrines. Prof. Tyndall, no feeble knight, saw opportunity to do battle for the faith, and pitched in. Pitching in may be a holiday diversion; but it involves the melancholy liability of being pitched out, which was the issue in this case. Mr. Martineau's rejoinder, under the title of "Modern Materialism," was a smiling annihilation.

—In 1882 came a volume on "Spinoza," embracing the pleasantest account of his life and the toughest analysis of his doctrine. His retirement from the college gave him opportunity to gather up the results of his labors; and that same year the Clarendon Press brought out his "Types of Ethical Theory," in two volumes—perhaps the most comprehensive dis-

cussion of philosophical ethics of the century. Two years later came the two immortal volumes of "The Study of Religion." Here most of us supposed his labors must end; but in 1890 came the tremendous volume, "The Seat of Authority." In 1891-92 he gathered from the English magazines four volumes of his choicest essays, embracing with them the "Miscellanies" and the "Essays, Philosophical and Theological," before mentioned. These were published under the title of "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses." In 1893 came the little volume of "Home Prayers," his "Pax Vobiscum."

Academic honors were tardy, but they came. The first, we rejoice to say, was from America. In 1872 Harvard College conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Laws. In 1874 the University at Leyden made him a Doctor of Sacred Theology. Some time later Edinburgh gave him the degree of Doctor of Divinity. Later still Oxford crowned him Doctor of Civil Laws. And there was another honor, something more than academic: on his eighty-third birthday he received a testimonial to his great service as a philosophical and religious teacher, signed by something like seven hundred of the more distinguished scholars and thinkers of Europe and America, without distinction of school or sect. It was such a tribute as, perhaps, none other ever won.

Record of these later years it is not necessary to make. Like all the other years, we may dare to say they have been consecrated to what is noblest and holiest; and we take leave of the nonagenarian, cared for by filial tenderness, looking with smiling heart upon the world he has served, and back upon the vanished rank of children, kinsmen, friends, he doubts not to rejoin.

In the course of a long and close connection with many of the most distinguished writers of the century, Messrs. Blackwood and Sons have naturally acquired much interesting literary material. Mr. Blackwood, the present head of the house, has, the Publishers' Circular learns, placed this material in the hands of Mrs. Olliphant for use in a work to consist of biographies of former members of the firm.

MACMILLAN & CO. will issue in their "Eversley Series" a uniform edition of "Ecce Homo," "Natural Religion," "The Expansion of England," and "Lectures and Essays," by the late Sir John Seeley; and to the miscellaneous works of Dean Church, in the same series, will be added a selection of his more important contributions to *The Guardian*, and, by the courtesy of Messrs. Longmans, "The Beginnings of the Middle Ages," contributed by the Dean to the "Epochs of Modern History Series."

LITERARY DEPARTMENT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

CONDUCTED BY REV. CHARLES R. GILLETT, LIBRARIAN OF UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

Monasticism.*

THE appearance in English dress of Professor Harnack's essay on Monasticism should be of interest not to the theologian and not to the historian alone, but to every thoughtful mind. The subject, sketched in bold lines by one of the world's great historians, is no trivial and narrow theme. Within monasticism's mighty bosom have surged the passions and the longings of multitudes of the noblest and of the meanest of the sons of earth. Hope, fear, love, hate, humility, pride, self-effacing devotion, self-asserting ambition, world-renunciation and world-conquest—all the impulses of which the human heart is capable have flourished in monasticism's fruitful soil. The study of monasticism is the study not of a minor movement or of a side eddy within the Christian Church, but of Christianity itself, for Christianity was for centuries monasticism. But the study of monasticism is a study not of Christianity alone, but of life—for monasticism was for centuries life at its highest and at its lowest, at its noblest and its basest. A movement rooted, as it has shown itself to be, in the deepest instincts of the human heart and ministering, as it has ministered, as well in the active and practical West as in the indolent and dreamy East, to a common need of man, may not be lightly spoken of or carelessly ignored. Though in these latter days we have learned a lesson which monasticism could not teach, though we seek in other fashion to meet our spirits' needs, and though its life ideals are no longer ours, we cannot forget that during centuries of sensuality and centuries more of barbarism, the world felt the reprobating, condemning, quickening and restraining influence of an institution which was a constant protest against the reign of the material and a constant testimony to the power of the spiritual, which was indeed the conscience of the world incarnate.

It is not just that such an institution should be known to-day only as caricatured by monkish legend and by monkish vice; nor is it wise that the genius of the institution should be lost sight of either through contempt for the baseness or through rev-

erence for the nobleness of its historic representatives. We welcome such a study as this of Professor Harnack because it brings before us in clear bold lines not monks but monasticism, because it recognizes and reveals the true place and influence in history of this mighty force. The author has not attempted the vain task of presenting within the compass of a single lecture a history of monasticism in all its varying moods and fortunes, but its controlling principles and the great epoch in its development are sketched with a clearness and a fulness that leave nothing to be desired. Brief though it is, as a study of the *genius* of monasticism, this production of Professor Harnack's earlier days is unsurpassed. May it find in Mr. Gillett's admirable version, in which are preserved in an unusual degree the force and vigor of the original, as many and as appreciative readers here as in its native land.

ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFETT.

MEDIEVAL EUROPE (814-1300). By EPHRAIM EMERTON, Ph.D., Professor of History in Harvard University, Boston : Ginn & Co., 1894. 12mo, pp. xxv, 607.

The title of this book is wider than its contents; it deals principally with the Empire and the Papacy. One chapter is given to the growth of the French monarchy, while the other countries of Europe are mentioned only as they touch the principal subjects. "Medieval" is a convenient term to apply to the whole period (350 to 1500 A. D.) and there is no good reason why it should be limited to the time 800 to 1300 A. D.

The Church was the greatest thing in that period, and the author has done well to put it in the foreground. The growth of the Papacy, its high claims, its competition and struggle with the Empire form the principal thread of the narrative about which all other material is grouped. It is right in theory, but occasionally one gets the impression that the ecclesiastical interests predominate too much, while the political history is forced into the background.

The author's carefulness and conscientiousness sometimes prevent his making clear and concise statements; the judicial processes of his mind are too apparent in the written account. This makes his work seem uneven. At times too much is said about events which are themselves stated either too briefly or too vaguely. There is

* Monasticism : Its Ideals and Its History. A lecture by Adolf Harnack, D.D., translated by Charles R. Gillett, A.M., with a preface by Arthur C. McGiffert, D.D. New York : The Christian Literature Co. Pp. iii, 87. 50 cents. This article is a reprint of the preface to the book itself.

often a diffuseness in the style which makes one feel that the conversations and exercises of the class-room have had too much influence on the form of the book.

The chapter on the crusades is the only unsatisfactory one in the book. The account is too general and follows too closely the traditional view of them and the relations of the crusaders to the Eastern emperor. The chapter might have been made far more interesting and valuable by a brief but more detailed narrative. The Emperor Alexius should have been cleared of the charges of gross duplicity and treachery in his dealings with the crusaders. From the "literature" of the subject some of the most important works by Röbriecht, Riant, Hagenmeyer, Fischer, Klein and others are omitted.

Some typographical or other errors may be noticed: on page 38 the King of Burgundy is called Rudolf, but on p. 90, Robert; Agapitus stands for Agapetus on pp. 128 and 129 and in the index; "has" on p. 195 should be "hast"; what is said on p. 329 about the effects of the excommunication of Henry IV. by Gregory VII. hardly tallies with the account on p. 250; twice on p. 380 Zama stands for Zara; on p. 531 seignior is once misprinted seignor; line 10 on p. 281 should read "victory of the empire over the church" instead of "victory of the church over the empire," since the next sentence demands this order, and, besides Otto of Freising at that time thought the condition of the Church desperate, and held King Conrad III. mainly responsible for it. (See his Chronicle VII, 23, 24, 26.)

But the faults indicated above are slight compared with the excellences of the book. The most of the subjects are treated with great discrimination. On the first chapter we are taken through that most chaotic but important century, the ninth, and shown the beginnings of the states of Europe. In chapters two to ten we follow the history of the growth of the Papacy and of the Empire, their mutual services, their struggles and the complete downfall of the latter. The questions at issue between them, the inevitability of the struggle, the deep misfortunes of the Franconian and Staufen emperors and their tragic overthrow—all are told in a most interesting way. Chapter twelve on the French monarchy is good but too brief. The remaining chapters on the intellectual life, the feudal institutions, the organization of the middle and lower classes and the ecclesiastical system are all excellent. The last chapter, on the ecclesiastical system, is especially clear and interesting.

Professor Emerton has given us a good and readable account of that interesting age, and his book will be heartily welcomed by all who are teaching the history of that period.

OLIVER J. THATCHER.
The University of Chicago.

Protestant Missions.*

THIS volume, as its title-page and preface indicate, presents a course of lectures recently delivered by its author before the students of Hartford Theological Seminary. It is one of the most valuable contributions which has recently been made to the history of Protestant missions, and worthily takes its place by the side of the volume on "Moravian Missions" published by the same author. Its special field is the missionary efforts in Protestant churches from the time of the great Reformation of the sixteenth century to the latter part of the eighteenth century, when what is commonly called the modern era of foreign missions begins; and a conspicuous merit of these lectures is the revelation which they present of the continuous presence in the heart and activity of the Reformed churches of the foreign missionary spirit. It will hereafter be an unpardonable mistake to assign the beginning of modern missions to the year 1792 or 1795. It is true that the movement under William Carey, leading to the formation of the English Baptist Missionary Society in the former year, and that movement which culminated in the organization of the London Missionary Society three years later, were marked epochs, and have been followed by the rapid and general development of missionary activity which gives a special character to the last century. But the missionary spirit was in the Reformed churches from the outset, as these lectures plainly show, and had happy illustrations in individuals and in missionary movements.

To those who are not familiar with the facts it will be surprising to learn of missionary men and missionary movements during the two centuries and a half which lie between the days of Luther and the times of Carey, in Germany, in Holland, in England, in Denmark, as well as the notable efforts of John Eliot and David Brainerd and others in behalf of the aborigines of America. Where all is excellent it is perhaps invidious to indicate special excellences, and yet I think all who read this volume will feel that the lectures upon John Eliot, and

* PROTESTANT MISSIONS: Their Rise and Early Progress. Lectures by A. C. Thompson, Author of "Moravian Missions," etc., etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894. 12mo, pp. vii, 314.

David Brainerd, and Christian Frederick Schwartz are among the most attractive and significant portions of this interesting record. Happily no one who fairly begins the volume will be likely to lay it down without reading every lecture and every note.

These lectures are written in the singularly chaste and accurate style which is characteristic of all its author's productions. Facts are stated simply and clearly, comments are perspicuous and to the point, and nowhere is the narrative clogged by superfluous comment or reflection. The author gives no indiscriminating praise to the men in whom, in these early days, this missionary spirit manifested itself, nor is he anywhere oblivious to the faulty methods which characterized much of the work of these men. The volume is made especially valuable by eighteen pages of carefully prepared notes, no one of which can be safely overlooked in the perusal, and in many of which are to be found important corrections of current misapprehensions. Further value is given to the volume by a complete index.

A special interest attaches to this volume from the fact that its author had passed the limit of fourscore years before it saw the light, and that he is still bringing forth fruit in old age. May a kindly Providence spare him many years and bless his labors to the still further enrichment of Christian thought and life!

Boston.

JUDSON SMITH.

THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA AND METHODOLOGY. On the basis of Hagenbach. By GEORGE R. CROOKS, D.D., and JOHN F. HURST, D.D. New edition, revised. New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1894. 8vo, pp. 627.

In the curriculum of a few theological seminaries in America only, is the subject of "Theological Encyclopedia" included. And yet it is a discipline which is of no small value and importance to the young theologue. It has been fitly compared to the map and guide-book of a foreign country with which the traveller provides himself. When properly constructed it has for its object the mapping out of the various departments of theological science, setting forth the task of each and indicating the degree in which the task has been performed, and above all, exhibiting the relations which the various members of the body of theological science bear to one another. It is in this last particular that most books on the subject are weak and unsatisfactory. It is far easier to take up the branches one after another, and

to show the contents or "material" of each; making thus a "material encyclopedia." The "formal encyclopedia" is more theoretical and philosophical in its treatment, since its function is the exhibition of the inter-relations of the parts, rather than their delineation as an aggregate of separate units.

It was a wise caution of Hagenbach that the theological student should hear lectures on this subject twice—once at the beginning of his course in order that he might become oriented in his chosen field, and again at the close that he might know whither he had arrived. But in our American schemes of education, the subject of encyclopedia has received scant recognition, and it would be matter of small surprise if many a reader should connect the title given above with such a work as the Schaff-Herzog "Encyclopædia" or some other similar compend of information arranged on the alphabetical plan. But that is just what it is not. It is an attempt to present a systematic introduction to each and every branch of theological learning, and its material is arranged in an order which corresponds with the logical development of the subjects treated, and, corresponding to the evolution and nature of the subject, it is a scientific treatment and discipline.

America has produced a half-dozen such works, but most of them have been based upon German prototypes. Europe has been quite prolific, and several of the German treatises have been put into English. But the work of Hagenbach was not only one of the earliest in the present century; it was the most compendious and yet complete, and it soon won for itself a place which it has not yet lost. Its present appearance in a new and revised edition is a continued compliment to the original, which has long enjoyed the fame of being a "student's book." In this edition it has been much augmented by the addition of a large amount of literature in English, thus making the book of greater usefulness to the English or American student. As an instance in point, mention may be made of the appendix containing the names of the most important books in the department of the history of the Christian churches in the United States, but scattered through the work are many titles which will guide and assist the theological student and reader. The book consists of an introduction, a general and a special portion. The first treats of encyclopedia and methodology, their idea and scope; its second of theology, its history

and relations; while the third takes up the four-fold division of theology as Exegesis, History, Dogmatics, and Practical Theology, and divides each into its separate and component parts. Though many objections have been urged against this division, it seems destined to continue long in vogue, and in any event it can claim for itself great clearness and the utmost intelligibility. We do not feel inclined to criticise the division in this place, because any such criticism must pass over the heads of the present editors and attach to the original author.

The severest additional criticism that can be made is that it goes, in some instances, beyond the proper sphere of the theological encyclopedia and embraces some of the material of the separate discipline; but it is just this feature which will recommend it to many readers. At all events a book like this should be in the hands of every theological student.

CHARLES R. GILLETT.
Union Theological Seminary.

BOOK NOTES.

Exegetical.

THE question is often asked, "Which is the best commentary for a Sunday-school teacher—for a student—for a minister?" It is a difficult question to answer. There are so many good commentaries that to mention one in preference to others is invidious. Some would reply that there is no "best," and others will be guided by experience, or, mayhap, by prejudice. The Cambridge Bible for Schools is very excellent, but it numbers nearly as many volumes as there are books in the Bible. Lange, Pulpit, Speaker's, Ellicott, Butler and a host of others hold special places, but they are voluminous and contain material which is adapted to special classes of readers. Among them all a most worthy place is held by the *Illustrated or Popular Commentary on the New Testament*, by Dr. Lyman Abbott. It has been for some time before the public, but it is appearing in a new edition. Three volumes are before us, covering the Gospels, Acts and Romans. They contain the text with comments upon the principal points, given with a fulness that is surprising considering the comparative brevity which characterizes the set as a whole. Having had occasion recently to put the volumes to a practical test, they were found to answer every requirement with eminent success. The question as to a good commentary on this portion of the New Testament was thus

answered satisfactorily and the answer is now made to our readers also. (New York and Chicago: A. S. Barnes & Co.)

Two additional volumes in the "Expositor's Bible" series have been received: *The Book of Ezekiel*, by the Rev. John Skinner, professor of Old Testament Exegesis in the Presbyterian College, London, and *The Book of Daniel*, by Dr. F. W. Farrar, Archdeacon of Westminster, more recently appointed Dean of Canterbury. Professor Skinner very modestly disclaims any attempt to make a distinctive contribution to Old Testament literature. He acknowledges his indebtedness to some of the best exegetical works in English, German and French, and he announces that his purpose has been to "make the exposition a fairly adequate guide to the sense of the text, and to supply such information as seemed necessary to elucidate the historical importance of the prophet's teaching." Archdeacon Farrar has done so much work in connection with the history and exposition of the Minor Prophets, collectively and severally, that one can scarcely imagine a writer better qualified for the task set by the Expositor's series. That task is not so much exposition in the sense of comment on the text as it is exposition of the significance of larger sections taken with their context, though it does not entirely exclude the former. It is not the minute examination of the exegete, but the comment which shall help the expository preacher to grasp an extended passage in all its wealth of significance and bearing. Doubtless many readers will not agree with the author as to the authorship of the book, and will wonder how he can hold such views and yet regard the book as worthy of a place in the Canon. Such have a double motive for examining these pages, and an excellent opportunity to have their problem solved. It makes an interesting study of the reconciliation of criticism and devotion. (New York: Armstrong & Son. \$1.50 each.)

THE PSALMS, of all the books of the Bible, most easily lend themselves to a devotional treatment. Many are the commentaries based on them, and each is a mirror of the mind of the commentator or a reflex of his purpose. Under the name *Psalm-Mosaics*, the Rev. C. Saunders Dyer has prepared "a biographical and historical commentary on the Psalms," which is the result of the incidental labors of a number of years. Historical incidents which illustrate the various passages, and striking remarks of various commentators and other writers, have been garnered and grouped in their

appropriate places. Of the two portions the former appears to be of more immediate use, though the whole makes a useful and attractive book. The amount of "padding" is, however, not inconsiderable, and causes the severest criticism that we are inclined to apply. (New York: Thomas Whittaker. \$2.50.)

The Armenian Outrages.

"It is high time for the conscience of Europe and America to assert itself—not simply the 'Nonconformist conscience,' but the Established, the Orthodox, the Catholic, the Agnostic, and the Infidel conscience, in fact the human conscience—against this crime upon humanity." These words are the result of deep conviction and of varied experience in the domain of the "sick man of Europe." Christendom does not realize the horrors that have recently been enacted in Armenia under the orders of the Sultan. Newspaper accounts are at best only partial and incomplete, and it is matter of congratulation that the facts are now set forth with much of detail, horrid though the details may be, so that men of conscience may be awakened to the treatment accorded to human beings in this year of grace. Frederick Davis Greene, for several years a resident in Armenia, has set forth the dreadful tale in a volume called *The Armenian Crisis in Turkey*. In it he tells of the massacre of 1894, describes its antecedents and its significance, and enters upon a consideration of some of the factors which enter into the solution of this phase of the Eastern question. We can well agree with the words of Dr. Josiah Strong's preface, when he says, "This is an important book." It should be read and pondered by all philanthropic persons—by ministers, by statesmen, and by all those who have any desire for the rule of righteousness, justice, and peace. Action should follow thought, and the Sublime Porte should be made to feel the weight of the public opinion of an outraged world. There can be no doubt that "what is needed is prompt, decisive, and final action." (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.)

Lent.

THE Rev. Hermann Lilienthal, in his recent volume on *Lent, past and present*, admits that so far as we can see, the institution of Lent is ecclesiastical in its origin. A more open acknowledgment could not be asked by any of those who think that the duty of any Christian observance is limited by the words of direct scriptural institution, and should not be extended to any not thus authorized.

The argument which is used in the volume before us is based really, though not in these words, upon the Christian consciousness and experience of the ages. Upon this ground the author discusses the primitive purpose of Lent, Lenten observances, fasting, and the Holy Week. Originally delivered as a series of Lenten addresses, the book is intended to serve a denominational end, and in this purpose it has the endorsement of the presiding bishop, Dr. John Williams, of Connecticut. (New York: Thomas Whittaker. 75 cents.)

"Topical Outlines of Bible Themes."

A BIBLE text-book, and yet with a difference, is before us. The text-book is satisfied with a citation of passages, or even the passages in full, under appropriate catchwords. The present volume contains the catchwords and the citation of appropriate texts, but instead of citing the corresponding passages, the author, the Rev. G. S. Bowes, of Ramsgate, England, has appended a brief statement of the lesson inculcated by the text. The passages are arranged in their logical order without reference to their chronological sequence, so that the book has the general appearance of being a collection of the proof-texts that might be cited by a teacher of systematic theology. For a study of the Bible by topics it is likely to be useful, and, with proper care, it can be used to advantage in preparing courses of Bible readings. (New York and Chicago: F. H. Revell Co. \$1.50.)

Family Prayers.

THE minister is sometimes asked to recommend a suitable book to be used in the conduct of family worship by those who are timid even before their own households. Many books of this sort have been prepared, and each has some points of excellence. Under the name *Prayers for Heart and Home* the Rev. F. B. Meyer has issued "morning and evening devotions for a month." They contain much that is tender and good, much that is excellent for the purpose in view, but a perusal of several sections impresses the thought that a printed prayer can only attain to the highest excellence when it expresses the petition born of the larger Christian consciousness of an aggregate of persons all inspired by the same spirit. Herein lies the power of the Book of Common Prayer, which has been produced by a process like evolution, and which is not strictly of individual authorship. (New York: F. H. Revell Co. 75 cents.)

ANOTHER book of the same class, and intended to meet the wants of the same class

of persons, is entitled *Thirteen Weeks of Prayers*. It was compiled from many sources by Benjamin B. Comegys, LL.D., and now appears in its fifth edition, revised and enlarged. The compiler is well known in this and allied fields of labor, and he has here produced a book having many excellent features. It labors under the same difficulties that affect all such books, but the author's wish will be most fully met if the user shall pass from it to the employment of extempore prayer in the conduct of family worship. (New York and Chicago: F. H. Revell Co. 75 cents.)

Practical.

THE latest book from the pen of Dr. Arthur T. Pierson is dedicated to Mr. Spurgeon, "the man who made the most of himself and of his life." The appropriate title of the work is *Life Power; or, Character, Culture and Conduct*. In its pages he sets forth the elements and secrets of power, and the power of a presiding purpose. The use and abuse of books, the genius of industry, the ethics of amusement and the inspiration of ideals are the remaining subjects treated. The pages are full of illustrations, stories, incidents and allusions which make the book's discourse bright and readable, while admirably pointing the moral which the reader is expected to draw. The book is to be commended, not only for itself, but because it serves as an admirable example of a method of retaining and fixing the attention of those to whom one speaks from the Sabbath pulpit. (New York and Chicago: F. H. Revell Co. \$1.00.)

WITHIN recent years the blackboard has been called in as an adjunct to the work in the Sunday-school, and the value of pictures to impress lessons upon the youthful mind has been very generally admitted. Within moderate bounds this method has some good points, but the teacher or superintendent has need of a preliminary guide or handbook to initiate him in the mysteries of the art. Such a book may be found in *Pictured Truth*: a handbook of blackboard and object lessons, by Rev. Robert F. Y. Pierce. Some of the pictures are too elaborate for imitation, but they may be found useful by way of suggestion. (New York and Chicago: F. H. Revell Co. \$1.25).

Two small books are also at hand: *The Book of Job*, in Maynard's English Classic Series, embracing the Revised Version with the American Revisers' preferences of readings, edited by Dr. Samuel M. Jackson. It

is a tribute to the position which this book has held as an example of English pure and undefiled. It is neatly printed, and is arranged after the style of the parallelisms of Hebrew poetry. (New York: Maynard, Merrill & Co. 24 cents.)—The other is a *Vest Pocket Companion for Christian Workers*, containing a number of series of the "best texts," arranged by R. A. Torrey, for use upon several occasions, adapted to the various phases of the work of those who would help their fellows. (New York and Chicago: Revell Co. 25 cents.)

Municipal Reform.

ONE of the thoughts which were in the mind of Dr. Parkhurst during the terribly trying experiences of the past years while he has been fighting municipal corruption, was that success in New York would have a very stimulating effect in other cities where corruption and political evils are being combatted. In this he was right, and many will be surprised to know how many societies have been formed for purposes along these lines. A book just issued under the title *Municipal Reform Movements*, by Dr. William H. Tolman, enumerates them and gives some account of each. Besides, the volume contains suggestions and hints looking towards the adaptation of the plan of campaign to other places with special needs. The materials thus presented are of immense value in the conflict, and the book is well called a "text-book of the new reformation." It is deserving of wide attention. (New York and Chicago: F. H. Revell Co. \$1.00.)

Old South Leaflets.

A CONSIDERABLE number of short historical documents have been issued by the "Directors of Old South Studies," at the Old South Meeting House, Boston, Mass. Thus far some fifty-five leaflets have been printed, some of them of general interest and some having special relation to New England. Before us are the four latest, bearing the titles, "The Indian Grammar Begun," by John Eliot, bearing the original date of 1666; "God's Promise to His Plantations," by John Colton (1630); "Letters of Roger Williams to Winthrop"; "The Way of the Churches of New England," being the preface to Thomas Hooker's Survey of the Summe of Church Discipline. The object of these publications is to make accessible to readers in general some of the interesting documents connected with early American history. They are to be obtained at the address given above at the moderate cost of five cents each.

Education in Massachusetts.

PERSONS interested in the history of educational methods and institutions in America will be glad to know of a recent work by George H. Martin on *The Evolution of the Massachusetts Public School System*. It does not pretend to be an exhaustive treatment, but it is a very readable sketch, tracing the influences at work in the early days, the various phases assumed, the hinderances met and overcome, and the final outcome. The scope of the book is shown by its chapter headings: The Early Legislation: its principles and precedents; Schools Before the Revolution; The District School and the Academy; Horace Mann and the Revival of Education; The Modern School System; and The Modern School. Having been originally cast in the form of lectures, the work lacks some of the features of permanent value which might have attached to a treatise, but the form has made the treatment more vivid. The author is Supervisor of Public Schools in Boston. (New York: D. Appleton & Co. International Education series. \$1.50.)

The Pygmies.

THE second volume in the "Anthropological Series, edited by Prof. Frederick Starr," of the University of Chicago, deals with *The Pygmies*, and is a translation made by the editor from "Les Pygmées," by the late Prof. A. de Quatrefages, of Paris. It consists principally of a collection of the various papers and other publications of the author upon this interesting subject. He discusses the pygmies mentioned by the ancients, those of the East, the Micropes, the Negrillos, the Hottentots and the Bushmen of Africa. The body of the book will be of interest to a large circle of specialists, but the accounts of the mental, moral and religious qualities and powers of these undersized specimens of human kind will appeal more strongly to those who look upon all men, irrespective of stature, as subjects of missionary labor. (New York: D. Appleton & Co. \$1.50.)

It is nearly fifteen years since Dr. W. Garden Blaikie's *Personal Life of David Livingstone* appeared and took high rank as an authority upon this subject. After having been out of print for a long time, it has now been republished in cheaper form, in which it will probably find readers not a few. The work is too well known to need special commendation, and it is only necessary to mention its reappearance. It is chiefly based upon Livingstone's unpublished journals and correspondence now in

the possession of his family. (New York and Chicago: F. H. Revell Co. \$1.50.)

ONE of the most powerful books, and one that has been much read during the past forty years is T. S. Arthur's *Ten Nights in a Bar-Room*. It was first copyrighted forty-one years ago, and it now appears again in a new edition. The story is a horrible one, but its moral is proportionately strong. It is an argument taken, as it were, from life, and is a concrete presentation of the grounds against the evils of the drink-traffic. Its tale though old is still terribly new. (Philadelphia: Porter & Coates. 75 cents.)

"The Christian State."

THAT the author, Dr. George L. Herron, is in earnest in this "political vision of Christ," there can be no question. He is one of the many writers who are seeking to shed some light upon the dark problems of our social life. But however true the basis of his argument may be, that argument has many times before been pleaded with equal earnestness and greater power. All thinking men admit that more of Christ's spirit is needed in the life of our people, but how that end may be attained is still the question—one that the writer of this book has failed to answer. If he had noted the times more exactly he would have perceived that the last two decades have witnessed on the part of the Christian Church a grand realization of the duties it owes to suffering humanity. Unfortunately he utterly ignores this fact. The book is also marred by attempted flights of rhetoric—which are not successful. (New York: Crowell & Co.)

THE chief literary work which Mr. Gladstone has on hand at the present time is one on which he has been working for the last ten years in the short holidays of his crowded public life. This is a new edition of Bishop Butler, with Annotations. Mr. Gladstone's book is to be in two volumes. The text will be in one, the annotations in another.

"THE Life and Letters of the Late Prof. E. A. Freeman," edited by the Rev. W. R. Stephens, Dean of Winchester, is to be published by Macmillan & Co. in two crown octavo volumes, with portraits, and a copy of an original sketch of Mr. Freeman seated at his study table.

THE author of "Supernatural Religion," a book which excited a great deal of controversy in its day, and was hailed by Mr. John Morley as the final blow to the Christian faith, has published an article in the *Nineteenth Century* for this month, under his name, which is Walter R. Cassells. Mr. Cassells, many years ago, published one if not two volumes of poems, but this, I think, is the first time that he has put his name to anything else. Although an amateur, he has by long and persevering study acquired some considerable familiarity with early Christian literature.

RECORD OF THEOLOGICAL BOOKS.

Compiled and edited by Ernest C. Richardson, Librarian College of New Jersey, Princeton, N. J.

OUTLINE OF CLASSIFICATION.

- I. Exegetical Theology.
- II. Historical Theology.
 - 1. Biblical and Jewish.
 - 2. Post-Biblical.
 - 3. Non-Christian Religions.
- III. Systematic Theology.

I.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

a. American and English.

BEATTIE, Francis R. Radical criticism: an exposition and examination of the radical critical theory concerning the literature and religious system of the Old Testament scriptures; introd. by W. W. Moore, D. D. N. Y. and Chic., Revell, 1895. 323 p. 12°. \$1.50.

BOWES, G. S. Topical outlines of Bible themes. N. Y. and Chic., Revell Co., 1895. 410 p. 8°. \$1.50.

DYER, A. Psalm mosaics: a biographical and historical commentary on the psalms. N. Y., Whittaker, 1895. 8°. \$2.50.

FARRAR, F. W. (Archdeacon). The book of Daniel. N. Y., Armstrong, 1895. 8°:334 p. 12°. (Expositor's Bible, new [8th] ser.) \$1.50.

GLADSTONE, W. E. The Psalter; with concordance and other auxiliary matter. Lond., 1895. 260 p. 32°. 3s. 6d.; 5s.

LATCH, E. B. Application of the Mosaic system of chronology in the elucidation of mysteries pertaining to the Bible in stone, known as the Great Pyramid of Egypt. Phil., press of J. B. Lippincott Co., 1895. 2-30 p. 8°. Pap., 25c.

SKINNER, J. The book of Ezekiel. Lond., Hodder, 1895. 510 p. 8°. 7s. 6d. (Expositor's Bible.)

TAYLOR, Barnard C. The historical books of the Old Testament. Phil., American Baptist Pub. Soc., 1895. 96 p. (Bible handbooks for young people, No. 2.) Cl., 50c.

THOMSON, W. H. The parables and their home: the parables by the lake. N. Y., Harper, 1895. 3+159 p. 1 il. 12°. \$1.25.

WHITTAM, W. G. Short notes on the book of Joshua. Lond., Relife, 1895. 8°. 1s.

b. Other.

BACHMANN, Joh. Präparationen u. Commentare zu den gelesenen Büchern des alten Testaments. Kleine Propheten. Berl., Mayer & Müller. 8°.

10. Nahum u. Habakuk. Analyse. Uebersetzg., Disposition. 1895. iii+50 p. —90M.

BRANDI, S. M. La question biblique de l'en-cyclique "Providentissimus Deus"; tr. M. goyer. Paris, Lethielleux, 1895. 245 p. 16°.

- IV. Practical Theology.
 - 1. Individual Experience.
 - 2. The Family, Society, The State.
 - 3. The Church.
 - 4. Sermons and Preaching.
 - 5. Missions and Evangelism.
- V. Bibliography, Encyclopaedia Essays, etc.

EHRHARDT, Eug. Der Grundcharakter der Ethik Jesu im Verhältniss zu den messianischen Hoffnungen seines Volkes u. zu seinem eigenen Messiasbewusstsein. Freiburg i. B., Mohr, 1895. vi+119 p. 8°. 2M.

HALMEL, Ant. Ueb. römisches Recht im Galaterbrief. Eine Untersuchg. zur Geschichte des Paulinismus. Essen, G. D. Baedeker, 1895. vii+32 p. 8°. —80M.

HEILIGSTEDT, Aug. Präparation zur Genesis m. den nötigen die Uebersetzung u. das Verständniss des Textes erleichternden Anmerkungen. Halle, E. Anton, 1895. xii+126 p. 8°. 1.80M.

KINZLER, Adf. Ueb. Recht u. Unrecht der Bibelkritik. 2. Adr. Basel, R. Reich, 1895. 45 p. —60M.

LUZZATTO, Sam. Dav. Philoxenus, sive de Onklosi, chaldaica Pentateuchi versione, dissertatio hermeneutico-critica. Ed. II, sumptibus Isaaci Gräber et cura Vict. Castiglioni. (In hebr. Sprache.) Cracoviae. Wien, Ch. D. Lippe, 1895. xii+xvi+139 p. 8°. 2.50M.

NIGLUTSCH, Jos. Brevis explicatio psalmorum selectorum usui clericorum in seminario Tridentino accommodata. Trient, J. Seiser, 1895. xxiv+204 p. 8°. 2M.

SCHNEIDER, P. Text u. kurze Erklärung des Römerbriefes. Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann, 1895. 120 p. 8°. 1.50; 2M.

WIENER, A. Die jüdischen Speisegesetze nach ihren verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten zum 1. Male wissenschaftlich-methodisch geordnet u. kritisch beleuchtet. xiv+9 p. 10 a-g u. 11-524. Breslau, Schles. Buchdruckerei etc., 1895. 8°. 10; 12M.

ZIMMER, Karl. Präparation zu den kleinen Propheten. Halle, Anton. 8°.

1. Die Propheten Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadja, Jona. iv+90 p. 1.60M.

ZUCK, Otto. Biblische Geographie in chronologischer Folge. Dresden, G. Kühtmann, 1895. 80 p. 8°. 2.50; 3M.

II.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

1. Biblical and Jewish.

a. American and English.

BENSON, R. M. The final passover: a series of meditations upon the passion of our Lord

Jesus Christ. V. 2. Part 1, the upper chamber. N. Y., Longmans, 1895. 9+457 p. 16°. \$1.75.

GEIKIE, Cunningham. New Testament hours. V. 2, the apostles, their lives and letters. N. Y., Ja. Pott & Co., 1895. II. 8°. \$1.50.

GREGORY, B. The sweet singer of Israel: selected psalms. Lond., C. H. Kelly, 1895. 268 p. 12°. 2s. 6d.

JACOBS, Jos. An inquiry into the sources of the history of the Jews in Spain. N. Y., Macmillan & Co., 1895. 263 p. \$1.75.

NOTOVITCH, N. The unknown life of Christ. Lond., Hutchinson, 1895. 312 p. 5s. 8°.

WORD, H. K. The story of Elijah. Lond., Stoneman, 1895. 110 p. 18°. 1s.

b. Other.

BISCHOFF, Erich. E. jüdisch-deutsches Leben Jesu. Tholdoth Jeschu ha-nozri, sche-hajah sche-nath scheloschah alaphim we-schibea meoth weschischschim libriath ha-olam. (Geschichte Jesu v. Nazareth, geboren im J. 3760 seit Erschaffg. der Welt.) Zum ersten Male nach dem Oxfordner Orig. Manuskript hrsg. v. B. Lpz., W. Friedrich, 1895. 61 p. 8°. 2M.

HAMBURGER, Ob.- u. Landes-Rabb. Dr. J. Jesus v. Nazaret. Geschichtliche, objektive Darstellg. seines Lebens, Wirkens u. Todes. Berl., Gergonne & Co., 1895. 46 p. 8°. 1M.

HIRSCH, Samson Raph. Israels Gebete, übers. u. erläutert. (Deutsch u. hebräisch.) Frankfurt a. M., J. Kauffmann, 1895. vi+758 p. 8°. 5; 6; 7; 8.75M.

HORODETZKY, S. A. Schem Mischmuell. Rabbi Samuel Elieser Eideles genannt der "Mahaschah" u. dessen Bedeutg. f. die Kenntniss des Talmuds. (In hebr. Sprache.) Drohobycz. Wien, Ch. D. Lippe, 1895. 39 p. 8°. —80M.

KAYSER, Frz. Die Ausbeutung der christlichen Konessionen u. politischen Parteien durch die Juden. Münster, A. Russell, 1895. 41 p. 8°. —75M.

LANGEN, Frhr. F. E. v. Talmudische Täuschungen. Das jiid. Geheimgesetz u. die deutschen Landesvertretgn. ein Handbüchlein f. Politiker. Lpz., H. Beyer, 1895. vi+114 p. 8°. 1M.

LUETGERT, W. Das Reich Gottes nach den synoptischen Evangelien. Eine Untersuchg. zur neutestamentl. Theologie. Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 1895. viii+179 p. 8°. 2.40; 3M.

PARMOD, Max. Antisemitismus u. Strafrechtspflege. 3. Aufl. Berl., S. Cronbach, 1895. iv+138 p. 8°. 1.50M.

REINACH, T. Textes d'auteurs grecs et romains relatifs au judaïsme. Paris, Leroux, 1895. xxii+376 p. 8°.

SCHLOTTMANN, Konst. Kompendium der biblischen Theologie des A. u. N. Testaments. Hrsg. v. Kühn. 2. Aufl. Lpz., Dörfling & Franke, 1895. vi+200 p. 8°. 4; 5M.

SCHRIFTEN des Institutum judaicum in Leipzig. Für den Jahrg. v. 4 Hftn. 2M. 43. Aus Jechiel Lichtensteins hebräischem Kommentar zum Neuen Testament. Von e. seiner Schüler. 32 p. —40M.

2. Post-Biblical.

a. American and English.

BETTANY, G. T. A popular history of the Reformation and modern Protestantism. N. Y., Ward, Lock & Bowden, Ltd., 1895. 512 p. 8°. Cl., \$2.

CORWIN, E. T., Dubbs, J. H., and Hamilton, J. T. A history of the Reformed Church, Dutch; the Reformed Church, German; and the Moravian Church in the United States. N. Y., The Christian Literature Co., 1895. 12°. (American church history ser., v. 8.) \$3.

CUTTS, E. L. History of the church of England. Lond., Longmans, 1895. 228 p. 12°. 2s. 6d.

HEFELE, C. J. A history of the councils of the church. N. Clark. Edinb., Clark. 8°. v. 4. 451-680. 1895. 500 p. 12s.

LOVE, W. De Loss, jr. The fast and thanksgiving days of New England. Bost., Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1895. 6+605 p. 12°. \$3.

NEWELL, E. J. A history of the Welsh church to the dissolution of the monasteries. Lond., Stock, 1895. 426 p. 10s. 6d.

PALMER, W. Notes of a visit to the Russian church in the years 1840, 1841. Lond., Longmans, 1895. 586 p. 8°. 8s. 6d.

PARKER, J. To-day's Christ. Lond., Nisbet, 1895. 160 p. 8°. (Apocryphal speech of Christ.)

SHELDON, H. C. History of the Christian church. N. Y., Crowell, 1894. [1895.] 5 v. 619; 562; 612; 449; 441 p. 8°. Per set, \$10.

WIRGMAN, A. Theo. The history of the English church and people in South Africa. N. Y., Longmans, 1895. 11+277 p. \$1.25.

b. Other.

ALLARD, P. L'archéologie chrétienne à Rome. La maison des martyrs. Paris, 1895. 39 p. 8°.

BEZIERS, M. Diocèse de Bayeux. Paris, Picard. 8°. III. 1895. 575 p.

DIONYSIUS, der Kartäuser, v. den letzten Dingen des Menschen. Aus dem Lat. v. J. Schröder. 2. Aufl. Regensburg, Nationale Verlagsanstalt, 1895. xlii+311 p. 8°. 1.50M.

FERET, P. La faculté de théologie de Paris.

Moyen age. T. 2. Paris, Picard, 1895. ill+621 p. 8°.

FLAVIGNY, de. Sainte Catherine de Sienne. N. e. Paris, Mignal, 1895. xvi+601 p. 8°.

GERADE, Paul. Meine Erlebnisse u. Beobachtungen als Dorfpastor. (1883-1893.) Eine Handreichg. f. Kandidaten u. junge Geistliche. Magdeburg, A. Rathke, 1895. vii+151 p. 8°. 2M.

GRAFFIN, R., ed. Patrologia syriaca complectens opera omnia ss. patrum, doctorum scriptorumque etc. Paris, Firmin-Didot. 2 col. 8°.

 Pars 1. ab initio ad a. 350.

 T. I (ed.) Joannes Parisot. 1895. lxxx+1057 p. 8°.

KOLDE, Th. Andreas Althamer der Humanist u. Reformator in Brandenburg-Ansbach. [Aus: "Beitr. z. bayr. Kirchengeschichte."] Mit e. Neudr. seines Katechismus v. 1528 u. archival. Beilagen. Erlangen, F. Junge, 1895. vi+138 p. 8°. 2M.

KRAUSS, F. A. Karl. Im Kerker vor u. nach Christus. Schatten u. Licht aus dem profanen u. kirchl. Cultur- u. Rechtsleben vergangener Zeiten. In 3 Büchern, 1895. ix+380 p. 8°. 6; 7.50M.

KRETZER, Eug. Friedrich Nietzsche. Nach persönl. Erinnergn. u. aus seinen Schriften. Frankfurt a. M., Kesselring, 1895. 38 p. 8°. 1.20M.

LE GRAND, A. Les Saints de la Bretagne. Paris, Gautier, 1895. 36 p. 8°.

MALNORY, A. St. Césaire d'Arles. Paris, Bouillon (1894), 1895. xxvi+318 p. 8°.

MEER, Aug. Das Central- u. Ursulinerinnen-Kloster Liebenthal, 2. Aufl. Breslau, Aderholz, 1895. 113 p. 8°. 1.20M.

NEHER, St. J. Personal-Katalog der seit 1813 ordinirten u. in der Seelsorge verwendeten Geistlichen des Bisth. Rottenburg. 3. Aufl. Schw. Gmünd, J. Roth, 1895. v+200 p. 8°. 3.50M.

NELK, Th. Die hl. Filomena, Jungfrau u. Märtyrin, die Wunderthäterin des 19. Jahrh. 4. Aufl. Regensburg, Nationale Verlagsanstalt, 1895. 222 p. 12°. -75M.

QUELLENSCHRIFTEN der elässischen Kirchengeschichte. Strassburg, Le Roux, 8°.

 I. Die Jahrbücher der Jesuiten zu Schlettstadt u. Rufach 1615-1765. I. Bd. Annuae litterae collegii Selestadiensis et residentiae Rubeacensis 1615-1713, hrsg. v. Jos. Gény. (Archivalische Beilage des Strassburger Diözesanblattes f. d. J. 1894.) 1895. xxviii+425 p.

RÄABE, Rich., ed. Petrus der Iberer. Ein Charakterbild zur Kirchen- u. Sittengeschichte des 5. Jahrh. Syrische Uebersetzg. e. um das J. 500 verfassten griech. Biographie. Lpz., J. C. Hinrichs' Verl., 1895. vii+132+146 p. 8°. 15M.

SALIS, L. R. v. Die Entwicklung der Kul-

tusfreiheit in der Schweiz. Basel, R. Reich, 1895. 100 p. 4°. 3M.

SAMMLUNG ausgewählter kirchen- u. dogmengeschichtlicher Quellschriften, als Grundlage f. Seminarübung. hrsg. v. G. Krüger. Freiburg i. B., J. C. B. Mohr. 8°.

 10. Vincenz v. Lerinum, Commonitorium pro catholicae fidel antiquitate et universitate aduersus profanas omnium haereticorum novitates. Hrsg. v. A. Jillicher. 1895. xlii+78 p. 1.50M.

SAUREL, F. Hist. religieuse du département de l'Hérault pendant la Révolution. Paris, Champion. 8°.

 2. 1895. xi+346 p.

SCHAUBURG, L. Hundert Jahre oldenburgischer Kirchengeschichte von Hamelmann bis auf Cadovius (1573-1667). Oldenburg, G. Stalling's Verl. 3 v. 8°. 9M.

SCHAUERTE, Frz. Der hl. Wigbert, erster Abt v. Fritzlar. Sein Leben u. Wirken u. seine Verehrung. Paderborn, Bonifacius-Druckerei, 1895. 84 p. 8°. -90M.

SCHOENER, Otto Heinr. Kurze Geschichte des Kirchspiels Nieder-Beerbach. Nieder-Beerbach, Darmstadt, A. Bergsträsser, 1895. 46 p. 8°. -80M.

SEDIR. La mystique judéo-chrétienne. Paris, Chamuel, 1894. 36 p. 8°.

SEPP, Joh. Religionsgeschichte v. Oberbayern in der Heidenezeit, Periode der Reformation u. Epoche der Klosteraufhebung. München, Literar. Institut, Dr. M. Huttler, 1895. iii+309 p. 8°. 5M.

SIMON, Max. 1200jähriger Parallel-Kalender der jüdischen u. christlichen Zeitrechnung 4561-5757 800-1996, nebst neuen Formeln zur vollständ. Berechn. des jüd. Kalenders. Für wissenschaftl. u. rituelle Zwecke bearb. Berl., M. Poppelauer, 1895. 29 p. 8°. 1M.

STANGL, Jos. Konkordat u. Religionsedikt. Von der jurist. Fakultät der Universität München gekrönte Preisschrift. 1. Tl.: Die Religionsverhältnisse der Minderjährigen nach der bayer. Verfassungsurkunde. München, Th. Ackermann, 1895. iv+244 p. 8°. 4.80M.

TAUTE, Rhold. Die katholische Geistlichkeit u. die Freimaurerei. Ein kulturgeschichtl. Rückblick. 1. u. 2. Aufl. Lpz., J. G. Findel, 1895. 94 p. 8°. 1.60M.

VERHANDLUNGEN der ausserordentlichen Generalsynode der evangelischen Landeskirche Preussens, eröffnet am 27. Oktbr. 1894, geschlossen am 15. Novbr. 1894. Berl., Wiegandt & Grieben, 1895. iii+767 p. 8°. 8M.

 3. Non-Christian Religions.

 a. American and English.

ABU-SALIH. The churches and monasteries of Egypt and some neighboring countries attributed to Abu-Salih; tr. from the original

Arabic, by B. T. A. Everts; with notes by Alfred J. Butler. N. Y., Macmillan, 1895. 382 p. 8°. Net, \$6.50.

BUDDHAGHOSHA. The Jataka; tr. from the Pali under the superintendence of E. B. Cowell: Buddha birth-stories. In 7 or 8 v. V. 1, tr. by Rob. Chalmers. N. Y., Macmillan & Co., 1895. 8°. Net, \$3.25.

BOUTON, J. Bell. Uncle Sam's church, his creed, Bible and hymn-book. 2d ed. Bost., Lamson, Wolffe & Co., 1895. 73 p. 12°. Net, 50c.

MUELLER, F. Max. Sacred books of the East; tr. by various Oriental scholars. V. 45. Gaina Sūtras; tr. from Prakrit, by Hermann Jacobi. Pt. 2. The Uttarādhyā yana Sūtra. The Sūtrakritiṅga Sūtra. N. Y., Macmillan & Co., 1895. 456 p. 8°. Net, \$3.25.

MUELLER, F. Max, ed. Sacred books of the East; tr. by various Oriental scholars. V. 36. The questions of King Milinda; tr. from the Pali, by T. W. Rhys Davids. Pt. 2. N. Y., Macmillan & Co., 1895. 338 p. 8°. Net, \$3.25.

PHILLIPS, Maurice. The teaching of the Vedas; what light does it throw on the origin and development of religion? N. Y., Longmans, 1895. 8+232 p. 12°. Cl., \$1.75.

RAGOZIN, Zénaïde A. The story of Vedic India, as embodied principally in the Rig-Veda. N. Y., Putnam, 1895. 12+457 p. 12°. (The story of the nations ser., No. 44.) II. map, cl., \$1.50; hf. leath., \$1.75.

b. Other.

DARSTELLUNGEN aus dem Gebiete der nichtchristlichen Religionsgeschichte. Münster, Aschendorff. 8°.

11. Mohammed. 2. Tl.: Einleitung in den Koran. System der koran. Theologie. Von Prof. Dr. Hub. Grimme. 1895. xii+186 p. 3.50M.
- HARDEN-HICKEY (pseud. St. Patrice). La Théosophie. Paris, Sauvaitre, 1895 (1890). x+235 p. 8°. 3.50f.
- THEOSOPHISCHE Schriften. Braunschweig, Schwetschke. 12°.
- VI. Göring, H. Dr. Franz-Hartmann, e. Vorkämpfer der Theosophie. Selbsterkenntniss u. Wiederverkörperung. Von Dr. Frz. Hartmann. 32 p. —40M.
- XI. Mead, G. R. S. Yoga, die Wissenschaft der Seele. 28 p. —20M.
- THEOSOPHISCHE Schriften. Braunschweig, Schwetschke. 12°. —20M.
12. 13. Hartmann, Frz. Mystik u. Weltende. 34 p.
14. 15. Ein Interview üb. Theosophie zwischen e. Berichterstatter des "New York World" u. Annie Besant. 44 p.

III.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

a. American and English.

DODD, Ira S. A lesson from the upper room: the social aspect of the Lord's supper. N. Y., Randolph, 1895. 3+44 p. 16°. Pap., 25c.

DODS, Marcus. The prayer that teaches to pray. N. Y. and Chic., Revell Co., 1895. 176 p. 12°. 75c.

EATON, T. T. The faith of the Baptists. Louisville, Ky., Baptist Book Concern, 1895. 88 p. 16°. 25c; pap., 15c.

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SUBJECT INDEX TO THEOLOGICAL PERIODICALS.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS RECORD.

| | | | |
|--------------|---|----------------|--|
| Af. M. E. R. | African M. E. Church Review. (Quarterly.) | Miss. H. | Missionary Herald. |
| Bapt. Q. | Baptist Quarterly Review. | Miss. R. | Missionary Review. |
| Bib. Sac. | Bibliotheca Sacra. (Quarterly.) | New Chr. Q. | New Christian Quarterly. |
| Bib. W. | The Biblical World. | New W. | The New World. (Quarterly.) |
| Can. M. R. | Canadian Methodist Review. (Bi-monthly.) | Our D. | Our Day. |
| Char. R. | Charities Review. | Prot. Ep. R. | Protestant Episcopal Review. |
| Chr. L. | Christian Literature. | Pre. M. | Preacher's Magazine. |
| Ex. | Expositor. | Presb. Q. | Presbyterian Quarterly. |
| Ex. T. | Expository Times. | Presb. Ref. R. | Presbyterian and Reformed Review. (Quarterly.) |
| Hom. R. | Homiletic Review. | Ref. Q. | Reformed Quarterly Review. |
| Luth. C. R. | Lutheran Church Review. | Sunday M. | Sunday Magazine. |
| Luth. Q. | Lutheran Quarterly. | Think. | The Thinker. |
| Meth. R. | Methodist Review. (Bi-monthly.) | Treas. | The Treasury. |
| Meth. R. So. | Methodist Review, South. (Quarterly.) | Yale R. | The Yale Review. (Quarterly.) |
| Min. | The Minster. | | |

Ja-January; F-February; Mr-March; Ap-April; My-May; Je-June; JI-July; Ag-August; S-September; O-October; N-November; D-December.

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African M. E. Church Review.

Philadelphia, April, 1895.

Municipal franchises.
Materia medica.
Educated fools.
Jews' question, by one of them.
Afro-American women.
Missions.
Value of wisdom.
What is the remedy.

Bibliotheca Sacra.

Oberlin, April, 1895.

Republic and the Debs insurrection.
Authority of the Scriptures.
Historic method of interpretation.
Social ethics of Jesus.
Restricted communion.
President Harper's lectures.

Canadian Methodist Review.

Montreal, March-April, 1895.

Light and the lantern.
Progressive revelation.
Buddhism.
Tendency of modern Theism to Pantheism.
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Realism in literature.
Outline study of the life of Christ.

Christian Literature.

New York, April, 1895.

Real prisoner of Chillon.
Balfour as a theologian and as a Christian.
Balfour's attack on agnosticism.
August Dillmann.
Comparative religion and Christian missions.
Reformation of Italy.
Baptist's message to Jesus.
Dead leader of English Congregationalism.
Essence of Buddhism.

The Expositor.
London, April, 1895.

Speeches in Chronicles.
Wise men.
Rulers of the synagogue.
Doctrine of Scripture: the reformers and the Princeton school.
Self-possession and effectual service.
Open eye.
Jeremiah: the man and his message.

The Expository Times.
Edinburgh, April, 1895.

Dante's use of the Divine Name in the "Divina Commedia."
Parables of Zechariah.
Wellhausen's latest work on Hebrew prophecy.
Is the Old Testament authentic?
Hebrew prophecy and modern criticism.
Sermonettes on the Golden texts.
Exposition of the First Epistle of St. John.

The Homiletic Review.
New York, April, 1895.

Arthur Hugh Clough and his poetry.
Spirit of man.
Drummond's Ascent of Man.
Order of events of the resurrection morning.
Position of the Virgin Mary during the crucifixion.
Some phases of German socialism.
Spiritual heredity.

The Lutheran Church Review.
Philadelphia, January, 1895.

Translations of German lyrics.
Worship of God in the Old Testament.
Christian Education.
Muhlenberg College and the University of Halle.
Laws and grace.

The Minster.
London, April, 1895.

The Incomplete Pragerovius.
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Recollections of great men in India.
Power of the resurrection.
Wardens of the Cinque Ports.
Dante's Geryon.
The officious girl.
Great monastic printing press.
Church in parliament.

The Missionary Herald.
Boston, April, 1895.

Definiteness of missionary consecration.
Early work in Macedonia.
Third annual conference of foreign missionary societies.
Special mission in Japan: Christian work in behalf of soldiers.

The Missionary Review.
New York, April, 1895.

Adoniram Judson Gordon.
The Apostle Columba.
Andrew P. Hopper.
Hindoo reformers of this century.
Facts and figures from British India.
London mission in Travancore.
Condition of Pariah outcasts in India.
Family life in India.

Preacher's Magazine.
New York, April, 1895.

Music in worship.
Lukewarmness.
In the banqueting house.
How men get their sermons.

Presbyterian Quarterly.
Richmond, April, 1895.

Latest phase of historical rationalism.
Bible in the college curriculum.
Church's double commission.
Paul on the Lord's Supper in 1 Cor. xi. 17-34.
Ordination in heathen lands.
Madame de Maintenon.
Single tax upon land.

Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
Philadelphia, April, 1895.

Christianity and the experimental method.
Messianic idea in the prophets.
Formation of the New Testament.
Origin and composition of Genesis.
W. G. T. Shedd.
Jair and Havvoth Jair.
Latest ecclesiastical movements in Germany.
An obsolete word examined.
Prof. Orr's Christian view of God and the world.
Bezold's Oriental diplomacy.

Reformed Quarterly Review.
Philadelphia, April, 1895.

Newly found Syriac gospels.
Reflections on the Epiphany.
Evangelists.
Lutheranism and the real presence.
Pittsburg Synod—its twenty-fifth anniversary.
Extracts from Gioberti.
Private interpretation.
Denominational college.

Sunday Magazine.
London and New York, April, 1895.

Tender Mercies of the Good.
First step towards happiness.
Country remedies.
Salisbury cathedral.
Sydney Smith and social reform.
Angel of St. Jude's.
Duty—the aim of life.
Glasgow Home for infirm children.
Eve of Christianity.

The Thinker.
New York, April, 1895.

Hebrew studies.
Atonement money.
Some prominent difficulties in the gospels: Hades and Gehenna.
John the Baptist's question to our Lord.
Harpagmos: Philippians ii. 6.
Logic of contemporary theology.

The Treasury.
New York, April, 1895.

Compulsion of love.
Perfection.
Communion sermons.
Twenty years of Presbyterian history.
Men and the church.

MAGAZINES.

THE contents of the ATLANTIC MONTHLY for April are: "A Singular Life," Elizabeth Stuart Phelps; "A Talk Over Autographs," Geo. Birkbeck Hill; "Flower Lore of New England Children," Alice Morse Earle; "Dumb Foxglove," Annie Trumbull Slosson; "The Expressive Power of English Hounds," Albert H. Tolman; "The Seats of the Mighty," Gilbert Parker; "Macbeth," John Foster Kirk; "Gridou's Pity," Grace Howard Peirce; "The Basis of our Educational System," James Jay Greenough; "Robert Louis Stevenson," C. T. Copeland; "In Memoriam Stevenson," Owen Wister.

THE CENTURY's contents for May are: "The Princess Sonia," Julia Magruder; "Temptation," Edith Willis Linn; "The Close of Lincoln's Career," Noah Brooks; "Unanswered," Charles Buxton Going; "Rubinstein," Alexander McArthur; "Life of Napoleon Bonaparte," William M. Sloane; "The Conquest of Arid America," William E. Smythe; "The Land of Lost Hopes," Edith M. Thomas; "Casa Braccio," F. Marion Crawford; "Beyond the Adriatic," Harriet Waters Preston; "An Errant Wooing," Mrs. Burton Harrison; "Two Shadowy Rivals," Richard Malcolm Johnston; "A Chapter of Municipal Folly," A. C. Bernheim.

THE COSMOPOLITAN for April contains: "The Nymph of the Attitudes," Mrs. Robert P. Porter; "Picturesque Papua," O. M. Spencer; "The Late Returning," Gertrude Hall; "English Wood-Notes," James Lane Allen; "English Country-House Parties," Lady Colin Campbell; "A Three-Stranded Yarn," W. Clark Russell; "China and Japan," Geo. Fred'k Seward; "The Krakatoa Eruption," Jean T. Van Gestel; "The Story of a Thousand," Albion W. Tourgée; "Three Chapters," Gertrude B. Stanton.

THE contents of May HARPER's are: "In Sunny Mississippi," Julian Ralph; "True, I Talk of Dreams," William Dean Howells; "Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc," Louis De Conte; "La Tinaja Bonita," Owen Wister; "Men's Work Among Women," Brockholst Morgan; "By Hook or Crook," Robert Grant; "Some Wanderings in Japan," Alfred Parsons; "People We Pass," Julian Ralph; "The Museum of the Prado," Royal Cortissoz; "Hearts Insurgent," Thomas Hardy; "The Story of the Liver," Andrew Wilson.

MAY LIPPINCOTT'S contains: "The Lady of Las Cruces," Christian Reid; "Effacing the Frontier," William Trowbridge Larned; "Odds on the Gun," A War Correspondent; "A Young

Corean Rebel," Haddo Gordon; "Martha's Headstone," Edith Brower; "High Fliers and Low Fliers," W. Warren Brown; "The Heart of the Fire Spirit," Alvin F. Sydenham; "Climbing the Social Ladder," George Grantham Bain; "On a Shad-Float," David Bruce Fitzgerald; "The Ghost of Rhodes House," William T. Nichols; "An Artist's Habitat," W. J. Linton; "The Menu of Mankind," Calvin Dill Wilson.

MCLURE'S MAGAZINE for May contains: "Our First One Hundred Thousand"; "Gaston Tissandier, the Balloonist," Robert H. Sherard; "The Second Funeral of Napoleon," Ida M. Tarbell; "Human Documents," A Series of 22 Portraits of Prince Bismarck; "What She Could," Ian MacLaren; "A Prairie College," Madame Blanc (Th. Bentzon); "The Destruction of the Reno Gang," Cleveland Moffet; "Journalism," Charles A. Dana; "A Game Postponed," Gertrude Smith; "Tammany," E. J. Edwards.

MAY SCRIBNER'S contains: "Golf," Henry E. Howland; "The Story of Bessie Costrel," Humphry Ward; "Fool's Gold," Edith M. Thomas; "A History of the Last Quarter-Century in the United States—The Downfall of the Carpet-Bag Regime," E. Benjamin Andrews; "A Short Study in Evolution," Abbe Carter Goodloe; "Will the Electric Motor Supersede the Steam Locomotive?" Joseph Wetzel; "Wood-Engravers," Stephane Pannemaker; "French Posters and Book Covers," Arsene Alexandre; "Playthings," Louise Betts Edwards; "The Art of Living—Occupation," Robert Grant; "Into the Dark," William Winter; "Impressionists," Jean Francois Raffaelli; "The Martyrdom of John the Baptist," Wolcott Le Clear Beard; "The Amazing Marriage," George Meredith.

NOTES.

MESSRS. MACMILLAN AND CO. will publish immediately a volume of Bishop Lightfoot's notes on St. Paul's Epistles. The work has been prepared for press by the Bishop-Designate of Adelaide. The same publishers have also nearly ready a volume of lectures by the late Dr. F. J. A. Hort.

MESSRS. LONGMANS will, in a week or so's time, have ready Mr. Froude's lectures on *English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century*.

THE Bookman believes that the "editions" of Mr. Balfour's *Foundations of Belief* each represent not less than 3000 copies, and that the third edition is well on the way to being sold out.

CHRONICLE, OBITUARY, AND CALENDAR.

COMPILED BY THE REV. GEO. W. GILMORE, A.M.

CHRONICLE.

(Closes on the 15th.)

Mar. 5.—Centenary Celebration of the London Missionary Society, in London.

Mar. 11.—Meeting of the American Woman's National Sabbath Alliance, in New York City.

Mar. 12.—Conference of diocesan delegates of the Episcopal Church of Canada to discuss a rearrangement of dioceses in the Dominion of Canada, at Toronto.

Mar. 21-26.—Interdenominational Convention of Christians from Canada and the United States to discuss methods of Christian work, in Philadelphia.

Mar. 21-28.—Third National (British Conference of **Evangelical Free Churches**, in Birmingham, Engl.

Mar. 26.—Annual meeting of the **New York McCall Auxiliary**, in New York City.

Apr. 1-3.—**Fifth Annual Conference on Missions**, under the auspices of the Amity Baptist Church, in New York City.

Apr. 6.—Forty-third Annual Conference of the **Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ**, (Mormon), at Independence, Mo.

Apr. 11.—The Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the **New York Female Auxiliary Bible Society**, in New York City.

Apr. 11-12.—Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the **Woman's Foreign Missionary Society of the Presbyterian Church**, U. S. A., in New York City.

The **Rt. Rev. Dr. Knight-Bruce**, lately Bishop of Mashonaland, has been appointed (Anglican) **Assistant Bishop of Exeter**.

The **Rev. Arthur J. Brown, D.D.**, of Portland, Oregon, has been elected **Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions**.

EDUCATIONAL.

The **Rev. John Nicum, D.D.**, of Rochester, N. Y., has accepted the presidency of **Wagner College**.

The **Rev. Reginald H. Starr, D.D.**, rector of St. Paul's church, Dedham, Mass., has been appointed **Professor of Dogmatic Theology** in the **University of the South**.

The **Rev. William Douglas Mackenzie, M.A.**, of Edinburgh, has been secured as **Acting Professor of Systematic Theology** in the **Chicago Congregational Theological Seminary**.

The following changes have taken place in the **Boston University School of Theology**: **Prof. O. A. Curtis** has resigned, to occupy some time in study in Europe; **Prof. Sheldon** takes Prof. Curtis' place in the department of **Systematic Theology**; the **Rev. C. W. Rishell, Ph.D.**, of Springfield, O., has been elected to the chair of **Church History**.

OBITUARY.

Broadus, Rev. John Albert (Baptist), D.D. (William and Mary College, and Richmond College, 1859), LL.D. (Wake Forest College, 1871), in Louisville, Ky., Mar. 16, aged 68. He was graduated from the University of Virginia, 1850; became assistant professor of Latin and Greek in the same institution, 1851, and chaplain of the same, 1855; was also pastor of the Baptist church in Charlottesville, 1851-1855, and 1857-1859; at the time of the organization of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Greenville, S. C., he became professor of New Testament interpretation and of homiletics, and this connection continued till his death. His best known works are "The Preparation and Delivery of Sermons" and "Lectures on the History of Preaching," though several other volumes have come from his pen.

Crary, Rev. Benjamin Franklin (Methodist

Episcopal), D.D., in San Francisco, Mar. 16, aged 74. He studied for the bar, and was admitted, 1844; was attracted to the ministry, which he entered, 1845; he soon took a high rank in the Indiana conference; was elected President of Hamline University, 1857, and Superintendent of Public Instruction in Minnesota, 1861; became a chaplain in the army the next year; was elected editor of the *Central Christian Advocate*, 1864, and re-elected, 1868; served as pastor and presiding elder in Colorado for several years; was elected editor of the *California Christian Advocate*, 1888, and re-elected, 1892.

Hill, Rev. Reuben (Lutheran), D.D., at Mt. Airy, Philadelphia, Mar. 3, aged 69. He was graduated from Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, 1852; became a teacher in Roanoke College, Va.; studied in the Gettysburg Theological Seminary; served as pastor successively of St. James' Church, Gettysburg, St. John's, Hagerstown, Md., First Church, Pittsburgh, Pa., Rhinebeck and Rochester, N. Y., and St. John's Church, Allentown. He was called by the Ministerium of Pennsylvania in 1885 to raise funds for new buildings for the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Mt. Airy, and to superintend the erection of the buildings. He was financial secretary of the institution at the time of his death.

Payne-Smith, Very Rev. Robert (Anglican), D.D., in Canterbury, England, April 1, aged 77. He was educated at Pembroke College, Oxford, graduating B.A., 1841, and M.A., 1843; was Boden Sanscrit Scholar, 1840, and Pusey and Ellerton Hebrew Scholar, 1843; ordained deacon, 1843, priest, 1844; became head-master of Kensington School, 1853; sub-librarian of the Bodleian library, Oxford, 1857; canon of Christ Church, Oxford, regius professor of Divinity, and rector of Ewelme, 1865; and Dean of Canterbury, 1871. He was a member of the Old Testament company of revisers, and was also Bampton Lecturer in 1869. His writings are generally of a class that appeal to the educated. His Bampton Lectures were on "Prophecy as a Preparation for Christ." He translated and edited Cyril's "Commentary on Luke," in Syriac and English, the "Ecclesiastical History of John. Bishop of Ephesus"; compiled a catalogue of the Syriac manuscripts in the Bodleian library; published eight out of ten parts of a Syriac thesaurus; and besides these had put forth "The Authenticity and Messianic Interpretation of the Prophecies of Isaiah Vindicated," "Jeremiah" in the Speaker's Commentary, "Isaiah" in the S. P. G. Commentary, and "Genesis" in Ellicott's Commentary.

Ridgaway, Rev. Henry Bascom (Methodist Episcopal), D.D. (Dickinson College, Pa., 1869), in Evanston, Ill., Mar. 30, aged 65. He was graduated from Dickinson College, Pa., 1849; served as pastor in Virginia, Maryland, Maine, New York and Ohio; became professor of historical theology in Garrett Biblical Institute, 1882, and of practical theology, 1884, serving also as president of the institution. He has written a "Life of Alfred Cookman," "Life of Bishop Edward S. Janes," "Life of Bishop Beverly Waugh," and "Bishop Matthew Simpson," besides books of travel.

Scudder, Rev. William Waterbury (Reformed Dutch), D.D. (Union College, 1867), at Glastonbury, Conn., March 4, aged 72. He was the second son of the devoted missionary, the Rev. John Scudder, and was born in India, coming to this country in his boyhood; he was graduated from the College of New Jersey, 1841; was principal of Hackettstown Academy, N. J., 1841-1843; entered Princeton Theological Seminary, 1843; was ordained an evangelist, 1846; was a missionary under appointment of the A. B. C. F. M., in Ceylon, 1846-1857; took service under the Reformed Dutch Board, in India, 1857-1873; returned to America, and became pastor of the Congregational Church at Glastonbury, Conn., 1873; was again missionary under the Reformed Dutch Board, in India, 1884-1888; became professor of theology in the Theological Seminary of the Arcot Mission, 1888; resigned and returned home, 1894. "A wonderful life."

Cartwright, Rev. Barton H. (Methodist Episcopal), at Oregon, Ill., Apr. 4, aged 85.

Cobb, Rev. Daniel (Methodist Episcopal), D.D. (U. S. Grant Memorial University), in Los Angeles, Cal., Dec. 25, 1894.

Earle, Rev. A. B. (Baptist Evangelist), D.D., at Newton, Mass., Mar. 30, aged 83.

Elliott, Rev. George (Presbyterian), at Pine Grove, Pa., Mar. 15, aged 70.

Greeves, Rev. Frederick (English Wesleyan Methodist), D.D., at Battersea, Eng., Mar. 11, aged 62.

Howard, Rev. H. R. (Episcopalian), S.T.D., in Tullahoma, Tenn., Mar. 20.

Jones, Rev. Samuel Flood (Anglican), precentor and minor canon of Westminster Abbey, in London, Mar. 19.

Sites, Rev. Nathan (Methodist Episcopal missionary), in Foo-Chow, China, Feb. 10, aged 63.

CALENDAR.

[The compiler will welcome notices of meetings of general importance and interest, provided such notices reach him before the 15th of the month prior to that in which the meetings are to take place. Exact dates and names of places, when and where the meetings are to be held, are desired.]

May 8-12.—Thirty-first International Convention of the **Young Men's Christian Associations**, at Springfield, Mass.

May 9.—Annual Meeting of the **American Bible Society**, in New York City.

May 10-14.—Convention of **Southern Baptists**, at Washington, D. C.

May 15-16.—Annual meeting of the **Woman's National Missionary Society of the Universalist Church**, in Brooklyn, N. Y.

May 16.—General Assembly, **Cumberland Presbyterian Church (colored)**, at Nashville, Tennessee.

General Synod of the **Reformed Presbyterian Church of America**, at Coulterville, Illinois.

General Assembly of the **Presbyterian Church of the United States of America**, at Pittsburgh, Pa.

General Assembly of the **Presbyterian Church in the United States**, at Dallas, Texas.

General Assembly of the **Cumberland Presbyterian Church**, at Meridian, Miss.

May 21.—Annual Meeting of the **Presbyterian Board of Home Missions**, at Pittsburgh, Pa.

May 23.—General Assembly, **United Presbyterian Church, North America**, at Pittsburgh, Pa.

May 24-30.—Twenty-second Annual Conference of **Charities and Correction**, at New Haven, Conn.

May 28.—Beginning of the series of **Baptist Anniversaries**, at Saratoga, N. Y.

Annual Meeting of the **American Congregational Association**, in Boston, Mass.

June 4-6.—Annual Meeting of the **Congregational Home Missionary Association**, at Saratoga, N. Y.

June 5.—Annual Meeting of the **Congregational Educational Society**, in Boston, Mass.

Annual Session of the General Synod of the **Reformed (Dutch) Church in America**, at Grand Rapids, Mich.

June 5.—Biennial Session of the **General Synod of the Lutheran Church**, in Hagerstown, Md.

June 6.—Synod of the **Reformed Presbyterian Church United States of America**, at Denver, Col.

Synod of **Reformed Presbyterian Church in America**, at Grand Rapids, Mich.

Annual Meeting of the **Lutheran Ministerium of Pennsylvania and adjacent States**, at Asbury Park, N. J.

June 9-12.—Annual Meetings of the "Welsh-English" **Methodists**, at Cardiff, Wales.

June 11-12.—Annual Synod of the **Welsh Calvinistic Methodists**, at Exeter Hall, London, Eng.

June 12.—General Assembly of the **Presbyterian Church in Canada**, at London, Ont.

June 12-19.—Twelfth Annual Meeting of the **International Missionary Union**, at Clifton Springs, N. Y.

June 12-20.—Annual Convention of the **United Norwegian Lutheran Church of the United States**, at St. Paul, Minn.

June 13-17.—Convention of the **Woman's Home and Foreign Missionary Society of the General (Lutheran) Synod**, at Williamsport, Pa.

June 14-21.—Third Biennial Convention of the **World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union**, and Nineteenth National Council of the **British Woman's Temperance Association**, in Exeter Hall, London, Eng.

June 20-29.—Session of the **Oberlin Summer School of Christian Sociology**, in Oberlin, O.

June 27-30.—Second International Convention of the **Epworth League Societies**, in Chattanooga, Tenn.